Coordination Equilibrium Shift

batch: Batch 19

aliases:
Equilibrium Selection and Transition
Focal-Point Coordination
Convention-Selection Governance
Mutual-Assurance Coordination
Better-Equilibrium Shift

slug: equilibrium

components: Desired Equilibrium and Legitimacy Criteria

components: Beliefs, Expectations, and Common-Knowledge Map

components: Participation Threshold and Critical Coalition

components: Early-Mover Protection and Bridge Incentive

components: Coordination Channel and State Visibility

components: Defection, Miscoordination, and Capture Guardrail

components: Distributional Fairness and Consent Review

components: Stabilization, Reinforcement, and Compliance Loop

components: Reevaluation, Exit, and Equilibrium Revision

mechanisms: Equilibrium Review and Reselection Trigger

essence_one_line: Move actors from a bad or unresolved equilibrium to a better one by aligning expectations, selecting a legitimate focal outcome, making commitments credible, protecting transition, and stabilizing coordinated practice.

compression_statement: Coordination Equilibrium Shift addresses cases where actors have several mutually stable outcomes and cannot safely reach the preferred one through unilateral action. It distinguishes preference from expectation, maps current and feasible equilibria, identifies who bears transition risk, and chooses a legitimate target. A focal signal creates a shared selection cue; common-knowledge channels and conditional commitments make participation credible; critical coalitions, bridge support, migration sequencing, and early-mover protection make the transition viable. State visibility, defection controls, fairness review, and stabilization turn a one-time coordination event into durable ordinary practice. Exit, revision, and reselection prevent the successful convention from hardening into unjustified lock-in.

core_intuition: When each actor’s best move depends on what others will do, persuasion about the endpoint is not enough. The intervention must change expectations about others, reduce the risk of moving early, synchronize complementary actions, and make the selected outcome sufficiently legitimate and observable that following it becomes rational.

canonical_formula: shift_quality = legitimacy(target) + common_expectation(signal,state) + credibility(commitment,threshold) + viability(sequence,bridge,early_mover_protection) + durability(reinforcement,repair) - harms(coercion,defection,capture,lock_in,stranding); activate only when threshold confidence and rights safeguards pass.

structural_problem: Several stable outcomes are possible, but actors cannot coordinate on one because expectations diverge, signals conflict, commitments are cheap talk, early movers face disproportionate loss, complementary roles are missing, or the transition contains unsafe intermediate states. The current equilibrium may be inferior yet individually rational to preserve. A sponsor may also label an outcome “better” without legitimate authority or fair distribution. Ordinary communication, incentive changes, standards, or threshold building each solve only part of the problem.

trigger_conditions: actors privately prefer the same outcome but wait for assurance that others will move

trigger_conditions: two or more conventions are workable but incompatible

trigger_conditions: unilateral switching is costly or unsafe

trigger_conditions: a legacy equilibrium persists through expectations and switching costs

trigger_conditions: coordination requires complementary roles rather than headcount alone

trigger_conditions: conflicting announcements or defaults create multiple focal points

trigger_conditions: a better equilibrium needs temporary bridge support

trigger_conditions: a transition can strand late or resource-poor actors

trigger_conditions: an established convention is locked in despite changed conditions

consequences_of_non_intervention:
persistent inferior equilibrium
duplicated standards and fragmentation
rational waiting and failed launches
unsafe partial migration
free riding and defection
coercive standardization
unequal transition burden
captured focal-point selection
lock-in and suppressed innovation

intervention_summary: Bound the coordination game; enumerate feasible equilibria; diagnose current reinforcement; define a legitimate target; map beliefs, payoffs, and early-mover risks; create a unique focal signal; establish conditional assurance and a critical coalition; sequence transition with bridges and rollback; protect early and vulnerable movers; publish verified state; deter defection and capture; review distribution and consent; reinforce the selected practice; and preserve exit and reselection.

operating_sequence: define actors, choices, timing, interdependence, externalities, and outside options

operating_sequence: enumerate feasible stable outcomes and uncertainty

operating_sequence: diagnose the current equilibrium and its expectation and switching-cost loops

operating_sequence: select a target through explicit legitimacy, rights, distribution, and feasibility criteria

operating_sequence: map first- and higher-order beliefs, credible messengers, and common-knowledge gaps

operating_sequence: map payoffs, transition costs, early-mover loss, defection gains, and risk bearers

operating_sequence: choose a clear focal signal, standard, default, deadline, or precedent with legitimate authority

operating_sequence: obtain conditional commitments from a critical coalition and verify readiness

operating_sequence: design phased or synchronized transition, interoperability bridges, rollback, and completion tests

operating_sequence: protect early movers and resource-poor participants with temporary proportionate support

operating_sequence: publish verified commitments, threshold confidence, readiness, exceptions, and breaches

operating_sequence: detect defection, conflicting signals, capture, collusion, and unsafe partial adoption

operating_sequence: review consent, distribution, access, minority options, and remedy

operating_sequence: reinforce onboarding, compliance, feedback, and repair until practice is self-supporting

operating_sequence: reopen selection when performance, legitimacy, technology, or conditions change

sense: Collect choices, beliefs, commitments, readiness, threshold, cost, defection, distribution, and outcome signals.

interpret: Distinguish preference, expectation, feasibility, legitimacy, threshold, and transition failure.

decide: Select, delay, pilot, assure, subsidize, synchronize, pause, roll back, reinforce, branch, or reopen the equilibrium.

act: Issue a focal cue, bind conditional commitments, protect movers, coordinate migration, and publish verified state.

verify: Test target performance, sustained adoption, fairness, residual defection, support independence, exit safety, and revision readiness.

decision_rules: if actors prefer the target but doubt others, prioritize common knowledge and conditional assurance

decision_rules: if the target is not legitimate or rights-compatible, do not solve selection through salience or coercion

decision_rules: if essential complementary roles are missing, measure coalition composition rather than total participation

decision_rules: if early movers bear public benefit risk, insure or share transition cost

decision_rules: if old and new systems cannot safely coexist, use a coordinated migration window with rollback

decision_rules: if a default produces formal opt-out but punitive practical exit, treat it as coercive

decision_rules: if adoption needs permanent extraordinary support, the target is not yet a self-sustaining equilibrium

decision_rules: if a selected convention blocks better alternatives after conditions change, trigger reselection

prose_essence:
Coordination Equilibrium Shift is used when several outcomes are stable because each actor’s best response depends on what they expect others to do. The obstacle is not simply disagreement, missing instructions, or weak motivation. Actors can privately prefer the same better outcome and still rationally preserve the current one because moving alone is costly, complementary participants may not arrive, signals conflict, or no one can verify that enough others will follow through.

The archetype changes that strategic situation. It bounds the actors and choices, enumerates feasible equilibria, diagnoses the current self-reinforcing pattern, and selects a target through explicit feasibility, rights, distribution, consent, and authority criteria. It then maps first- and higher-order expectations: what each actor believes, what each believes others know, and which source can credibly make the selection common knowledge. A focal signal identifies one target; reciprocal or conditional commitments make intended participation credible; a critical coalition and transition plan make the endpoint viable; bridge support prevents early movers from carrying collective risk.

Coordination is not complete at announcement or threshold crossing. The transition must preserve service and lawful outside options, expose verified readiness, detect defection and capture, and avoid unsafe partial states. After cutover, onboarding, monitoring, compliance, reinforcement, and repair must make ordinary participation self-supporting. Scheduled and event-driven reselection prevents a successful convention from becoming an unchallengeable incumbent.

The canonical sequence is:

1. Define actors, choices, interdependence, timing, externalities, and outside options.
2. Enumerate stable outcomes and diagnose why the current equilibrium reproduces itself.
3. Select a legitimate target and preserve rights and practical exit.
4. Map beliefs, common-knowledge gaps, payoffs, transition costs, and early-mover risk.
5. Issue one credible focal signal and bind conditional commitments from a viable coalition.
6. Sequence migration with compatibility bridges, state visibility, support, and rollback.
7. Detect defection, capture, collusion, coercion, and unequal burden.
8. Stabilize the target, remove extraordinary support only after a self-sustainability test, and retain revision.

The intervention is successful when the selected outcome is not only collectively attractive but individually safe enough to join, sufficiently legitimate to sustain, operationally reachable through intermediate states, and revisable when evidence changes.

prose_when_to_use:
Use the archetype when two or more mutually stable outcomes are feasible and unilateral action toward the preferred outcome is risky, ineffective, or irrational. Typical signals include incompatible standards that are each workable, organizations waiting for one another to adopt a shared practice, complementary platform sides stuck in a cold start, communities privately opposing a norm but expecting others to comply, infrastructure participants unable to migrate safely at different times, or public actors needing one common emergency convention.

A practical intake test asks:

- Do actors’ payoffs materially depend on the choices they expect from others?
- Is more than one outcome self-reinforcing under plausible strategies?
- Does the present pattern persist even though a different outcome could make many actors better off?
- Can the proposed target be selected through legitimate authority, consent, rights, and distribution criteria?
- Are early-mover loss, missing complements, ambiguous signals, or cheap-talk commitments blocking change?
- Can transition and rollback be designed without stranding participants or destroying necessary service?

Use the full contract when selection, assurance, transition, and stabilization all matter. If the direction is already chosen and only adoption volume is missing, Critical Mass Building may be the bounded owner. If rewards must change so the target becomes individually rational, use Payoff Restructuring as a companion. If only a chosen technical interface needs specification and conformance, use Interoperability Standardization. If separated systems are restarting under an agreed plan, use Coordination and Synchronization Across Reentry Phases.

Do not use the archetype when one actor can optimize independently, when only one feasible stable outcome exists, or when the sponsor has not established legitimate authority to define “better.” Do not describe coercive enforcement as equilibrium selection merely because compliance becomes stable. An equilibrium can be efficient for insiders and harmful to outsiders; collusion, exclusion, discriminatory norms, and captured standards require rejection or redesign, not more effective stabilization.

prose_structural_problem:
In a coordination problem, preference and expectation separate. An actor may prefer everyone to use a new protocol but retain the legacy one because counterparts remain there. A worker may prefer a safer reporting norm but stay silent because colleagues are expected to stay silent. A supplier may invest in a new standard only if manufacturers and buyers commit. Each actor’s local caution reproduces the collective condition that makes caution rational.

Several structural barriers recur:

- **Plural stable outcomes.** More than one convention works, but using different ones destroys compatibility or value.
- **Private agreement without common knowledge.** Actors know their own preference but cannot safely infer others’ intentions or knowledge.
- **Cheap talk.** Public support carries no cost, verification, or consequence, so promises do not change best responses.
- **Early-mover exposure.** First movers pay switching, learning, compatibility, reputation, or safety costs before benefits arrive.
- **Missing complements.** Total adoption can look high while a crucial role, geography, platform side, or capability remains absent.
- **Unsafe intermediate states.** Old and new arrangements cannot coexist cleanly, or partial migration creates greater risk than either endpoint.
- **Conflicting focal signals.** Different leaders, defaults, dates, standards, or precedents split expectations instead of unifying them.
- **Illegitimate selection.** A sponsor treats its preference as collective value, suppresses dissent, or shifts costs to actors without standing.
- **Support dependence.** Subsidy, attention, or emergency authority creates adoption that collapses when extraordinary support ends.
- **Lock-in.** Once coordination succeeds, switching cost and enforcement protect the convention after its value or legitimacy decays.

These failures cannot be solved by communication alone. More messaging may increase awareness without creating reciprocal assurance. A default may coordinate behavior but conceal coercion. Subsidies may buy temporary participation without producing a viable equilibrium. A standard may specify a target but not establish why actors will select it. The structural intervention must connect expectations, commitments, payoffs, threshold composition, transition states, legitimacy, and revision.

prose_intervention_logic:
Begin with diagnosis, not promotion. Map the actor set, actual choices, sequence, information, outside options, and affected nonparticipants. Enumerate feasible equilibria and test their stability conditions. Identify the current pattern and ask why unilateral deviation fails. Distinguish stable best responses from temporary confusion, simple path dependence, direct coercion, or a sponsor’s dissatisfaction with an outcome others reasonably prefer.

Select the target only after comparing value, feasibility, rights, distribution, authority, consent, minority options, reversibility, and externalities. “Pareto improvement” is useful evidence but not a complete legitimacy test: transition losses, unrepresented outsiders, irreversible rights effects, and unequal bargaining power still matter. Preserve a reason record and a challenge path.

Map expectations and payoff exposure. Determine whether actors need information, credible common knowledge, changed incentives, insurance, complementary commitments, or synchronized timing. Select one focal cue—such as a standard, default, public date, precedent, or anchor coalition—with a legitimate sender and unambiguous effective conditions. Then convert intention into assurance through conditional pledges, contracts, deposits, guarantees, schedules, or independently verified readiness.

Define the critical coalition by role and network position, not headcount alone. A platform may need suppliers and users; an infrastructure migration may need operators, vendors, and emergency services; a norm shift may need protected exemplars and credible institutions. Use confidence bands rather than false threshold precision.

Design transition states. Identify what must move together, what can migrate in waves, which bridges permit coexistence, where rollback remains possible, and how stranding is remedied. Protect first movers through shared costs, insurance, guarantees, interoperability, temporary capacity, or bounded subsidies. Publish verified state with uncertainty and correction rather than performative pledge totals.

During and after transition, watch for defection, free riding, counterfeit commitment, conflicting signals, collusion, capture, unsafe partial adoption, and unequal burden. Reinforce the selected practice through onboarding, standards, feedback, proportionate enforcement, and repair. Sunset bridge support only after observed support-independent performance. Reopen selection when performance, technology, legitimacy, participation, or external conditions cross declared triggers.

prose_key_components:
### Coordination Dilemma and Actor Boundary (`coordination_dilemma_and_actor_boundary`)

Prevents ordinary collaboration problems or single-actor optimization from being mislabeled as equilibrium selection.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"coordination_dilemma_and_actor_boundary","name":"Coordination Dilemma and Actor Boundary","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Defines the actors, decisions, interdependencies, timing, externalities, and jurisdiction within which unilateral best responses depend on what others are expected to do.","purpose":"Prevents ordinary collaboration problems or single-actor optimization from being mislabeled as equilibrium selection.","required_fields":["actor_set","choice_set","interdependence","timing","affected_nonparticipants","boundary_owner","decision_frequency","outside_options"],"validation_questions":["Are payoffs materially conditional on others’ choices?","Who is affected without choosing?","Can actors observe one another?","Does the boundary omit a decisive actor?"],"failure_signals":["false_coordination_frame","omitted_actor","hidden_externality","unclear_choice_set"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Coordination Dilemma and Actor Boundary as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Coordination Dilemma and Actor Boundary using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Feasible Equilibrium Set (`feasible_equilibrium_set`)

Makes the multiplicity explicit so the intervention is not reduced to promoting a favorite option without comparing stable alternatives.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"feasible_equilibrium_set","name":"Feasible Equilibrium Set","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Enumerates stable or self-reinforcing outcome patterns that actors could reach under current constraints, including mixed, segmented, or partial equilibria.","purpose":"Makes the multiplicity explicit so the intervention is not reduced to promoting a favorite option without comparing stable alternatives.","required_fields":["candidate_equilibria","stability_conditions","actor_strategies","feasibility_constraints","entry_and_exit","failure_equilibria","uncertainty","model_owner"],"validation_questions":["Which outcomes are mutually stable?","Can different subgroups settle separately?","Which equilibrium exists only on paper?","What new option changes the set?"],"failure_signals":["single_option_assumption","infeasible_target","segmented_equilibrium_missed","model_overconfidence"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Feasible Equilibrium Set as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Feasible Equilibrium Set using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Current Equilibrium Diagnosis (`current_equilibrium_diagnosis`)

Distinguishes a bad equilibrium from temporary disorder, active transition, coercion, or an outcome that some actors reasonably prefer.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"current_equilibrium_diagnosis","name":"Current Equilibrium Diagnosis","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Identifies the presently sustained pattern, the beliefs and feedback that reproduce it, and whether it is inefficient, unsafe, exclusionary, fragile, or merely different from a sponsor preference.","purpose":"Distinguishes a bad equilibrium from temporary disorder, active transition, coercion, or an outcome that some actors reasonably prefer.","required_fields":["observed_pattern","supporting_expectations","reinforcement_loops","switching_costs","distribution","stability_evidence","dissent","diagnosis_confidence"],"validation_questions":["Why does unilateral deviation fail?","Who benefits from the status quo?","Is the pattern stable or only sticky?","What evidence would falsify the diagnosis?"],"failure_signals":["path_dependence_mislabeled","preference_erasure","temporary_state_mistaken","status_quo_power_hidden"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Current Equilibrium Diagnosis as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Current Equilibrium Diagnosis using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Desired Equilibrium and Legitimacy Criteria (`desired_equilibrium_and_legitimacy_criteria`)

Prevents equilibrium engineering from becoming covert preference imposition or coordination around an efficient but illegitimate outcome.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"desired_equilibrium_and_legitimacy_criteria","name":"Desired Equilibrium and Legitimacy Criteria","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Defines candidate target outcomes and tests them for value, feasibility, rights, consent, distribution, reversibility, and authority to coordinate.","purpose":"Prevents equilibrium engineering from becoming covert preference imposition or coordination around an efficient but illegitimate outcome.","required_fields":["target_equilibrium","selection_criteria","public_or_shared_value","rights_floor","consent_basis","distributional_effects","authority","reversibility"],"validation_questions":["Better for whom?","Who may choose the target?","Which rights are nontradeable?","Can dissenters retain a lawful outside option?"],"failure_signals":["sponsor_capture","efficiency_only_choice","coercive_standard","unreviewable_target"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Desired Equilibrium and Legitimacy Criteria as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Desired Equilibrium and Legitimacy Criteria using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Beliefs, Expectations, and Common-Knowledge Map (`beliefs_expectations_and_common_knowledge_map`)

Equilibrium selection often fails because actors privately prefer the same outcome but cannot safely assume that others will choose it.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"beliefs_expectations_and_common_knowledge_map","name":"Beliefs, Expectations, and Common-Knowledge Map","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Maps what actors believe others will do, what they believe others know, which forecasts are shared, and where uncertainty or plural narratives block coordinated choice.","purpose":"Equilibrium selection often fails because actors privately prefer the same outcome but cannot safely assume that others will choose it.","required_fields":["first_order_beliefs","higher_order_expectations","information_sources","credibility","uncertainty","rumors","knowledge_gaps","update_channels"],"validation_questions":["Do actors know others prefer the target?","Is the signal common knowledge or private?","Which source is credible to each group?","Can strategic misreporting distort expectations?"],"failure_signals":["false_consensus","private_signal_fragmentation","rumor_dominance","credibility_gap"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Beliefs, Expectations, and Common-Knowledge Map as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Beliefs, Expectations, and Common-Knowledge Map using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Payoff and Risk Map (`payoff_and_risk_map`)

Reveals why a target that is collectively beneficial may remain individually unsafe and where assurance rather than persuasion is required.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"payoff_and_risk_map","name":"Payoff and Risk Map","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Represents rewards, costs, losses, timing, uncertainty, strategic exposure, and distribution for staying, switching, moving early, defecting, or coordinating on each equilibrium.","purpose":"Reveals why a target that is collectively beneficial may remain individually unsafe and where assurance rather than persuasion is required.","required_fields":["actor_strategy_profiles","current_payoffs","target_payoffs","transition_costs","early_mover_risk","defection_gain","uncertainty","risk_bearer"],"validation_questions":["Who pays before benefits arrive?","Can late movers free ride?","What is the worst credible loss?","Are payoffs monetary, social, legal, or operational?"],"failure_signals":["average_payoff_blindness","transition_cost_omission","tail_risk_ignored","burden_shift"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Payoff and Risk Map as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Payoff and Risk Map using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Focal Point and Selection Signal (`focal_point_and_selection_signal`)

Coordinates expectations without assuming that any visible label, leader announcement, default, deadline, or precedent will be legitimate or understood uniformly.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"focal_point_and_selection_signal","name":"Focal Point and Selection Signal","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Creates a salient, interpretable, credible, and sufficiently unique cue that tells actors which of several acceptable equilibria to expect and when it becomes operative.","purpose":"Coordinates expectations without assuming that any visible label, leader announcement, default, deadline, or precedent will be legitimate or understood uniformly.","required_fields":["selected_option","signal_form","sender_credibility","audience_interpretation","effective_condition","uniqueness","accessibility","conflict_resolution"],"validation_questions":["Will actors read the same cue the same way?","Can rivals spoof it?","Does salience substitute for consent?","What happens if signals conflict?"],"failure_signals":["ambiguous_signal","competing_focal_points","authority_without_legitimacy","inaccessible_cue"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Focal Point and Selection Signal as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Focal Point and Selection Signal using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Commitment and Assurance Structure (`commitment_and_assurance_structure`)

Closes the gap between wanting coordinated change and trusting that enough others will actually follow through.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"commitment_and_assurance_structure","name":"Commitment and Assurance Structure","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Makes intended participation credible through reciprocal pledges, conditional commitments, guarantees, deposits, contracts, public schedules, or enforceable contingent rules.","purpose":"Closes the gap between wanting coordinated change and trusting that enough others will actually follow through.","required_fields":["commitment_form","covered_actors","conditions","verification","enforcement","release_rule","breach_response","commitment_owner"],"validation_questions":["Is the promise observable and enforceable?","Can actors condition commitment on a threshold?","Who guarantees performance?","Can commitments trap actors after conditions change?"],"failure_signals":["cheap_talk","asymmetric_binding","unenforceable_promise","commitment_lock_in"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Commitment and Assurance Structure as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Commitment and Assurance Structure using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Participation Threshold and Critical Coalition (`participation_threshold_and_critical_coalition`)

Separates pure equilibrium selection from the bounded threshold-building work required to make the choice self-supporting.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"participation_threshold_and_critical_coalition","name":"Participation Threshold and Critical Coalition","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Determines the minimum mix, scale, density, authority, or complementary roles needed for the selected equilibrium to become viable.","purpose":"Separates pure equilibrium selection from the bounded threshold-building work required to make the choice self-supporting.","required_fields":["threshold_measure","critical_roles","coalition_composition","geographic_or_network_density","confidence_band","measurement","threshold_owner","reevaluation"],"validation_questions":["Is total count enough or are particular roles essential?","Can a local cluster start safely?","How uncertain is the threshold?","Who is excluded from the coalition?"],"failure_signals":["headcount_only_threshold","missing_complement","false_precision","elite_only_coalition"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Participation Threshold and Critical Coalition as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Participation Threshold and Critical Coalition using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Transition Path and Sequencing (`transition_path_and_sequencing`)

A desirable endpoint can fail when simultaneous change is impossible, legacy and target systems cannot coexist, or intermediate states are unsafe.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"transition_path_and_sequencing","name":"Transition Path and Sequencing","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Designs the reversible steps, synchronization points, dependencies, migration windows, temporary rules, and handoffs that move actors from the current to selected equilibrium.","purpose":"A desirable endpoint can fail when simultaneous change is impossible, legacy and target systems cannot coexist, or intermediate states are unsafe.","required_fields":["transition_states","dependency_order","parallel_run","decision_dates","migration_window","rollback","temporary_governance","completion_test"],"validation_questions":["Which moves must be simultaneous?","Can old and new systems interoperate?","Where is rollback still possible?","Who declares completion?"],"failure_signals":["big_bang_failure","unsafe_intermediate_state","permanent_transition","stranded_actor"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Transition Path and Sequencing as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Transition Path and Sequencing using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Early-Mover Protection and Bridge Incentive (`early_mover_protection_and_bridge_incentive`)

Reduces rational waiting and avoids asking vulnerable actors to bear public coordination risk for everyone else.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"early_mover_protection_and_bridge_incentive","name":"Early-Mover Protection and Bridge Incentive","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Protects actors who switch before the target equilibrium is self-sustaining through guarantees, subsidies, insurance, compatibility, temporary support, or shared transition costs.","purpose":"Reduces rational waiting and avoids asking vulnerable actors to bear public coordination risk for everyone else.","required_fields":["eligible_movers","covered_risks","support_form","budget","duration","anti_gaming","sunset","equity_rule"],"validation_questions":["Who bears first-loss risk?","Will support attract performative adoption?","Does it privilege incumbents?","How does it end without collapse?"],"failure_signals":["premature_sunset","subsidy_capture","permanent_dependency","inequitable_support"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Early-Mover Protection and Bridge Incentive as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Early-Mover Protection and Bridge Incentive using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Coordination Channel and State Visibility (`coordination_channel_and_state_visibility`)

Turns private intention into common operational knowledge while limiting surveillance, manipulation, and false reporting.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"coordination_channel_and_state_visibility","name":"Coordination Channel and State Visibility","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Provides shared, timely, auditable visibility into commitments, participation, readiness, exceptions, breaches, and transition state.","purpose":"Turns private intention into common operational knowledge while limiting surveillance, manipulation, and false reporting.","required_fields":["channel","state_definitions","update_cadence","data_provenance","access","uncertainty","correction","privacy"],"validation_questions":["Can all actors see the same relevant state?","Are counts verified?","Does the dashboard create false certainty?","Can participants correct errors?"],"failure_signals":["stale_state","performative_commitment","privacy_overreach","metric_gaming"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Coordination Channel and State Visibility as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Coordination Channel and State Visibility using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Defection, Miscoordination, and Capture Guardrail (`defection_miscoordination_and_capture_guardrail`)

Protects the selected equilibrium from actors who gain by exploiting others’ commitment or by controlling the selection process.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"defection_miscoordination_and_capture_guardrail","name":"Defection, Miscoordination, and Capture Guardrail","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Detects strategic defection, conflicting signals, counterfeit commitments, partial adoption, collusion, sponsor capture, and cascading coordination failure.","purpose":"Protects the selected equilibrium from actors who gain by exploiting others’ commitment or by controlling the selection process.","required_fields":["defection_conditions","signal_conflict","verification","sanctions","anti_collusion","capture_review","incident_path","restoration"],"validation_questions":["Can a late defector profit?","Who audits the coordinator?","Could the target enable collusion?","What evidence triggers pause?"],"failure_signals":["free_riding","coordinator_capture","collusive_equilibrium","false_defection_claim"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Defection, Miscoordination, and Capture Guardrail as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Defection, Miscoordination, and Capture Guardrail using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Distributional Fairness and Consent Review (`distributional_fairness_and_consent_review`)

Ensures that coordination benefits do not justify concentrating transition cost, excluding minority practices, or eliminating legitimate alternatives without authority.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"distributional_fairness_and_consent_review","name":"Distributional Fairness and Consent Review","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Assesses who gains, pays, waits, loses optionality, is represented, or is coerced by the selected equilibrium and transition.","purpose":"Ensures that coordination benefits do not justify concentrating transition cost, excluding minority practices, or eliminating legitimate alternatives without authority.","required_fields":["benefit_distribution","cost_distribution","voice","consent","rights","accessibility","remedy","minority_option"],"validation_questions":["Are vulnerable actors asked to move first?","Can lawful alternatives coexist?","Who had standing in selection?","What remedy exists for stranded parties?"],"failure_signals":["majority_coercion","minority_erasure","cost_externalization","access_barrier"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Distributional Fairness and Consent Review as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Distributional Fairness and Consent Review using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Stabilization, Reinforcement, and Compliance Loop (`stabilization_reinforcement_and_compliance_loop`)

Prevents temporary coordination success from decaying when attention, subsidy, leadership, or novelty recedes.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"stabilization_reinforcement_and_compliance_loop","name":"Stabilization, Reinforcement, and Compliance Loop","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Reinforces the selected equilibrium after transition through standards, feedback, incentives, monitoring, enforcement, onboarding, and repair until ordinary practice is self-supporting.","purpose":"Prevents temporary coordination success from decaying when attention, subsidy, leadership, or novelty recedes.","required_fields":["stability_metrics","reinforcement","onboarding","compliance","drift_monitor","repair","support_sunset","owner"],"validation_questions":["Does adoption persist without extraordinary support?","Are new entrants coordinated?","Is enforcement proportionate?","Can drift reveal a better equilibrium?"],"failure_signals":["support_cliff","ritual_compliance","punitive_lock_in","new_entrant_failure"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Stabilization, Reinforcement, and Compliance Loop as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Stabilization, Reinforcement, and Compliance Loop using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

### Reevaluation, Exit, and Equilibrium Revision (`reevaluation_exit_and_equilibrium_revision`)

Avoids turning successful coordination into irreversible path dependence or an incumbent convention protected from challenge.

Semantic canonical mapping retained the complete legacy component record: {"slug":"reevaluation_exit_and_equilibrium_revision","name":"Reevaluation, Exit, and Equilibrium Revision","component_type":"required_governance_component","definition":"Defines triggers and legitimate processes for revisiting, reversing, branching, deprecating, or replacing the selected equilibrium when conditions or evidence change.","purpose":"Avoids turning successful coordination into irreversible path dependence or an incumbent convention protected from challenge.","required_fields":["review_triggers","performance_evidence","exit_rights","revision_authority","branching_rule","migration_support","sunset","archive"],"validation_questions":["When should the equilibrium be reopened?","Can dissenters exit safely?","Who can propose an alternative?","How are legacy commitments unwound?"],"failure_signals":["equilibrium_lock_in","premature_churn","punitive_exit","history_erasure"],"safeguards":["independent_evidence_review","affected_actor_voice","versioned_decision_record","proportionate_privacy","exception_and_remedy_path"],"implementation_notes":"Implement Reevaluation, Exit, and Equilibrium Revision as an explicit governed object with a named owner, evidence source, decision role, effective condition, review trigger, and downstream consumer. Test it against actors with different payoffs and information, not only the sponsor’s model.","assurance_notes":"Verify Reevaluation, Exit, and Equilibrium Revision using observed behavior, participant evidence, counterfactual scenarios, and post-transition outcomes. Sample dissent, negative cases, late entrants, vulnerable participants, and conditions under which the object should be revised or retired."}

prose_common_mechanisms:
### Common-Knowledge Broadcast (`common_knowledge_broadcast`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

A credible public statement, ledger, or synchronized notice that makes the selected option and participation state visible to all relevant actors.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: broad actors can receive and authenticate the same message; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"common_knowledge_broadcast","name":"Common-Knowledge Broadcast","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"A credible public statement, ledger, or synchronized notice that makes the selected option and participation state visible to all relevant actors.","fit_conditions":["broad actors can receive and authenticate the same message"],"minimum_configuration":["signal identity","audience","publisher authority","timestamp","acknowledgment","correction"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Common-Knowledge Broadcast.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Common-Knowledge Broadcast implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Conditional Assurance Contract (`conditional_assurance_contract`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Commitments become binding only if a declared participation threshold or complementary actor set is reached.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: actors prefer the target but rationally fear being among too few movers; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"conditional_assurance_contract","name":"Conditional Assurance Contract","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Commitments become binding only if a declared participation threshold or complementary actor set is reached.","fit_conditions":["actors prefer the target but rationally fear being among too few movers"],"minimum_configuration":["threshold","pledges","verification","activation rule","release","breach remedy"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Conditional Assurance Contract.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Conditional Assurance Contract implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Anchor-Participant Pact (`anchor_participant_pact`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Essential high-leverage actors commit together, supply minimum capability, and make the target credible to later participants.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: a small set of complementary roles determines viability; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"anchor_participant_pact","name":"Anchor-Participant Pact","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Essential high-leverage actors commit together, supply minimum capability, and make the target credible to later participants.","fit_conditions":["a small set of complementary roles determines viability"],"minimum_configuration":["anchor criteria","mutual commitments","capacity","anti_capture","entry path","review"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Anchor-Participant Pact.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Anchor-Participant Pact implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Focal Standard and Effective Date (`focal_standard_and_effective_date`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

A legitimate authority or coalition selects one convention, protocol, side, format, or schedule and declares when it governs.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: multiplicity comes from equally workable conventions and coordination needs a unique cue; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"focal_standard_and_effective_date","name":"Focal Standard and Effective Date","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"A legitimate authority or coalition selects one convention, protocol, side, format, or schedule and declares when it governs.","fit_conditions":["multiplicity comes from equally workable conventions and coordination needs a unique cue"],"minimum_configuration":["standard","authority","effective date","transition","exceptions","revision"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Focal Standard and Effective Date.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Focal Standard and Effective Date implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Default Switch with Protected Opt-Out (`default_switch_with_opt_out`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

The default changes to the selected equilibrium while preserving a visible, feasible, and nonpunitive outside option where legitimate.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: inertia blocks coordination but compulsory adoption is unnecessary or unlawful; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"default_switch_with_opt_out","name":"Default Switch with Protected Opt-Out","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"The default changes to the selected equilibrium while preserving a visible, feasible, and nonpunitive outside option where legitimate.","fit_conditions":["inertia blocks coordination but compulsory adoption is unnecessary or unlawful"],"minimum_configuration":["default","notice","opt out","nonretaliation","monitoring","sunset"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Default Switch with Protected Opt-Out.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Default Switch with Protected Opt-Out implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Bridge Subsidy and First-Loss Guarantee (`bridge_subsidy_and_first_loss_guarantee`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Temporary support covers switching cost or downside for early movers until the target becomes self-sustaining.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: transition risk rather than target payoff blocks adoption; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"bridge_subsidy_and_first_loss_guarantee","name":"Bridge Subsidy and First-Loss Guarantee","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Temporary support covers switching cost or downside for early movers until the target becomes self-sustaining.","fit_conditions":["transition risk rather than target payoff blocks adoption"],"minimum_configuration":["eligibility","covered loss","budget","verification","anti gaming","sunset"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Bridge Subsidy and First-Loss Guarantee.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Bridge Subsidy and First-Loss Guarantee implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Pilot Cohort and Cascade (`pilot_cohort_and_cascade`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

A bounded cluster proves viability, exposes transition failures, and then expands through declared gates rather than ungoverned imitation.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: local density can support the target before system-wide adoption; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"pilot_cohort_and_cascade","name":"Pilot Cohort and Cascade","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"A bounded cluster proves viability, exposes transition failures, and then expands through declared gates rather than ungoverned imitation.","fit_conditions":["local density can support the target before system-wide adoption"],"minimum_configuration":["cohort boundary","success test","learning","expansion gates","rollback","equity"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Pilot Cohort and Cascade.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Pilot Cohort and Cascade implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Coordinated Migration Window (`coordinated_migration_window`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

Actors move during a common window with interoperability bridges, readiness checks, cutover support, and rollback.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: legacy and target systems must coexist only briefly or simultaneous change matters; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"coordinated_migration_window","name":"Coordinated Migration Window","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"Actors move during a common window with interoperability bridges, readiness checks, cutover support, and rollback.","fit_conditions":["legacy and target systems must coexist only briefly or simultaneous change matters"],"minimum_configuration":["readiness","window","bridge","support","cutover","rollback"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Coordinated Migration Window.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Coordinated Migration Window implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Commitment and Readiness Dashboard (`commitment_and_readiness_dashboard`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

A verified shared state view shows pledges, threshold confidence, complementary roles, readiness, exceptions, and breaches.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: actors need operational common knowledge rather than private promises; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"commitment_and_readiness_dashboard","name":"Commitment and Readiness Dashboard","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"A verified shared state view shows pledges, threshold confidence, complementary roles, readiness, exceptions, and breaches.","fit_conditions":["actors need operational common knowledge rather than private promises"],"minimum_configuration":["metrics","provenance","access","uncertainty","correction","privacy"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Commitment and Readiness Dashboard.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Commitment and Readiness Dashboard implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

### Equilibrium Review and Reselection Trigger (`equilibrium_review_and_reselection_trigger`)

**Type:** `implementation_pattern`

A scheduled or event-driven forum reopens selection when performance, legitimacy, technology, participation, or external conditions cross a threshold.

Selection constraints and retained implementation evidence: lock-in risk is material and the convention may outlive its value; Complete legacy mechanism record retained: {"slug":"equilibrium_review_and_reselection_trigger","name":"Equilibrium Review and Reselection Trigger","mechanism_type":"implementation_pattern","purpose":"A scheduled or event-driven forum reopens selection when performance, legitimacy, technology, participation, or external conditions cross a threshold.","fit_conditions":["lock-in risk is material and the convention may outlive its value"],"minimum_configuration":["triggers","evidence","standing","alternatives","decision rule","migration remedy"],"implementation_steps":["Define the actors, choices, current equilibrium, target, legitimacy basis, and influence of Equilibrium Review and Reselection Trigger.","Specify the signal, commitments, threshold or activation conditions, owners, verification, exceptions, and revision path.","Pilot against defection, partial adoption, false readiness, vulnerable early movers, conflicting signals, and coordinator capture.","Publish proportionate state and reasons, protect privacy and practical exit, and measure post-support stability.","Stop, roll back, branch, or redesign if rights, legitimacy, threshold confidence, distribution, or performance fails."],"validation_signals":["actors interpret activation conditions consistently","commitment or readiness evidence is independently verifiable","the mechanism changes best responses rather than only stated attitudes","early and vulnerable movers receive proportionate protection","temporary authority and support have expiry and reselection"],"misuse_risks":["coercive_compliance","false_common_knowledge","capture_or_collusion","privacy_overreach","support_dependency"],"safeguards":["rights_and_legitimacy_review","independent_verification","protected_exit","distributional_monitoring","sunset_and_revision"],"non_equivalence":"Equilibrium Review and Reselection Trigger implements a bounded part of Coordination Equilibrium Shift. It does not alone enumerate equilibria, select a legitimate target, map beliefs and payoffs, assure a critical coalition, govern transition, stabilize practice, and preserve exit and revision."}

prose_failure_modes:
### Announcement Without Common Knowledge

**Failure:** A message is sent but actors do not know that others received, believed, or will act on it. **Recovery:** authenticated common broadcast, acknowledgment, belief sampling, state visibility. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Cheap Talk Commitment

**Failure:** Actors pledge support without cost, verification, or conditional binding. **Recovery:** assurance contract, deposit or guarantee, threshold activation, breach remedy. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Wrong Or Illegitimate Equilibrium

**Failure:** A powerful sponsor selects its preferred outcome and labels compliance coordination. **Recovery:** selection criteria, standing and consent, rights floor, independent distribution review. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Early Mover Exposure

**Failure:** First movers bear cost while others wait or free ride. **Recovery:** first-loss protection, bridge subsidy, anchor pact, conditional launch. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Unsafe Partial Transition

**Failure:** Incomplete migration breaks compatibility, service, or safety. **Recovery:** dependency sequence, migration window, bridge interface, rollback gate. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Threshold False Precision

**Failure:** A single adoption number ignores role composition, network density, or uncertainty. **Recovery:** critical coalition model, confidence band, scenario test, threshold reevaluation. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Competing Focal Points

**Failure:** Multiple authorities, dates, defaults, or standards fragment expectations. **Recovery:** signal registry, authority resolution, conflict notice, selection reset. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Coordination Capture Or Collusion

**Failure:** The process stabilizes an exclusionary or cartel-like outcome. **Recovery:** anti capture review, outside option, competition and rights review, external oversight. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Support Cliff

**Failure:** Adoption collapses when temporary subsidy or attention ends. **Recovery:** self sustainability test, gradual sunset, post support monitoring, fallback. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

### Equilibrium Lock In

**Failure:** A once-useful convention suppresses better alternatives and punishes exit. **Recovery:** review triggers, protected exit, branching and versioning, reselections. Reassess the target, commitments, state evidence, affected actors, and decisions made under the failed condition; use pause, rollback, repair, or reselection rather than preserving the appearance of coordination.

prose_neighbor_distinctions:
### `critical_mass_building`

Builds enough participation for self-sustaining emergence after a direction is sufficiently defined; the candidate also selects among equilibria, aligns expectations, assures commitment, governs transition, and preserves revision. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `coordination_and_synchronization_across_reentry_phases`

Sequences restart of separated parts under a chosen reentry objective; it does not choose among competing strategic equilibria. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `payoff_restructuring`

Changes rewards and penalties so choices change; equilibrium selection may succeed without payoff change through focal signals and assurance, and includes legitimacy and transition. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `symbolic_convention_governance`

Maintains arbitrary signs and meanings; strategic conventions can concern driving sides, protocols, technologies, behaviors, or institutions, not only symbolic meaning. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `symmetry_breaking_for_differentiation`

Breaks equivalence to assign roles or direction; it does not build mutual expectations and transition actors between equilibria. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `network_effect_bootstrapping`

Solves platform cold start as a domain configuration with adoption thresholds; the parent transfers beyond networks and includes selection and revision. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `interoperability_standardization`

Specifies and governs shared technical interfaces after a standard is chosen; the parent governs how one of multiple viable standards becomes selected and adopted. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

### `feedback_loop_redirection`

Rewires response signals and rules; it can reinforce a chosen equilibrium but does not supply selection legitimacy and mutual assurance. Preserve it as an accepted companion rather than absorbing its mature identity.

The queue’s single related-only neighbor, `coordination_and_synchronization_across_reentry_phases`, is especially bounded: it brings separated parts back in a safe order after a reentry objective already exists. Q32 concerns the prior strategic problem of choosing and making one of several stable outcomes credible. The frozen proposed alias to `critical_mass_building` is also rejected. Threshold accumulation is one component of the shift, while expectations, focal selection, assurance, transition, legitimacy, stabilization, and revision remain distinct.

prose_cross_domain_examples:
### Interoperability Standard

Competing workable protocols require a legitimate selection forum, focal specification and date, anchor implementers, conformance evidence, adapters, coordinated migration, and version review. The distinctive risk is standard sponsor capture and stranded legacy users. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Platform Cold Start

Both sides condition participation on the other; anchor users, minimum liquidity assurance, temporary subsidy, verified readiness, and support sunset create a viable target equilibrium. The distinctive risk is subsidy-dependent activity mistaken for durable adoption. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Organizational Operating Model

Teams privately prefer a shared workflow but wait for others; commitments, default tooling, cohort migration, bridge staffing, common state, and protected exceptions coordinate change. The distinctive risk is performative compliance and punitive opt-out. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Public Safety Convention

Authorities and communities select a common warning, evacuation side, or emergency protocol through credible broadcast, drills, accessibility, synchronized activation, and post-event revision. The distinctive risk is ambiguity or exclusion causing unsafe split behavior. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Energy Transition

Producers, grid operators, suppliers, financiers, and users require complementary thresholds, long-term assurance, early-mover protection, infrastructure sequencing, fairness, and reselection. The distinctive risk is cost shifting and stranded communities or assets. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Distributed Technology Migration

Validators, clients, exchanges, applications, and users coordinate a version or rule change with activation threshold, readiness dashboard, compatibility bridge, migration window, rollback, and minority-chain governance. The distinctive risk is false readiness, chain split, or captured activation. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Social Norm Change

A harmful convention persists because dissenters expect others to comply; protected pledges, credible exemplars, coordinated public shift, early-mover safety, and reinforcement alter expectations. The distinctive risk is shaming, surveillance, or suppressing legitimate pluralism. A mature implementation records the current and target equilibrium, actor-specific transition exposure, focal authority, verified commitments, critical coalition, intermediate states, bridge support, defection response, distribution, support sunset, and reselection triggers.

### Worked protocol-selection case

Three public agencies and their suppliers use incompatible identity protocols. Everyone prefers one shared protocol, but no agency will move first because users would lose access to the others. A legitimate interagency forum compares feasible standards, security, accessibility, vendor concentration, cost, and exit. It selects one focal standard and effective date, obtains conditional commitments from all three agencies and two essential suppliers, funds adapters for small vendors, publishes independently verified readiness with uncertainty, and runs a reversible pilot. Cutover occurs only when complementary-role thresholds pass. A post-migration review monitors outages, vendor exclusion, support dependence, and sponsor capture; version governance can reopen the choice when cryptography or accessibility requirements change.

### Worked norm-shift case

Employees privately prefer to stop an unsafe informal practice but expect peers and managers to punish dissent. Anonymous preference evidence reveals pluralistic ignorance. A protected conditional pledge activates only if a cross-role threshold is reached; credible senior and worker exemplars announce together; anti-retaliation, alternate reporting, and independent enforcement protect early movers. The organization changes the default procedure, publishes verified adoption without exposing individual pledges, monitors retaliation and workload, and permits justified exceptions. The shift is not successful merely because the old behavior disappears: safety, voice, practical exit, and post-attention stability must improve.

prose_non_examples:
- A project team needs a shared calendar after everyone already agrees on the schedule. This is routine coordination or synchronization, not equilibrium selection.
- A regulator wants compliance with a lawful single rule and no alternative equilibrium is in scope. Use implementation and enforcement governance.
- An organization changes rewards so an undesirable strategy is no longer individually rational. That is Payoff Restructuring unless multiple equilibria and mutual assurance still require the parent.
- A platform simply needs more users after its target model and complementary sides are settled. Network Effect Bootstrapping may own the work.
- A standards body documents terminology meanings. That is Symbolic Convention Governance.
- A migration team sequences services back online after a shutdown. That is Coordination and Synchronization Across Reentry Phases.
- A leader announces a deadline without legitimate selection, reciprocal commitment, threshold evidence, bridge support, or rollback. That is an order, not a mature shift.
- A default technically permits opt-out but imposes loss of benefits, stigma, inaccessible procedure, or retaliation. That is coercion, not assurance.
- A cartel coordinates prices, a dominant platform locks out rivals, or a majority suppresses a minority practice. Stability does not make the equilibrium legitimate.
- Subsidized signups disappear when payments end. That is purchased activity, not a support-independent equilibrium.
- A public dashboard counts unverifiable pledges. That is performative visibility, not common operational knowledge.
- An incumbent convention cannot be reviewed because switching would be difficult. That is lock-in, not a reason to abandon reselection.

prose_tradeoffs:
**Speed versus legitimacy.** A powerful authority can create a focal point quickly, but premature selection can suppress standing, alternatives, and distribution review. Emergency authority needs narrow scope, evidence, review, and expiry.

**Salience versus deliberation.** A vivid default, leader, date, or precedent may solve ambiguity while biasing selection toward whoever controls attention. Separate the cue that coordinates from the criteria that justify the target.

**Commitment versus adaptability.** Strong commitments make participation credible but can trap actors when conditions change. Use conditional activation, limited duration, review triggers, and lawful unwind paths.

**Threshold confidence versus privacy.** Shared readiness data creates common knowledge, yet detailed participant exposure can enable retaliation or strategic targeting. Publish verified aggregate and role coverage with purpose-limited detail.

**Transition assurance versus subsidy dependence.** Bridge support can make early movement rational but may attract performative adoption or protect incumbents. Tie support to verified risk, use anti-gaming controls, test self-sustainability, and sunset gradually.

**Uniformity versus pluralism.** One convention reduces friction but can erase minority practice and experimentation. Preserve compatible branches, adapters, or practical opt-out when the coordination benefit does not require exclusivity.

**Enforcement versus voluntary coordination.** Sanctions can deter defection but also convert assurance into coercion. Match enforcement to explicit commitments, consequence, due process, and remedy; do not punish dissent from an illegitimate target.

prose_invariants_to_preserve:
1. Strategic interdependence and multiple feasible equilibria are demonstrated, not assumed.
2. The current equilibrium is diagnosed through behavior, beliefs, feedback, and switching conditions.
3. The target is selected by legitimate criteria, not sponsor preference or salience alone.
4. Rights floors and materially affected outsiders remain inside the analysis.
5. Common knowledge is distinguished from one-way communication and private information.
6. Commitments are credible enough to alter expectations and have verifiable activation conditions.
7. Thresholds include essential roles, density, and uncertainty rather than headcount alone.
8. Early and resource-poor movers do not carry uncompensated collective transition risk.
9. Intermediate states, bridges, rollback, and stranded-party remedy are explicit.
10. Shared state is verified, timely, correctable, and proportionate to privacy.
11. Defection, collusion, capture, and conflicting focal points have detection and response.
12. Consent, distribution, access, and practical exit are reviewed throughout transition.
13. Temporary subsidy and extraordinary coordination authority expire.
14. Stabilization does not convert the selected equilibrium into irreversible obedience.
15. New entrants can understand and join the convention without hidden sponsorship.
16. Performance, legitimacy, and changed conditions can trigger exit, branching, or reselection.

prose_target_outcomes:
A good intervention produces shared and accurate expectations about the selected target, credible participation from the necessary complementary coalition, a transition in which no critical actor or vulnerable group is stranded, and a practice that remains viable after bridge support ends. Actors should know not only what to do but why others are expected to do it, when activation occurs, how readiness is verified, what happens on breach, and how the convention can later change.

Operational indicators include verified commitment rate, critical-role coverage, threshold confidence, interpretation consistency, transition completion, rollback incidence, early-mover loss, defection, exception use, stranded actors, opt-out feasibility, distributional effects, support dependency, post-support stability, new-entrant success, and revision latency. Read the measures together. A high pledge count with missing complementary roles is not readiness; rapid adoption under punitive exit is not legitimate coordination; stability under permanent subsidy is not a self-sustaining equilibrium.

The objective is not permanent uniformity. Some domains support plural local equilibria connected by translation or interoperability. Success may mean selecting one global protocol, several compatible regional conventions, or a bounded default with genuine opt-out. The target outcome is the least coercive stable coordination structure that satisfies the legitimate need.

prose_parameter_dimensions:
Implementations must declare their tuning choices because hidden parameters can determine who coordinates, who pays, and which outcome becomes focal.

- **Actor and matter scope:** tune formal and de facto participants, affected outsiders, geographic or network boundaries, decision frequency, and lawful outside options.
- **Equilibrium model depth:** decide how many alternatives, mixed or segmented outcomes, uncertainty ranges, and strategic adaptations need explicit representation.
- **Signal salience and authority:** tune uniqueness, credibility, accessibility, language, effective date, acknowledgment, conflict resolution, and protection against spoofing.
- **Commitment strength:** choose public pledge, conditional contract, deposit, guarantee, binding schedule, or enforceable rule according to cheap-talk and breach risk.
- **Threshold definition:** tune total count, complementary roles, density, geography, capacity, confidence band, and verification freshness.
- **Transition pace:** choose simultaneous cutover, waves, cohorts, parallel run, or reversible pilot based on compatibility and intermediate-state risk.
- **Bridge strength and duration:** calibrate subsidy, insurance, interoperability, staffing, technical support, or first-loss protection to actual early-mover exposure.
- **Visibility and privacy:** publish enough verified state to create common operational knowledge without exposing sensitive strategy, association, or dissent.
- **Defection response:** tune monitoring, cure period, sanction, guarantee, rollback, and restoration to consequence and strategic exploitability.
- **Opt-out and minority coexistence:** test cost, accessibility, stigma, interoperability, and retaliation; formal permission is not practical exit.
- **Support sunset:** reduce extraordinary support only after observed stability, not a planned date or headline adoption number alone.
- **Revision threshold:** specify performance, legitimacy, technology, participation, harm, capture, or external-change conditions that reopen selection.

Parameters should be versioned, explained, and stress-tested against actor heterogeneity. A threshold suitable for a dense technical network may fail in a geographically dispersed public system. A strong focal authority may accelerate emergency coordination but require short expiry and external review. A default that works for low-cost software preference may be coercive in healthcare, employment, or public benefits.

prose_variants_and_near_names:
### Convention Selection and Standard Migration

Several technically or socially workable conventions are incompatible, and actors need one selected standard plus governed migration. Specialized requirements are selection forum, standard and effective date, compatibility bridge, conformance evidence, version and deprecation. Not merely Symbolic Convention Governance or Interoperability Standardization; it owns the prior strategic selection and collective transition.

### Mutual-Assurance Collective-Action Shift

Actors prefer a collective outcome but participate only if enough others make credible conditional commitments. Specialized requirements are conditional pledge, threshold activation, first loss protection, public commitment state, release and remedy. Critical Mass Building may supply the threshold, but the variant emphasizes higher-order belief, conditional commitment, and assurance.

### Platform and Market Cold-Start Equilibrium

Complementary market or platform sides wait for one another and initial value is below the sustainable level. Specialized requirements are cross side threshold, anchor participants, initial utility floor, market making or subsidy, support independence test. Network Effect Bootstrapping is the specialized companion; this variant preserves legitimacy, distribution, transition, defection, and reselection.

### Norm Shift with Protected Early Movers

A social or organizational convention persists because potential dissenters expect others to comply and fear being isolated. Specialized requirements are private preference evidence, protected conditional pledge, credible public exemplar, anti retaliation, pluralism and exit review. Not a generic behavior-change campaign; it changes mutual expectations while protecting dissent and legitimate plurality.

Near aliases—Equilibrium Selection and Transition, Focal-Point Coordination, Convention-Selection Governance, Mutual-Assurance Coordination, and Better-Equilibrium Shift—are acceptable only when they denote the complete parent loop. A focal point, deadline, pledge, default, subsidy, standard, dashboard, pilot, or migration window by itself is a mechanism. “Consensus” is not an alias: actors can coordinate without agreeing that the selected outcome is intrinsically best, and apparent consensus can exist without credible expectation of action.

name: Convention Selection and Standard Migration

variant_type: other

use_when: The specialization materially changes how Coordination Equilibrium Shift is configured while preserving its invariants.

name: Platform and Market Cold-Start Equilibrium