Preference Conflict Accommodation

batch: Batch 19

aliases:
Heterogeneous Preference Reconciliation
Plural Preference Decision Design
Preference Impasse Resolution
Multi-Preference Accommodation
Partial-Dissatisfaction Governance

slug: preference

slug: aggregation

slug: equity

components: Stated, Revealed, and Constructed Preference Validation

components: Nonnegotiable Rights and Constraint Floor

components: Minority, Tail, and Information-Loss Guardrail

components: Matching, Segmentation, and Versioning Path

components: Bargaining, Trade, Compensation, and Rotation Path

components: Decision Legitimacy, Reason, and Dissent Record

components: Implementation Commitment and Dissatisfaction Monitor

components: Revision, Exit, and Preference Update Rule

mechanisms: Preference Elicitation and Tradeoff Matrix

mechanisms: Mediation, Deadlock, and Escalation Ladder

essence_one_line: Resolve or accommodate heterogeneous preferences by validating what actors value, protecting nonnegotiable constraints, selecting a legitimate collective-choice or plural-outcome mechanism, and governing dissatisfaction, implementation, and revision.

compression_statement: Preference Conflict Accommodation begins by defining the decision and standing, eliciting preferences through accessible channels, and testing stated and revealed evidence under real constraints. It decomposes positions into interests, intensity, substitution, and nonnegotiable floors; maps compatibility, coalitions, and scarcity; and then selects the right method. Some cases require one audited aggregate. Others preserve more value through matching, segmentation, versioning, local options, bargaining, issue trades, compensation, rotation, time sharing, random allocation, or coexistence. Impasse has a legitimate escalation path. Reasons and dissent make partial dissatisfaction visible. Implementation monitoring detects burden drift and strategic resistance, while exit and revision prevent a temporary compromise from freezing adaptive preferences.

core_intuition: Heterogeneity is not itself a defect. The design problem is to determine which differences require one collective decision, which can coexist, which can be traded, and which are protected from aggregation. A good solution minimizes unjustified dissatisfaction without promising unanimity.

canonical_formula: accommodation_quality = fidelity(preferences,constraints) + legitimacy(standing,rule,reasons) + preservation(rights,minority,plural_options) + implementability(commitment,resources,remedy) - harms(coercion,information_loss,power_capture,uncompensated_burden,lock_in); revise when evidence or membership changes.

structural_problem: Actors affected by a shared decision value outcomes differently, rank tradeoffs differently, face different constraints, or attach noncompensable importance to incompatible options. The process either forces a false average, lets the majority erase intense minorities, treats constrained behavior as free preference, fragments into endless deliberation, or allows veto and delay to become power. Even a legitimate decision leaves partial dissatisfaction that can undermine implementation if burdens, reasons, remedy, and revision are absent.

trigger_conditions: preference rankings conflict and one shared choice is required

trigger_conditions: a winning option creates severe concentrated loss

trigger_conditions: stated preferences differ from observed constrained choices

trigger_conditions: coalitions cycle and agenda order changes the result

trigger_conditions: one bundle cannot satisfy heterogeneous segments

trigger_conditions: issue trades or time sharing could preserve more value

trigger_conditions: a veto protects either a right or strategic rent and the distinction is unclear

trigger_conditions: deliberation reaches impasse or produces consensus theater

trigger_conditions: implementation resistance reveals unrecorded dissatisfaction

trigger_conditions: membership, information, or preferences change after decision

consequences_of_non_intervention:
deadlock and delay
majority or veto domination
false consensus
minority harm and exit
strategic preference reporting
unstable bargains
segmentation and exclusion
implementation sabotage
unfunded accommodation
locked-in obsolete compromise

intervention_summary: Define the decision and standing; elicit and validate plural preferences; map dimensions, intensity, rights floors, compatibility, coalitions, and power; choose an aggregation or accommodation portfolio; preserve minority and tail information; govern matching, segmentation, bargaining, rotation, compensation, or randomization as appropriate; route impasse; record reasons and dissent; translate the decision into commitments and remedy; monitor dissatisfaction and burden; and reopen when preferences or conditions change.

operating_sequence: define decision, actors, authority, constraints, and affected outsiders

operating_sequence: elicit preferences through plural accessible channels with provenance

operating_sequence: compare stated and revealed choices under constraints and framing

operating_sequence: decompose positions into interests, intensity, substitutions, timing, and uncertainty

operating_sequence: identify rights, safety, consent, dignity, and mission floors

operating_sequence: map compatibility, scarcity, coalitions, externalities, and separability

operating_sequence: define standing, representation, voice, vote, veto, and challenge

operating_sequence: generate aggregation and plural accommodation options

operating_sequence: select and stress-test the decision rule and weights

operating_sequence: inspect minority loss, polarization, tails, and noncompensable harm

operating_sequence: configure matching, segmentation, local option, bargaining, trade, compensation, rotation, randomization, or coexistence

operating_sequence: route impasse through a legitimate time-bounded ladder

operating_sequence: record process, reasons, distribution, dissent, uncertainty, and review

operating_sequence: fund and assign implementation commitments and remedies

operating_sequence: monitor residual dissatisfaction, burden, compliance, exit, and strategic resistance

operating_sequence: revise when evidence, membership, preferences, performance, or harm changes

sense: Collect stated, revealed, constrained, dissenting, minority, burden, implementation, and exit signals.

interpret: Distinguish position, interest, intensity, right, tradeable preference, strategic report, and adaptive preference.

decide: Aggregate, match, segment, version, bargain, trade, compensate, rotate, randomize, authorize, defer, or preserve plural options.

act: Issue a reasoned decision and implement commitments, safeguards, remedies, and review conditions.

verify: Test preference fidelity, rights, distribution, implementation, dissatisfaction, stability, exit safety, and revision need.

decision_rules: if a claim is a protected right or safety floor, do not aggregate it as preference weight

decision_rules: if preferences can coexist without harmful spillover, prefer matching, segmentation, local option, or versioning over forced uniformity

decision_rules: if one outcome is required, precommit the aggregation rule and test agenda, weights, cycles, and minority loss

decision_rules: if issue intensities differ and terms are tradeable, use bargaining or reciprocal exchange with power safeguards

decision_rules: if equally legitimate claims exceed indivisible capacity, use controlled randomization after eligibility and rights tests

decision_rules: if delay benefits one actor, time-bound impasse and escalate legitimately

decision_rules: if dissatisfaction becomes unanticipated harm or nonimplementation, provide remedy and trigger review

prose_essence:
Preference Conflict Accommodation governs decisions in which affected actors value outcomes differently, rank tradeoffs differently, or attach intense and sometimes noncompensable importance to incompatible options. The objective is not to erase heterogeneity or promise unanimity. It is to convert plural preference evidence into the most legitimate and implementable arrangement available while preserving rights, minority loss, dissent, remedy, and revision.

The archetype begins before voting or negotiation. It defines the decision, actors, affected outsiders, authority, constraints, and option set. It elicits preferences through accessible channels and records provenance, information, framing, timing, uncertainty, and constraints. It compares stated preferences with revealed choices cautiously: behavior under poverty, coercion, inaccessible options, or strategic pressure may reveal necessity rather than welfare. It decomposes positions into interests, dimensions, intensity, substitution, timing, and protected floors.

The intervention then chooses a method that fits the conflict structure. When one output is necessary, an explicit aggregation or social-choice rule may be correct. When outcomes can coexist, matching, segmentation, local options, versioning, rotation, or time sharing can preserve more value. When actors value issues differently, bargaining and package trades may create gains. Compensation can address legitimate concentrated loss but may never purchase rights, consent, dignity, or uncompensable safety. Controlled randomization can resolve equally legitimate claims to indivisible opportunity. Deadlock has a bounded escalation path.

A legitimate decision may still leave dissatisfaction. The design records who lost, by how much, why the rule was chosen, which constraints governed, what remedy or accommodation exists, and when the decision can be reopened. Implementation commitments and burden monitoring matter because paper agreement can collapse into resistance, exit, or shifted harm. Heterogeneous preferences change with information, membership, experience, and available options; revision is therefore a required component, not an admission that the first process failed.

The canonical loop is:

1. Bound the decision, actors, authority, options, constraints, and externalities.
2. Elicit and validate plural preferences with provenance and uncertainty.
3. Decompose positions into interests, intensity, substitution, and nonnegotiable floors.
4. Map compatibility, scarcity, coalitions, separability, standing, and power.
5. Generate both aggregation and plural-accommodation options.
6. Select and precommit the method; stress-test agenda, weights, strategy, minority loss, and coercion.
7. Route impasse and record reasons, dissent, distribution, remedy, and appeal.
8. Fund implementation, monitor dissatisfaction and burden, and revise when conditions change.

prose_when_to_use:
Use the archetype when several actors or groups have materially different preferences about a shared decision and those differences create impasse, cycles, unstable compromise, partial dissatisfaction, or pressure for a one-size-fits-all result. It applies to public policy, organizational priorities, product and service configuration, schedules and scarce resources, labor bargaining, platform matching, community land use, and emergency allocation.

Strong signals include:

- rankings conflict and one collective outcome appears necessary;
- majority support coexists with severe concentrated minority loss;
- agenda order, voting rule, weights, or tie breaks can change the winner;
- stated preferences differ from observed behavior under constraints;
- one apparent group contains important internal heterogeneity;
- preferences can be satisfied through matching, versions, jurisdictions, schedules, or local options rather than a universal rule;
- actors value several issues with different intensity and can trade across them;
- delay, veto, turnout, expertise, or bargaining power determines the outcome more than preference legitimacy;
- agreement exists on paper but dissatisfied actors resist implementation or exit;
- membership, evidence, preferences, or available alternatives changed after the original decision.

Use Aggregation Function Design and Weighting after the case has established that one output is necessary and legitimate. Use Revealed Preference Validation when the core problem is inference from constrained choices. Use Subgroup Deliberation when premature consensus and groupthink are the main process risk. Use Versioning and Quality Discrimination when commercial self-selection is the bounded tool, subject to fairness and base-quality safeguards. Use Deadlock Resolution when the immediate need is only to break a circular blockage.

Do not use the archetype for one person’s internal approach-avoidance conflict, for conflict of interest between duty and incentive, or for a decision governed by a nonnegotiable lawful safety rule with no preference tradeoff. Do not aggregate a right merely because many people would prefer to override it. Do not call coerced silence, inaccessible participation, or inability to exit a stable preference settlement.

prose_structural_problem:
Preference conflicts become hard when institutions confuse positions with interests, votes with welfare, behavior with free choice, and agreement with legitimacy. A survey can omit people who cannot attend or safely answer. A majority can impose a small average gain at severe cost to a minority. A veto can protect a right or extract strategic rent. An aggregate can hide bimodality. A negotiation can reflect unequal outside options more than genuine preference intensity. A segmented menu can preserve choice or create a degraded tier for disadvantaged users.

Common structural failures include:

- **Preference evidence failure:** framing, nonresponse, language, information, access, or proxy selection shapes the recorded preference set.
- **Constraint blindness:** observed choices are treated as desired choices despite budget, coercion, lack of alternatives, or adaptive expectations.
- **False commensurability:** rights, dignity, safety, identity, or irreversible harm are converted into ordinary weights or money.
- **Aggregation loss:** averages and winning rules erase intensity, polarization, tails, local exceptions, and dissent.
- **Method lock-in:** every conflict is sent to majority vote, weighted scoring, consensus, or negotiation regardless of structure.
- **Power and standing asymmetry:** organized, wealthy, expert, incumbent, or patient actors gain more voice, veto, or delay power.
- **False zero-sum framing:** preferences that could coexist by segment, time, role, location, or version are forced into one outcome.
- **Coercive bargain:** actors accept because outside options, employment, benefits, information, or time are controlled by others.
- **Impasse exploitation:** whoever can wait longest obtains an informal veto.
- **Implementation neglect:** residual dissatisfaction, resource gaps, and burden drift undermine the selected arrangement.
- **Preference lock-in:** a historical compromise persists after actors, evidence, options, or values change.

These failures explain why no single queue neighbor owns q34. Aggregation supplies one decision operator. Decomposition, revealed-preference analysis, subgroup deliberation, and versioning supply evidence or mechanisms. The parent must choose among them, constrain them, connect them to implementation, and preserve revision.

prose_intervention_logic:
Start with a decision charter. Define the choice, whether one outcome is truly required, the authority to decide, materially affected actors, future and diffuse interests, constraints, time horizon, resources, spillovers, and practical exit. Establish standing before soliciting preferences so participation does not depend on power or convenience.

Use several elicitation channels—individual, group, anonymous, accessible, behavioral, representative—and preserve provenance. State the option set and information each actor had. Compare stated and revealed preferences, but treat inconsistency as a diagnostic rather than proof of irrationality. Test framing, strategic response, adaptive preference, missing alternatives, and constraint effects.

Decompose positions. Identify underlying interests, intensities, substitution, timing, uncertainty, and within-group segments. Separate protected rights and safety floors from tradeable preferences. Map compatibility: some preferences can coexist, some require shared scarce resources, some are conditionally compatible through sequencing, and some create unavoidable conflict.

Generate an option portfolio before selecting a rule. Compare one collective aggregate with matching, segmentation, local discretion, versioning, rotation, time sharing, package bargaining, compensation, controlled randomization, coexistence, or deferral. Evaluate each for feasibility, rights, distribution, spillovers, power, strategy, reversibility, and implementation cost.

When aggregation is necessary, precommit the rule, eligible inputs, normalization, weights, agenda, tie break, and exception conditions. Run sensitivity and cycle tests. Drill down into minority and tail loss. When bargaining is used, verify authority, voluntary participation, reservation points, outside options, enforceability, and whether any loss is noncompensable. When matching or segmentation is used, protect a viable base floor, mobility, stability, and anti-segregation constraints.

Time-bound impasse and distinguish productive deliberation from delay power. Escalation may include facilitation, mediation, renewed option generation, controlled random tie break, arbitration, legitimate authority, safe default, or rollback. Preserve appeal and reentry.

The final record explains the evidence, standing, method, weights or terms, rights floors, distribution, dissent, uncertainty, implementation obligations, remedy, and revision triggers. Monitor whether residual dissatisfaction becomes obstruction, exit, burden, or harm; do not reinterpret all dissent as bad faith. Reopen the arrangement when preferences, membership, options, evidence, performance, or legitimacy materially change.

prose_key_components:
### Preference Actor and Decision Boundary (`preference_actor_and_decision_boundary`)

Prevents preference conflict from being reduced to the loudest participants or an artificially narrow decision.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"preference_actor_and_decision_boundary","name":"Preference Actor and Decision Boundary","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Defines the choice, affected actors, decision authority, time horizon, resource constraints, interdependencies, and who bears consequences without formal choice.","purpose":"Prevents preference conflict from being reduced to the loudest participants or an artificially narrow decision.","required_fields":["decision","actor_set","affected_nonparticipants","authority","time_horizon","resource_boundary","outside_options","owner"],"validation_questions":["Who chooses and who lives with the result?","Which preferences are decision-relevant?","Can the problem be decomposed?","Who defines the boundary?"],"failure_signals":["omitted_actor","false_scope","authority_gap","externalized_dissatisfaction"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Preference Actor and Decision Boundary with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Preference Actor and Decision Boundary against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Preference Elicitation and Provenance (`preference_elicitation_and_provenance`)

Preferences cannot be reconciled fairly when silence, access, language, agenda setting, or question design determine what appears in the record.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"preference_elicitation_and_provenance","name":"Preference Elicitation and Provenance","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Collects preferences through accessible, plural channels and records whose preference, about which options, under what information, constraints, framing, timing, and confidence.","purpose":"Preferences cannot be reconciled fairly when silence, access, language, agenda setting, or question design determine what appears in the record.","required_fields":["actor_or_group","option_set","elicitation_channel","information_context","constraints","timing","confidence","provenance"],"validation_questions":["Can every affected group express a preference safely?","Does framing change the answer?","Are proxies authorized?","Is nonresponse interpreted cautiously?"],"failure_signals":["elite_capture","framing_bias","proxy_misrepresentation","silence_as_consent"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Preference Elicitation and Provenance with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Preference Elicitation and Provenance against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Stated, Revealed, and Constructed Preference Validation (`stated_revealed_and_constructed_preference_validation`)

Avoids treating every survey response or constrained behavior as fixed welfare truth.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"stated_revealed_and_constructed_preference_validation","name":"Stated, Revealed, and Constructed Preference Validation","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Compares stated rankings with observed choices under constraints and tests whether preferences are stable, informed, manipulable, adaptive, or still being constructed.","purpose":"Avoids treating every survey response or constrained behavior as fixed welfare truth.","required_fields":["stated_preference","revealed_choice","constraint_context","information_quality","choice_architecture","consistency","confidence","ethical_boundary"],"validation_questions":["Does behavior reveal preference or necessity?","Would options or information change the ranking?","Are contradictions meaningful?","Can inference harm the actor?"],"failure_signals":["constraint_misread","preference_laundering","unstable_ranking","surveillance_inference"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Stated, Revealed, and Constructed Preference Validation with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Stated, Revealed, and Constructed Preference Validation against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Preference Dimension and Intensity Map (`preference_dimension_and_intensity_map`)

Makes tradeable differences and compatible interests visible instead of treating binary positions as indivisible.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"preference_dimension_and_intensity_map","name":"Preference Dimension and Intensity Map","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Decomposes positions into underlying interests, attributes, intensity, substitution rates, timing, uncertainty, and within-group heterogeneity.","purpose":"Makes tradeable differences and compatible interests visible instead of treating binary positions as indivisible.","required_fields":["position","underlying_interest","attribute_dimensions","intensity","substitutability","timing","uncertainty","segment"],"validation_questions":["Which concern drives the position?","What can substitute?","How intense and durable is it?","Does a group contain internal disagreement?"],"failure_signals":["position_fixation","false_group_average","intensity_erasure","noncompensable_value_traded"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Preference Dimension and Intensity Map with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Preference Dimension and Intensity Map against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Nonnegotiable Rights and Constraint Floor (`nonnegotiable_rights_and_constraint_floor`)

Separates preference accommodation from trading away protected interests or calling coercion a compromise.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"nonnegotiable_rights_and_constraint_floor","name":"Nonnegotiable Rights and Constraint Floor","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Identifies legal, ethical, safety, dignity, consent, and mission constraints that aggregation, bargaining, compensation, or majority choice may not override.","purpose":"Separates preference accommodation from trading away protected interests or calling coercion a compromise.","required_fields":["right_or_constraint","holder","authority","minimum_floor","waiver_rule","conflict","review","remedy"],"validation_questions":["Which claims are preferences and which are rights?","Who may waive?","Is the floor equally accessible?","What happens when floors conflict?"],"failure_signals":["rights_aggregation","coerced_waiver","unsafe_compromise","mission_drift"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Nonnegotiable Rights and Constraint Floor with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Nonnegotiable Rights and Constraint Floor against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Conflict and Compatibility Structure (`conflict_and_compatibility_structure`)

Directs the case toward aggregation, matching, segmentation, bargaining, rotation, randomization, or authoritative decision rather than one default method.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"conflict_and_compatibility_structure","name":"Conflict and Compatibility Structure","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Maps which preferences are compatible, substitutable, conditionally compatible, rivalrous, mutually exclusive, or dependent on sequence and resources.","purpose":"Directs the case toward aggregation, matching, segmentation, bargaining, rotation, randomization, or authoritative decision rather than one default method.","required_fields":["preference_pairs","compatibility_class","resource_coupling","sequence_effect","externality","coalitions","conflict_severity","uncertainty"],"validation_questions":["Can preferences coexist by domain or time?","Is scarcity real?","Which coalition blocks which outcome?","Does sequencing create compatibility?"],"failure_signals":["false_zero_sum","hidden_coupling","coalition_blindness","manufactured_scarcity"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Conflict and Compatibility Structure with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Conflict and Compatibility Structure against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Representation and Standing Rule (`representation_and_standing_rule`)

Preference processes are illegitimate when power, turnout, access, or institutional status silently determines whose preferences count.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"representation_and_standing_rule","name":"Representation and Standing Rule","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Defines who may participate, speak, vote, bargain, veto, challenge, or receive notice, including affected minorities, future actors, diffuse interests, and authorized proxies.","purpose":"Preference processes are illegitimate when power, turnout, access, or institutional status silently determines whose preferences count.","required_fields":["standing_basis","representation_method","proxy_authority","voice_right","vote_or_veto","future_or_diffuse_interest","conflict_of_interest","review"],"validation_questions":["Who lacks organized representation?","Are representatives accountable?","Does a veto protect a right or extract rent?","Can affected outsiders challenge?"],"failure_signals":["participation_inequality","unaccountable_proxy","strategic_veto","future_interest_omission"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Representation and Standing Rule with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Representation and Standing Rule against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Aggregation and Collective Choice Rule (`aggregation_and_collective_choice_rule`)

Turns plural inputs into a decision without hiding normalization, weights, agenda effects, cycles, tie breaks, or information loss.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"aggregation_and_collective_choice_rule","name":"Aggregation and Collective Choice Rule","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Selects and documents a voting, scoring, weighting, deliberative, consensus, social-choice, or hybrid rule suited to the decision and preference structure.","purpose":"Turns plural inputs into a decision without hiding normalization, weights, agenda effects, cycles, tie breaks, or information loss.","required_fields":["purpose","eligible_inputs","scale_normalization","weights","rule","agenda","tiebreak","sensitivity"],"validation_questions":["Why does this rule fit?","Can agenda order reverse the result?","How sensitive is the winner?","Who selected the weights?"],"failure_signals":["rule_shopping","majority_cycle","weight_capture","false_precision"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Aggregation and Collective Choice Rule with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Aggregation and Collective Choice Rule against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Minority, Tail, and Information-Loss Guardrail (`minority_tail_and_information_loss_guardrail`)

A usable aggregate can conceal the actors most harmed by it and create apparent consensus from polarized inputs.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"minority_tail_and_information_loss_guardrail","name":"Minority, Tail, and Information-Loss Guardrail","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Preserves intense minority harm, veto-worthy constraints, bimodality, local exceptions, and dissent that an average or winning option would erase.","purpose":"A usable aggregate can conceal the actors most harmed by it and create apparent consensus from polarized inputs.","required_fields":["minority_profile","tail_loss","bimodality","protected_floor","drilldown","exception","dissent","harm_threshold"],"validation_questions":["Who loses badly under the winner?","Does the summary hide polarization?","Can local accommodation reduce harm?","What cannot be compensated?"],"failure_signals":["tyranny_of_average","tail_erasure","consensus_theater","minority_sacrifice"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Minority, Tail, and Information-Loss Guardrail with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Minority, Tail, and Information-Loss Guardrail against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Accommodation Option Portfolio (`accommodation_option_portfolio`)

Prevents premature convergence on averaging or majority choice when architecture can preserve more preference value.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"accommodation_option_portfolio","name":"Accommodation Option Portfolio","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Generates multiple ways to live with heterogeneous preferences: universal rule, local discretion, matching, segmentation, versioning, rotation, sequencing, compensation, shared minimum, or lawful exit.","purpose":"Prevents premature convergence on averaging or majority choice when architecture can preserve more preference value.","required_fields":["option","mechanism_class","fit","feasibility","rights","cost","distribution","reversibility"],"validation_questions":["Can the decision be modularized?","Can actors self-select safely?","Would rotation or time sharing work?","Which option preserves the most noncompensable value?"],"failure_signals":["single_method_lockin","illusory_choice","exclusionary_segmentation","unfunded_accommodation"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Accommodation Option Portfolio with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Accommodation Option Portfolio against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Matching, Segmentation, and Versioning Path (`matching_segmentation_and_versioning_path`)

Uses heterogeneity constructively instead of forcing one bundle on actors with different preference surfaces.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"matching_segmentation_and_versioning_path","name":"Matching, Segmentation, and Versioning Path","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Assigns actors to compatible partners, services, schedules, jurisdictions, or versions when differentiated outcomes can coexist without unacceptable spillovers.","purpose":"Uses heterogeneity constructively instead of forcing one bundle on actors with different preference surfaces.","required_fields":["matching_sides","eligibility","attributes","capacity","version_floor","self_selection","spillover","mobility"],"validation_questions":["Can preferences be satisfied separately?","Is matching stable and strategy-resistant?","Does the base version remain viable?","Can actors move between segments?"],"failure_signals":["cream_skimming","segregation","low_tier_degradation","matching_manipulation"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Matching, Segmentation, and Versioning Path with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Matching, Segmentation, and Versioning Path against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Bargaining, Trade, Compensation, and Rotation Path (`bargaining_trade_compensation_and_rotation_path`)

Converts intensity and comparative value into agreement while constraining coercion, bribery, exploitation, and uncompensable harm.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"bargaining_trade_compensation_and_rotation_path","name":"Bargaining, Trade, Compensation, and Rotation Path","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Enables reciprocal concessions, issue trades, side payments, burden sharing, time sharing, or rotation when preferences conflict but gains from exchange exist.","purpose":"Converts intensity and comparative value into agreement while constraining coercion, bribery, exploitation, and uncompensable harm.","required_fields":["issues","reservation_points","tradeable_terms","compensation","rotation","power","enforcement","fairness"],"validation_questions":["Are concessions voluntary?","Can money legitimately compensate this loss?","Does power distort the bargain?","Is rotation workable over time?"],"failure_signals":["coercive_bargain","rights_sale","wealth_dominance","unenforced_trade"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Bargaining, Trade, Compensation, and Rotation Path with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Bargaining, Trade, Compensation, and Rotation Path against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Impasse, Deadlock, and Escalation Path (`impasse_deadlock_and_escalation_path`)

Keeps conflict from becoming indefinite paralysis or informal domination by whoever can wait longest.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"impasse_deadlock_and_escalation_path","name":"Impasse, Deadlock, and Escalation Path","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Detects unresolved cycles and routes them through mediation, renegotiation, tie-break, randomization, arbitration, authority, rollback, or safe default.","purpose":"Keeps conflict from becoming indefinite paralysis or informal domination by whoever can wait longest.","required_fields":["impasse_condition","cycle_map","time_limit","resolver","break_action","safe_default","appeal","reentry"],"validation_questions":["Is more deliberation likely to help?","Who benefits from delay?","What resolver has legitimacy?","Can the action be reversed?"],"failure_signals":["delay_veto","premature_force","captured_resolver","unsafe_default"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Impasse, Deadlock, and Escalation Path with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Impasse, Deadlock, and Escalation Path against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Decision Legitimacy, Reason, and Dissent Record (`decision_legitimacy_reason_and_dissent_record`)

Makes partial dissatisfaction visible and allows actors to distinguish legitimate loss from arbitrary disregard.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"decision_legitimacy_reason_and_dissent_record","name":"Decision Legitimacy, Reason, and Dissent Record","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Records standing, evidence, preferences, rule choice, rights constraints, tradeoffs, distribution, reasons, dissent, uncertainty, and review.","purpose":"Makes partial dissatisfaction visible and allows actors to distinguish legitimate loss from arbitrary disregard.","required_fields":["decision","process","rule","rationale","distribution","dissent","uncertainty","notice","challenge"],"validation_questions":["Can a losing actor see how the preference counted?","Were constraints applied consistently?","Is dissent preserved?","Can errors be corrected?"],"failure_signals":["opaque_tradeoff","reasonless_majority","dissent_suppression","no_review"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Decision Legitimacy, Reason, and Dissent Record with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Decision Legitimacy, Reason, and Dissent Record against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Implementation Commitment and Dissatisfaction Monitor (`implementation_commitment_and_dissatisfaction_monitor`)

A procedurally valid preference decision can fail when losers obstruct, burdens shift, promises lack resources, or dissatisfaction becomes harm.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"implementation_commitment_and_dissatisfaction_monitor","name":"Implementation Commitment and Dissatisfaction Monitor","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Translates the decision into obligations, resources, interfaces, milestones, compliance, remedy, and measures of residual dissatisfaction, burden, exit, and strategic resistance.","purpose":"A procedurally valid preference decision can fail when losers obstruct, burdens shift, promises lack resources, or dissatisfaction becomes harm.","required_fields":["commitments","owners","resources","milestones","compliance","dissatisfaction","burden","remedy"],"validation_questions":["Can actors implement what they accepted?","Where does dissatisfaction become noncompliance or exit?","Are burdens as predicted?","Who repairs breach?"],"failure_signals":["paper_agreement","loser_sabotage","burden_drift","unfunded_commitment"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Implementation Commitment and Dissatisfaction Monitor with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Implementation Commitment and Dissatisfaction Monitor against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

### Revision, Exit, and Preference Update Rule (`revision_exit_and_preference_update_rule`)

Prevents a one-time aggregation from freezing adaptive preferences or locking actors into an obsolete compromise.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"revision_exit_and_preference_update_rule","name":"Revision, Exit, and Preference Update Rule","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Reopens the decision when preferences, membership, information, constraints, performance, or harm change and governs lawful exit, migration, sunset, and precedent.","purpose":"Prevents a one-time aggregation from freezing adaptive preferences or locking actors into an obsolete compromise.","required_fields":["review_triggers","new_preferences","membership_change","performance","exit_right","revision_authority","migration","archive"],"validation_questions":["When is dissatisfaction evidence for revision?","Can actors exit without retaliation?","Do new members have standing?","How are sunk commitments unwound?"],"failure_signals":["preference_lockin","constant_churn","punitive_exit","precedent_erasure"],"safeguards":["affected_party_voice","rights_and_power_review","independent_rule_audit","reason_and_dissent_record","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Revision, Exit, and Preference Update Rule with a named owner, evidence source, authority, access rule, decision point, review trigger, and link to downstream accommodation. Test across minorities, nonparticipants, strategic actors, and constrained choices.","assurance_notes":"Audit Revision, Exit, and Preference Update Rule against framing, nonresponse, agenda, representation, power, privacy, distribution, and observed implementation. Preserve counterexamples, dissent, uncertainty, and conditions requiring correction or retirement."}

prose_common_mechanisms:
### Preference Elicitation and Tradeoff Matrix (`preference_elicitation_and_tradeoff_matrix`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Collects rankings, intensity, constraints, substitutions, confidence, and affected-party context across a declared option set.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: preferences are insufficiently visible or positions hide interests; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"preference_elicitation_and_tradeoff_matrix","name":"Preference Elicitation and Tradeoff Matrix","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Collects rankings, intensity, constraints, substitutions, confidence, and affected-party context across a declared option set.","fit_conditions":["preferences are insufficiently visible or positions hide interests"],"minimum_configuration":["option set","actor set","channels","intensity","substitution","provenance"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Preference Elicitation and Tradeoff Matrix.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Preference Elicitation and Tradeoff Matrix is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Ranked or Approval Choice with Audit (`ranked_or_approval_choice_with_audit`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Aggregates plural rankings using a declared social-choice rule with agenda, cycle, tie-break, sensitivity, and minority-loss review.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: one collective choice is necessary and rights floors already pass; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"ranked_or_approval_choice_with_audit","name":"Ranked or Approval Choice with Audit","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Aggregates plural rankings using a declared social-choice rule with agenda, cycle, tie-break, sensitivity, and minority-loss review.","fit_conditions":["one collective choice is necessary and rights floors already pass"],"minimum_configuration":["eligibility","ballot","rule","agenda","tiebreak","audit"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Ranked or Approval Choice with Audit.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Ranked or Approval Choice with Audit is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Deliberative Weighting Workshop (`deliberative_weighting_workshop`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Makes objective weights and preference tradeoffs explicit through structured affected-party deliberation and sensitivity analysis.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: the decision combines attributes and legitimacy depends on reasoned weight setting; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"deliberative_weighting_workshop","name":"Deliberative Weighting Workshop","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Makes objective weights and preference tradeoffs explicit through structured affected-party deliberation and sensitivity analysis.","fit_conditions":["the decision combines attributes and legitimacy depends on reasoned weight setting"],"minimum_configuration":["criteria","participants","weights","facilitation","sensitivity","record"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Deliberative Weighting Workshop.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Deliberative Weighting Workshop is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Interest-Based Bargaining Protocol (`interest_based_bargaining_protocol`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Separates positions from interests, explores package trades, tests reservation points, and records voluntary enforceable agreement.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: actors control tradeable issues and gains from exchange exist; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"interest_based_bargaining_protocol","name":"Interest-Based Bargaining Protocol","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Separates positions from interests, explores package trades, tests reservation points, and records voluntary enforceable agreement.","fit_conditions":["actors control tradeable issues and gains from exchange exist"],"minimum_configuration":["issues","interests","authority","packages","fairness","enforcement"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Interest-Based Bargaining Protocol.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Interest-Based Bargaining Protocol is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Two-Sided or Multi-Sided Matching (`two_sided_or_multi_sided_matching`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Matches actors or roles using preferences, eligibility, capacity, stability, strategy, and fairness constraints.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: heterogeneous preferences can be satisfied by differentiated pairing; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"two_sided_or_multi_sided_matching","name":"Two-Sided or Multi-Sided Matching","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Matches actors or roles using preferences, eligibility, capacity, stability, strategy, and fairness constraints.","fit_conditions":["heterogeneous preferences can be satisfied by differentiated pairing"],"minimum_configuration":["sides","rankings","capacity","algorithm","stability","appeal"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Two-Sided or Multi-Sided Matching.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Two-Sided or Multi-Sided Matching is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Segmented Version or Local Option (`segmented_version_or_local_option`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Offers differentiated versions, jurisdictions, schedules, or local rules with a protected base floor and spillover controls.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: plural outcomes can coexist without defeating the shared need; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"segmented_version_or_local_option","name":"Segmented Version or Local Option","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Offers differentiated versions, jurisdictions, schedules, or local rules with a protected base floor and spillover controls.","fit_conditions":["plural outcomes can coexist without defeating the shared need"],"minimum_configuration":["segments","versions","base floor","self selection","spillovers","mobility"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Segmented Version or Local Option.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Segmented Version or Local Option is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Rotation and Time-Sharing Rule (`rotation_and_time_sharing_rule`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Distributes an indivisible role, burden, location, priority, or schedule over time when simultaneous satisfaction is impossible.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: preferences are symmetric enough that temporal sharing is legitimate; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"rotation_and_time_sharing_rule","name":"Rotation and Time-Sharing Rule","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Distributes an indivisible role, burden, location, priority, or schedule over time when simultaneous satisfaction is impossible.","fit_conditions":["preferences are symmetric enough that temporal sharing is legitimate"],"minimum_configuration":["resource","sequence","duration","priority","handoff","review"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Rotation and Time-Sharing Rule.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Rotation and Time-Sharing Rule is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Compensation and Burden-Sharing Pact (`compensation_and_burden_sharing_pact`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Offsets legitimate but unequal losses through transfers, supports, reciprocal obligations, or shared costs while barring rights purchase.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: a chosen outcome creates compensable concentrated loss; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"compensation_and_burden_sharing_pact","name":"Compensation and Burden-Sharing Pact","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Offsets legitimate but unequal losses through transfers, supports, reciprocal obligations, or shared costs while barring rights purchase.","fit_conditions":["a chosen outcome creates compensable concentrated loss"],"minimum_configuration":["loss map","eligibility","valuation","funding","rights bar","remedy"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Compensation and Burden-Sharing Pact.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Compensation and Burden-Sharing Pact is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Controlled Random Tie-Break (`controlled_random_tie_break`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Uses transparent, auditable randomness after eligibility, rights, and priority tests cannot justify differentiation.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: equally legitimate claims exceed indivisible capacity; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"controlled_random_tie_break","name":"Controlled Random Tie-Break","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Uses transparent, auditable randomness after eligibility, rights, and priority tests cannot justify differentiation.","fit_conditions":["equally legitimate claims exceed indivisible capacity"],"minimum_configuration":["unit","eligible set","probability","draw","audit","appeal"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Controlled Random Tie-Break.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Controlled Random Tie-Break is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

### Mediation, Deadlock, and Escalation Ladder (`mediation_deadlock_and_escalation_ladder`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Time-bounds negotiation and routes impasse through facilitation, mediation, arbitration, authority, safe default, or rollback.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: delay or circular veto prevents necessary decision; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"mediation_deadlock_and_escalation_ladder","name":"Mediation, Deadlock, and Escalation Ladder","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Time-bounds negotiation and routes impasse through facilitation, mediation, arbitration, authority, safe default, or rollback.","fit_conditions":["delay or circular veto prevents necessary decision"],"minimum_configuration":["trigger","stages","resolver","authority","default","appeal"],"implementation_steps":["Define decision, standing, option set, rights floors, and the preference conflict addressed by Mediation, Deadlock, and Escalation Ladder.","Collect preference, intensity, constraint, power, and distribution evidence before configuring the mechanism.","Precommit rules, authority, tie breaks, exceptions, reasons, appeal, implementation, and revision.","Test strategic reporting, minority loss, coercion, segmentation, nonresponse, and implementation burden.","Monitor dissatisfaction, exit, remedy, and changed preferences; revise or retire when conditions fail."],"validation_signals":["the mechanism fits the mapped conflict structure","rights and standing pass before preference combination","minority and tail loss remain visible","actors can understand reasons and challenge error","implementation and revision are funded and practical"],"misuse_risks":["majority_domination","strategic_preference_reporting","power_distorted_bargaining","false_consensus","locked_in_compromise"],"safeguards":["rights_floor","rule_precommitment","minority_drilldown","independent_power_review","appeal_exit_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Mediation, Deadlock, and Escalation Ladder is one implementation option. It does not alone elicit and validate preferences, choose among aggregation and plural accommodation, protect rights and minorities, govern impasse, implement commitments, and preserve revision."}

prose_failure_modes:
### Manufactured Preference Record

Framing, option omission, inaccessible channels, proxy error, or silence-as-consent creates the preference set the sponsor wants. Recover by reopening standing and elicitation, expanding options, preserving provenance, and auditing nonresponse and representation.

### Constrained Choice Laundering

Behavior under poverty, dependency, coercion, or inaccessible alternatives is treated as welfare preference. Recover through constraint mapping, counterfactual options, stated-revealed comparison, ethical inference review, and remedy.

### Rights Aggregated as Weights

A majority or score trades away safety, dignity, consent, or legal rights. Stop the method, restore the nonnegotiable floor, review authority and harm, and reconsider affected decisions.

### Rule Shopping and Agenda Capture

Sponsors select weights, ballot, sequence, or tie break after seeing which method favors them. Recover through precommitment, alternative-rule sensitivity, independent audit, and remand.

### Tyranny of the Average

A mean or winner hides polarization and intense minority harm. Drill down, inspect tails and bimodality, generate local accommodation, and reject the aggregate if protected loss remains.

### Exclusionary Segmentation

Versions or local options become segregation, cream skimming, or a degraded base tier. Enforce a core floor, mobility, capacity, anti-discrimination, spillover, and outcome review.

### Coercive Bargain

Agreement reflects unequal outside options, time pressure, employment, benefits, or information rather than voluntary trade. Pause, rebalance representation and information, protect floors, use independent facilitation, and reopen terms.

### Delay Veto and Endless Deliberation

An actor gains by preventing closure. Apply declared time limits, mediation, new option generation, tie-break, authority, or safe default with appeal.

### Paper Compromise and Burden Drift

Owners, resources, and remedies are absent, or implementation shifts cost to losers. Fund commitments, monitor burden and dissatisfaction, correct breach, and revise the arrangement.

### Preference Lock-In

A historical compromise is treated as permanent despite changed information, membership, options, or harm. Trigger review, support migration and exit, preserve history, and select again legitimately.

prose_neighbor_distinctions:
### `aggregation_function_design_and_weighting`

Owns the explicit transformation of many inputs into one output and is the exact companion when aggregation is selected. The candidate first decides whether one output is legitimate and also governs matching, segmentation, bargaining, rotation, compensation, impasse, dissatisfaction, and revision. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `goal_valence_decomposition_and_separation`

Treats one actor or stakeholder-specific goal with simultaneous approach and avoidance pull; q34 governs conflict among actors or groups with heterogeneous preferences. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `revealed_preference_validation_against_indifference_curves`

Infers and validates tradeoff surfaces from constrained choices. It supplies evidence but not collective-choice and accommodation governance. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `subgroup_deliberation_and_recombination`

Protects divergent reasoning from premature groupthink through split-and-recombine deliberation. It is a process mechanism, not the outcome-method portfolio. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `versioning_and_quality_discrimination`

Uses differentiated quality or access menus for self-selection and price discrimination. Versioning is one bounded accommodation path and carries fairness risks. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `deadlock_resolution`

Breaks an existing circular blockage through release, preemption, renegotiation, tie-break, or authority. It does not own preference evidence, rights, method selection, minority loss, implementation, and revision. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `acceptable_substitution_mapping`

Maps equivalent bundles and substitution rates, supplying tradeoff evidence. It does not select a collective arrangement. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

### `alignment_governance_and_dispute_resolution`

Provides a legitimate forum, authority boundaries, and escalation for multi-actor misalignment. It can host the candidate but does not supply the full preference and social-choice contract. Preserve the accepted identity as a companion rather than absorbing it.

The five queue neighbors collectively demonstrate the gap. One aggregates, one decomposes ambivalence, one validates revealed preferences, one structures deliberation, and one offers commercial versions. None chooses among the complete method portfolio or owns rights, standing, minority loss, impasse, partial dissatisfaction, implementation, and revision.

prose_cross_domain_examples:
### Public Land-Use Choice

Residents, businesses, renters, landowners, users, and future residents value housing, green space, mobility, quiet, tax base, and heritage differently. The process establishes standing, accessible elicitation, rights and environmental floors, preference intensity, and geographic distribution. It compares one zoning rule with neighborhood variation, transferable capacity, mitigation, time limits, and compensation. Rule sensitivity and minority displacement are published. Implementation monitors housing, access, noise, displacement, and appeal; review occurs when conditions change.

### Organizational Work Arrangement

Teams prefer different combinations of remote work, collaboration, commute, focus, mentoring, and service coverage. Rather than averaging days, the organization maps role constraints and individual preferences, preserves accessibility and nondiscrimination, and tests team-level schedules, matched collaboration windows, local options, rotations, and service floors. It records residual dissatisfaction and workload. Exit and review prevent managers from turning a temporary local arrangement into hidden status hierarchy.

### Product Configuration

Users conflict over simplicity, control, privacy, automation, price, and support. A single default cannot satisfy every preference, but unlimited settings create complexity. The design validates segments, preserves a safe accessible base, offers a bounded version or mode portfolio, makes self-selection transparent, prevents low-tier degradation, and permits switching. Outcome monitoring distinguishes useful pluralism from exploitative price discrimination.

### Hospital Schedule Allocation

Clinicians have preferences over shifts, continuity, training, caregiving, income, and workload while safety and coverage are nonnegotiable. A matching mechanism uses declared preferences, qualifications, capacity, fairness, and protected needs. Rotation handles unavoidable burdens; controlled randomization breaks equal-priority ties. Appeals correct data and hardship. The hospital monitors fatigue, burden distribution, vacancies, swaps, and exit rather than reporting only fill rate.

### Multi-Issue Labor Bargaining

Workers and management value wages, flexibility, staffing, safety, training, scheduling, and duration differently. Interest decomposition reveals package trades, while legal and safety floors remain nonnegotiable. Representatives need mandate and accountability. Power and strike or lockout exposure are explicit. The agreement names resources, enforcement, reopened conditions, and remedies; dissatisfaction and disparate burden are monitored during implementation.

### Disaster Resource Prioritization

Communities and agencies have incompatible preferences over speed, geographic coverage, vulnerability, infrastructure, and economic continuity. Rights and lifesaving floors precede aggregation. A transparent priority rule combines need and capacity, preserves tail risk, records communities receiving less, and uses rotation or staged allocation where possible. Urgent authority expires, appeals and correction remain, and post-event review includes affected parties.

### Platform Matching

Participants on several sides rank partners, timing, price, quality, and restrictions differently. Matching may preserve more value than one score, but it must address strategic rankings, capacity, stability, discrimination, privacy, and unmatched actors. A fallback, appeal, and periodic model review are part of the accommodation; the algorithm is not the parent.

prose_non_examples:
- One person feels both attracted to and afraid of one goal. Use Goal Valence Decomposition and Separation.
- A fiduciary’s private incentive conflicts with an entrusted duty. Use Conflict-of-Interest Mitigation.
- Actors share the target but cannot coordinate their timing. Use coordination or synchronization.
- A dataset requires one rollup formula and preference accommodation has already been decided. Use Aggregation Function Design and Weighting.
- An analyst only needs to infer tradeoff curves from observed choices. Use Revealed Preference Validation.
- A group only needs independent breakout reasoning before plenary synthesis. Use Subgroup Deliberation and Recombination.
- A product uses good-better-best tiers only to extract willingness to pay. Use Versioning and Quality Discrimination and its fairness guardrails.
- A circular wait needs immediate safe release. Use Deadlock Resolution.
- A majority vote overrides a protected right. That is invalid aggregation, not preference accommodation.
- Participants accept because benefits, employment, information, or exit are controlled. That is coercion, not bargain.
- Silence or nonattendance is counted as indifference. That is evidence failure.
- A compromise cannot be reviewed because stakeholders agreed once. That is preference lock-in.

prose_tradeoffs:
**Decisiveness versus preference fidelity.** A simple vote or score produces closure but can erase intensity and constraint. Deeper elicitation improves fidelity but increases time, privacy, and strategic-reporting risk.

**Uniformity versus plural accommodation.** One rule improves interoperability and equal treatment; matching, segmentation, or local options preserve heterogeneous value. Plural outcomes require spillover, mobility, base-floor, and anti-segregation controls.

**Majority legitimacy versus minority protection.** Majority choice may be appropriate after standing and rights review, yet severe concentrated loss can justify accommodation, exception, compensation, or remand.

**Deliberation versus manipulation.** Discussion can create informed adaptive preferences and discover compatibility, but agenda, status, facilitation, and conformity can manufacture consensus. Preserve anonymous prework, dissent, and independent records.

**Bargaining freedom versus power inequality.** Package trades can unlock gains, while unequal information, time, wealth, authority, or outside options can produce coerced agreement. Review power and noncompensable boundaries.

**Compensation versus commodification.** Transfers can share legitimate burden but cannot make every rights, identity, health, consent, or irreversible loss tradable.

**Stability versus revision.** Durable arrangements reduce repeated conflict, but preferences and membership evolve. Use thresholds that avoid both constant churn and obsolete lock-in.

prose_invariants_to_preserve:
1. Decision boundary and affected standing precede preference combination.
2. Preference evidence retains provenance, information, constraints, framing, timing, and uncertainty.
3. Revealed behavior is not assumed to be free preference.
4. Groups are not treated as internally uniform without evidence.
5. Rights, safety, dignity, and consent floors are not aggregated away.
6. Method selection follows conflict structure rather than sponsor convenience.
7. One outcome is required only when plural accommodation cannot meet the legitimate need.
8. Aggregation rules, weights, agenda, tie breaks, and exceptions are declared before results.
9. Minority, tail, polarization, and noncompensable loss remain visible.
10. Matching and segmentation protect base quality, mobility, and anti-exclusion constraints.
11. Bargains and compensation are voluntary, power-aware, enforceable, and rights-bounded.
12. Impasse cannot become an unreviewed veto by delay.
13. Reasons and dissent are preserved without manufacturing consensus.
14. Implementation obligations and remedies are resourced.
15. Residual dissatisfaction and burden are monitored rather than moralized.
16. Appeal, practical exit, and revision remain available as preferences and membership change.

prose_target_outcomes:
Success means affected preferences are represented with appropriate confidence; rights floors and legitimate constraints are preserved; the selected method fits the actual structure; avoidable preference loss is reduced through plural accommodation; unavoidable dissatisfaction is visible and justified; and implementation remains stable without coercion or hidden burden.

Useful indicators include participation coverage, proxy accountability, nonresponse, stated-revealed divergence, option-set expansion, rule sensitivity, majority cycles, minority-tail loss, rights-floor breaches, accommodation uptake, matching stability, low-tier quality, bargaining distribution, impasse duration, commitment completion, residual dissatisfaction, strategic resistance, burden drift, appeal, exit, and revision latency.

Do not optimize one metric. High agreement may indicate coercion or a weak option set. Low dissent may reflect inaccessible participation. Stable implementation may reflect punitive exit. Numerous versions may reflect useful pluralism or discriminatory degradation. Interpret process, distribution, rights, and outcomes together.

prose_parameter_dimensions:
- **Decision granularity:** tune whether one universal result is necessary or domains, locations, times, roles, and versions can vary.
- **Standing and representation:** define direct participation, authorized proxy, future and diffuse interests, veto, challenge, and conflicts of interest.
- **Elicitation mix:** combine surveys, interviews, observed choices, deliberation, anonymous input, and representative evidence according to sensitivity and access.
- **Option-set breadth:** include status quo, alternatives, decomposed packages, local options, and outside options; a narrow option set manufactures preference.
- **Intensity and substitution:** decide whether rankings, cardinal strength, willingness to trade, indifference regions, or noncompensable thresholds are needed.
- **Rights floor:** specify which legal, ethical, safety, dignity, consent, and mission constraints are not subject to weighting or bargain.
- **Aggregation rule:** tune voting, approval, rank, score, weight, median, consensus, or hybrid rules and their agenda, cycle, tie-break, and sensitivity controls.
- **Minority-loss threshold:** define when an aggregate winner requires exception, accommodation, compensation, remand, or rejection.
- **Segmentation and mobility:** set base quality, eligibility, capacity, spillover, self-selection, switching, and anti-segregation rules.
- **Bargaining power safeguards:** calibrate representation, information parity, time, outside options, facilitation, enforceability, and noncompensable limits.
- **Impasse timing:** distinguish helpful deliberation from exploitative delay and define each escalation threshold.
- **Dissatisfaction tolerance:** define acceptable residual loss, warning signals, nonimplementation, exit, and harm triggers.
- **Review cadence:** combine scheduled review with membership, evidence, preference, performance, burden, and rights triggers.

Parameters are normative as well as technical. Changing a weight, quorum, agenda, threshold, segment, compensation rule, or review window can change who wins and who counts. Version them, explain them, and test them against minorities, nonparticipants, constrained actors, and strategic behavior.

prose_variants_and_near_names:
### Collective Policy Preference Aggregation

A public or organizational decision requires one outcome after legitimate standing and rights review. Specialized requirements are social choice rule, agenda and cycle test, minority loss review, public reason, appeal. Aggregation Function Design is the mechanism owner once aggregation is selected; this variant preserves the parent’s prior method-choice and postdecision safeguards.

### Matched or Segmented Preference Accommodation

Different outcomes can coexist through matching, local options, schedules, jurisdictions, or versions. Specialized requirements are segment or side map, capacity and stability, base floor, spillover control, mobility and exit. Not equivalent to commercial versioning; differentiated outcomes require equality, anti-segregation, base-quality, and mobility review.

### Multi-Issue Bargaining and Package Trade

Actors value issues with different intensity and can exchange concessions across a package. Specialized requirements are interest map, reservation points, package generator, power and coercion review, enforcement and reopener. Not generic negotiation; it preserves standing, rights floors, minority information, implementation, and revision.

### Rotating or Time-Shared Indivisible Choice

Competing preferences concern a role, schedule, location, priority, burden, or resource that cannot be shared simultaneously but can be shared over time. Specialized requirements are rotation unit, sequence fairness, handoff, priority exception, burden monitor. Rotation is not a universal fairness rule and fails when losses are irreversible or time value is asymmetric.

Near aliases preserve the parent only when they denote the complete lifecycle: Heterogeneous Preference Reconciliation, Plural Preference Decision Design, Preference Impasse Resolution, Multi-Preference Accommodation, and Partial-Dissatisfaction Governance. “Preference aggregation” is narrower. Consensus, survey, voting, matching, versioning, bargaining, compensation, rotation, lottery, and mediation are mechanisms or configurations.

name: Collective Policy Preference Aggregation

variant_type: other

use_when: The specialization materially changes how Preference Conflict Accommodation is configured while preserving its invariants.

name: Matched or Segmented Preference Accommodation

name: Multi-Issue Bargaining and Package Trade

name: Rotating or Time-Shared Indivisible Choice