{"schema_version":1,"experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp04_retrieval_first_paired20_20260802","cell_id":"invariant_mode_decomposition_design__political_science","hypothesis_id":"H1","search_queries":["\"legislative\" \"spectral\" roll-call coalition eigenvector defection","parliament coalition stability roll-call network member defection impact","legislative vote prediction whip targeting outreach concessions algorithm","dynamic latent factor roll call votes coalition collapse prediction","patent legislative vote prediction whip count software legislators","\"whip count\" software legislative vote prediction product","parliamentary party whipping concessions bargaining legislators professional practice","\"roll-call\" transition matrix eigenvalues legislature voting"],"sources":[{"source_id":"S1","title":"US12236497B2 — Systems and methods for predicting policy adoption","publisher":"United States Patent and Trademark Office record via Google Patents","url":"https://patents.google.com/patent/US12236497B2/en","source_class":"GOVERNMENT_OR_REGULATOR","claims_supported":["Discloses predicting each policymaker's decision and propensity, estimating passage likelihood, identifying an action likely to change a policymaker's prediction, and recommending that action to increase the desired outcome's likelihood.","Also discloses a virtual whipboard that groups legislators by predicted tendency and supports selecting groups for communication, substantially overlapping the proposed prediction-to-outreach workflow."]},{"source_id":"S2","title":"Voting Behavior, Coalitions and Government Strength through a Complex Network Analysis","publisher":"PLOS ONE; author manuscript via arXiv","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.0913","source_class":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","claims_supported":["Constructs roll-call agreement networks to recover emergent coalitions and measure polarization, coalition cohesiveness, and government strength over time.","Quantifies each member's contribution to coalition stability and the impact of possible defection, directly overlapping collective defection monitoring."]},{"source_id":"S3","title":"Coalition Structure and Polarization in Parliamentary Voting Networks: Evidence from the Italian Parliament","publisher":"arXiv","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.04088","source_class":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","claims_supported":["Combines voting distances, network modularity, community detection, and betweenness centrality across more than four million vote expressions.","Identifies implicit coalitions and structural bridge legislators from public roll-call data, demonstrating current system-level coalition monitoring beyond formal blocs."]},{"source_id":"S4","title":"Whip","publisher":"Apogee","url":"https://apog.ai/docs/features/whip","source_class":"COMMERCIAL_FIRST_PARTY","claims_supported":["Provides a live whip-count product that tracks each office's current position, movement history, evidence, responsible team member, and notes about what moved the office.","Shows that longitudinal pre-vote position tracking and coordinated outreach management are already productized, although the documentation does not describe modal inference or automated concession selection."]},{"source_id":"S5","title":"Whips","publisher":"UK Parliament","url":"https://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/principal/whips/","source_class":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","claims_supported":["Defines whips' responsibilities as maximizing attendance and securing votes consistent with party objectives.","States that whipping becomes especially important under small government majorities because major votes are easier to lose, supporting the operational problem context."]},{"source_id":"S6","title":"How is legislation made?","publisher":"Institute for Government and Bennett Institute for Public Policy","url":"https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-12/the-legislative-process.pdf","source_class":"AUTHORITATIVE_SECONDARY","claims_supported":["Explains that narrow majorities increase defeat risk and legislators' bargaining power.","Describes persuasion, incentives, concessions, and coalition negotiations as parts of legislative vote management, supporting the proposed intervention setting but not its modal decision rule."]}],"proximity":"SUBSTANTIAL_COLLISION","closest_analogues":[{"name":"US12236497B2 policy-adoption prediction and action-prescription system","similarity":"Covers pending-policy prediction, individual policymaker propensities, passage likelihood, recommended actions intended to change those propensities, and communication with selected legislator groups—the hypothesis's core operational path from pre-vote signals to targeted outreach.","remaining_difference":"Its disclosed decision representation is based on individual policymakers, alignments, assumptions, and groups; it does not expressly derive persistent or growing eigenmodes of a vote-transition operator or target a joint grievance direction.","source_ids":["S1"]},{"name":"Dal Maso et al. coalition-strength and defection-impact analysis","similarity":"Infers collective coalition structure from roll calls, tracks its stability over time, and evaluates the impact of possible defections rather than relying only on declared party labels.","remaining_difference":"It uses agreement-network communities and member contributions for retrospective or contemporaneous assessment, not modal stability classification followed by perturbation-based allocation of concessions or outreach.","source_ids":["S2"]},{"name":"Contemporary roll-call coalition-network monitoring","similarity":"Uses large-scale voting data to reveal implicit coalitions, polarization, cohesion, and structurally influential bridge legislators.","remaining_difference":"It does not estimate a vote-transition operator, encode grievances as invariant modes, or recommend interventions according to causal passage-probability sensitivity.","source_ids":["S3"]},{"name":"Commercial live whip-count systems","similarity":"Operationalizes the nominated workflow boundary by maintaining pre-vote positions, movement histories, evidence about what moved an office, team ownership, and outreach-relevant lists.","remaining_difference":"The opened product documentation describes a member-level ledger rather than automated collective-mode discovery, stability analysis, or optimized concessions.","source_ids":["S4"]}],"overlapping_components":["Pre-vote legislator-position estimation","Individual vote-propensity prediction","Bill-passage probability estimation","Selection of legislators or groups for communication","Recommendation of actions intended to improve policy-adoption probability","Roll-call-derived coalition structure","Longitudinal coalition-stability monitoring","Member-defection impact analysis","Identification of implicit coalitions and structural bridge legislators","Tracking evidence about what changed an office's position","Whip allocation under narrow-majority risk","Use of persuasion, incentives, and concessions as vote-management levers"],"remaining_contrastive_claim":"Unlike the located prior art, the hypothesis jointly estimates a legislative vote-transition operator, identifies persistent or growing collective grievance eigenmodes, and ranks concessions or outreach by perturbational sensitivity of passage probability, yielding better held-out close-vote performance than individual-propensity targeting.","claim_falsifier":"The contrastive claim would be falsified by an earlier paper, patent, product manual, or documented whip protocol that performs that complete operator-to-eigenmode-to-grievance-intervention workflow, or by a preregistered held-out comparison showing that its recommendations do not outperform the patented or conventional individual-propensity and coalition-network baselines.","problem_support":"MODERATE","recommendation":"REJECT","world_novelty_boundary":"The broad prediction-to-targeted-action workflow substantially collides with a granted policy-adoption patent, while collective roll-call structure, coalition-stability analysis, defection-impact measurement, implicit-coalition detection, and live whip ledgers are independently established. The bounded remaining distinction is the specific use of transition-operator eigenmodes as joint grievance targets and a modal sensitivity rule for choosing concessions. This ordinary-web-search review cannot exclude confidential party systems, proprietary lobbying platforms, poorly indexed patents, or undocumented professional practice, and it is not a legal patent-validity or freedom-to-operate opinion."}