{"schema_version":1,"experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp06_four_proposal_generalization60_20260803","cell_id":"bounded_rivalry_governance__aviation_aeronautics","arm":"COMPLETE_PROPOSAL_PORTFOLIO","candidate_id":"brg-aa-03-rotable-repair-reliability-arena","proposal_index":3,"version":0,"title":"Rotable Repair Reliability Arena for Recurring Maintenance Volume","problem":"An aircraft operator allocates recurring repair work for safety-relevant rotable components among qualified maintenance, repair, and overhaul shops. When the next contract or work share is determined mainly by quoted price and turnaround time, rival shops can improve their competitive position by narrowing inspections, classifying difficult units as uneconomical, using minimally compliant repairs, understating exclusions, or shifting latent repeat-removal and documentation costs back to the operator. Because these consequences appear after the award, the rivalry can select bid performance rather than dependable lifecycle performance.","actors":["Aircraft operator procurement team","Operator engineering and continuing-airworthiness personnel","Qualified maintenance, repair, and overhaul shops","Shop technicians and quality-assurance personnel","Operator maintenance-control and records teams","Flight crews and passengers exposed to component reliability","Line-maintenance teams performing removals and replacements","Independent scoring auditor and appeal reviewer","Component original-equipment manufacturer where technical data are required","Applicable maintenance-approval and aviation-safety authorities"],"observable_state":"For each eligible component work order: part and serial number; incoming condition and fault code; shop acceptance or rejection; quoted and invoiced price; promised and actual turnaround; inspection scope; findings; replaced parts; approved technical data used; bench-test result; release documentation completeness; warranty terms; repeat fault; early removal; no-fault-found classification; removal context; shop-attributable documentation correction; warranty claim; and subsequent service exposure. At the portfolio level, observe bid clustering, bid rotation, stable work-share patterns, selective rejection of difficult units, audit failures, concentration, appeals, and differences between quoted and realized operator burden.","consequence":"A shop can win work by presenting low immediate cost while transferring repeat removals, aircraft disruption, troubleshooting labor, records correction, warranty disputes, and latent reliability risk to the operator and downstream users. Honest shops may face pressure to match the narrow visible offer, while a single award can also make the operator dependent on one shop's tooling, records, and turnaround capacity.","affected_objective":"Preserve price and turnaround discipline in component repair while making verified repair quality, traceability, case acceptance, downstream reliability, workforce safeguards, and supply resilience legitimate routes to winning future work share.","intervention":"Replace the single episodic award with a rolling, multiple-award reliability arena for a narrowly defined set of rotable component families. Prequalify shops on approvals, technical-data access, tooling, personnel competence, configuration control, records portability, and financial capacity for a warranty reserve. During an initial observation round, allocate matched component lots under a frozen rulebook so shops receive comparable mixes of incoming condition and cannot improve rank by accepting only easy units. Safety, approved-data use, release documentation, and mandatory inspection requirements are pass-fail and cannot be traded against price. Among compliant repairs, score independently audited landed cost, turnaround reliability, accepted-case coverage, repeat-removal outcomes over a fixed observation window, documentation corrections, warranty responsiveness, and service exposure. Hold back a portion of the score until field outcomes mature. Allocate the next period's repair volume as a portfolio across at least two qualifying shops, with the marginal share determined by what each shop adds in reliability, capability coverage, and capacity resilience. Require a per-unit warranty reserve or bond that remains available through the observation window. Standardize bid and technical presentations and cap bidder-funded demonstration units and evaluator contact so winning does not depend on a marketing or free-work arms race. Screen cross-round bids, rejection patterns, and work-share stability for possible coordination, referring anomalies for independent inquiry rather than treating them as findings. Reopen a bounded challenger window each allocation period and conduct a post-period review before changing weights, bond levels, or eligibility.","structural_mapping":[{"archetype_element":"Rivalry purpose statement","domain_realization":"Use recurring supplier rivalry to discover dependable repair value and maintain capacity alternatives, rather than merely obtaining the lowest visible unit price."},{"archetype_element":"Scarce prize or selection constraint","domain_realization":"A constrained share of the operator's next-period repair volume for specified rotable component families."},{"archetype_element":"Competitor eligibility boundary","domain_realization":"Only shops holding the required approvals, technical data, tooling, competent personnel, configuration controls, portable records, and warranty capacity may compete."},{"archetype_element":"Contest arena boundary","domain_realization":"Permitted competition includes price, documented process improvement, compliant turnaround, case acceptance, warranty service, and verified repair outcomes. Falsified records, unauthorized data, selective concealment, interference, bid coordination, inducements to evaluators, and strategic rejection outside declared criteria are prohibited."},{"archetype_element":"Performance metric and scoring basis","domain_realization":"Noncompensable safety and traceability gates precede a held-back composite score covering risk-adjusted landed cost, turnaround reliability, accepted-case coverage, repeat removals, documentation quality, warranty response, and observed service exposure."},{"archetype_element":"Fair process and due process layer","domain_realization":"The operator freezes case-matching rules, outcome windows, attribution standards, weights, tie-breaks, audit access, conflict disclosures, debriefs, and an independent time-boxed appeal route before scored lots are assigned."},{"archetype_element":"Anti-sabotage and anti-collusion guardrail","domain_realization":"Custody logs, equal audit rules, bid and rejection-pattern screens, evaluator separation, and graduated penalties address interference, evidence manipulation, reciprocal bidding, and coordinated market sharing."},{"archetype_element":"Externality and spillover boundary","domain_realization":"Field removals, records corrections, warranty labor, difficult-unit rejection, and service exposure enter the evaluation, while a reserve remains available for attributable remediation after payment."},{"archetype_element":"Escalation and arms-race damper","domain_realization":"Standard bid templates, capped demonstration units, limited evaluator contact, and exclusion of uncompensated extras prevent costly presentations or free speculative work from becoming the route to award."},{"archetype_element":"Prize decomposition or multiple-winner design","domain_realization":"Repair volume is divided among at least two complementary qualifying shops to preserve capability coverage, comparison data, and contingency capacity."},{"archetype_element":"Winner power and lock-in review","domain_realization":"Portable repair records, operator access to outcome data, periodic reopening, and concentration review prevent a high-scoring shop from owning the information or interfaces needed for future competition."},{"archetype_element":"Learning and recalibration loop","domain_realization":"After each fixed outcome window, the operator reviews attribution disputes, censoring, case-mix balance, observed spillovers, concentration, and metric gaming before revising or retiring the arena."}],"mechanism_mapping":[{"mechanism_slug":"tender_or_rfp_process","role":"Publishes component scope, eligibility, case-allocation method, scoring, evidence requirements, conflicts, debriefs, and appeal rights before shops submit offers.","counterfactual_removal":"Without the structured and contestable solicitation, the operator could tailor qualification or work-share decisions after seeing supplier identities and results."},{"mechanism_slug":"contest_rulebook","role":"Freezes safety gates, allowed moves, matched-lot rules, outcome attribution, score holdback, tie-breaks, fouls, and appeals for each allocation period.","counterfactual_removal":"Without a binding rulebook, shops could not plan against stable terms and the operator could redefine repeat removal, difficult-unit acceptance, or documentation quality after outcomes appear."},{"mechanism_slug":"multiple_award_or_portfolio_selection","role":"Allocates repair volume across complementary qualifying shops based on the capability and resilience each adds to the supplier portfolio.","counterfactual_removal":"Without portfolio selection, small or noisy score differences could create single-shop dependence and eliminate the live comparator needed to discipline later performance."},{"mechanism_slug":"externality_bond_or_liability_rule","role":"Maintains a per-unit warranty reserve through the field-observation window for attributable repeat repair, records correction, or agreed remediation.","counterfactual_removal":"Without secured liability, a shop could price expected downstream failures as costs borne later by the operator, especially if the shop exits or disputes responsibility."},{"mechanism_slug":"anti_collusion_monitoring","role":"Pools cross-round bid, rejection, pricing, and work-share data to screen for cover bids, rotation, reciprocal abstention, or suspiciously stable divisions of work.","counterfactual_removal":"Without pooled monitoring, repeated procurements could look competitive one round at a time while suppliers quietly divide component families or allocation periods."},{"mechanism_slug":"sabotage_or_foul_penalty_schedule","role":"Publishes graduated consequences for falsified traceability, prohibited inducements, evidence tampering, interference, undeclared coordination, and repeated strategic case rejection.","counterfactual_removal":"Without predefined consequences, misconduct could remain a profitable competitive tactic and enforcement could be applied selectively after the fact."},{"mechanism_slug":"spending_cap_or_resource_cap","role":"Caps bidder-funded demonstrations, uncompensated sample work, marketing submissions, and direct evaluator access considered during competition.","counterfactual_removal":"Without the cap, well-resourced shops could turn qualification into a costly free-work and access contest unrelated to field repair quality."},{"mechanism_slug":"challenger_access_window","role":"Reopens qualification and a bounded share of repair volume each period for a shop meeting the same safety and capability requirements.","counterfactual_removal":"Without recurring access, accumulated records, tooling familiarity, and switching costs could make the first portfolio permanent even after another shop becomes qualified."},{"mechanism_slug":"post_contest_impact_review","role":"Compares awarded scores with mature field outcomes, downstream labor, warranty recovery, concentration, difficult-unit handling, and nonparticipant effects before the next round.","counterfactual_removal":"Without retrospective review, biased case matching, weak attribution, short observation windows, or a gamed metric could persist because each procurement appeared procedurally complete."}],"causal_chain":["Recurring repair volume is scarce, so qualified shops have reason to outperform or displace one another.","If awards emphasize quoted price and promised turnaround, lifecycle consequences arriving after release remain weakly coupled to winning.","Matched component lots and mandatory safety and traceability gates prevent shops from improving rank by selecting only easy work or trading compliance against price.","Score holdback makes verified field outcomes and service exposure relevant to the next allocation instead of ending evaluation at shop release.","A secured warranty reserve keeps agreed downstream costs attached to the shop that produced the repair.","Standardized submissions and capped demonstrations limit escalation into free work, marketing, or evaluator-access contests.","Portfolio allocation maintains rivalry and resilience without granting one noisy winner the entire future market.","Cross-round monitoring and graduated fouls constrain coordinated bidding, evidence manipulation, and strategic rejection.","Portable records and challenger windows keep later entry feasible despite incumbent learning and tooling advantages.","Post-period review tests whether winning remains coupled to dependable lifecycle contribution and revises or retires the rules when it does not."],"baseline":"A prespecified lowest-evaluated-price tender among approved shops, using quoted unit price and promised turnaround as the principal award variables, with standard regulatory compliance and warranty clauses but no matched outcome cohort, score holdback, portfolio objective, or recurring performance-based reallocation.","nearest_rivals":["A conventional performance-based maintenance contract with service-level penalties; it can reward availability but may aggregate outcomes at fleet level and leave component case mix or attribution opaque.","A single-source long-term partnership selected through technical review; it can support investment and shared learning but weakens continuing comparative pressure and creates switching dependence.","An approved-vendor list with dispatcher choice on each work order; it preserves options but may produce uncontrolled case selection, inconsistent evidence, and no coherent portfolio objective.","Fixed work-share quotas among qualified shops; they protect capacity diversity but do not make marginal volume responsive to audited lifecycle contribution.","Cost-plus repair with operator-directed inspection scope; it reduces pressure to omit work but weakens price discipline and places design and oversight burden on the operator.","A one-time sample-repair competition; it offers direct comparison but can be optimized as a demonstration and does not incorporate mature field outcomes or recurring contestability."],"remaining_contrastive_claim":"The testable contrast is whether matched repair cohorts, delayed field-outcome scoring, secured warranty responsibility, and recurring portfolio allocation keep supplier rivalry coupled to dependable lifecycle contribution more effectively than a lowest-price tender or fleet-level service contract. This is a design hypothesis, not an effect claim.","authority_safety":{"decision_authority":"The operator's formally designated procurement authority controls commercial allocation, while its continuing-airworthiness, engineering, and quality authorities control technical acceptance. Approved maintenance organizations retain responsibility for compliant maintenance releases, and applicable aviation authorities retain all approval and enforcement powers. No commercial score can waive maintenance data, inspection, release, airworthiness, or reporting requirements.","authorized_first_step":"Perform a read-only retrospective shadow evaluation using closed work orders and already-recorded service outcomes for a narrowly bounded set of component families. Blind shop identities during case matching and scoring, calculate hypothetical portfolio allocations, and do not change live work routing, supplier status, payments, warranties, or aircraft maintenance decisions.","excluded_actions":["No routing of live components based on the shadow score","No alteration of approved maintenance instructions, inspection intervals, release standards, or airworthiness decisions","No withholding of payment or warranty reserve under a rule not present in the governing contract","No supplier suspension, employee discipline, or misconduct finding based on anomaly screens alone","No disclosure of one shop's protected pricing, methods, or technical records to another shop","No compensation of a safety, traceability, or approved-data failure with price or turnaround points","No retrospective reclassification of work orders to favor or disfavor an identified shop"],"halt_rollback":"Halt if serial-level histories cannot be linked reliably, service exposure cannot be compared, case-mix adjustment depends on unreviewable assumptions, protected supplier data cannot be blinded, or a mandatory safety requirement has been made compensable. Void affected shadow rankings, preserve the original procurement and maintenance records unchanged, document the attribution failure, and restrict any rerun to a corrected predeclared dataset and rule set."},"negative_tests":{"strongest_counterevidence":"Existing repair awards already use comparable matched case mixes, mature serial-level field outcomes, secured warranty recovery, portable records, multi-source allocation, and recurring open competition, while quoted price and turnaround do not displace inspection quality or shift downstream costs.","problem_falsifier":"After controlling for component condition and service exposure, award-oriented price or turnaround differences are not associated with selective rejection, documentation corrections, repeat removals, warranty disputes, or realized operator burden, and shops cannot improve future work share through the alleged shortcuts.","intervention_falsifier":"Risk-adjusted shop rankings are unstable under reasonable matching or attribution choices; repeat removals cannot be attributed to repair decisions; outcome maturation is too delayed for allocation; or the arena systematically rewards easy case mix, incumbent data advantages, or reserve capacity rather than dependable repair contribution.","risks":["Serial-level outcomes may be censored when components leave the operator's fleet or observation window.","Route, environment, installation, aircraft condition, and troubleshooting quality can confound shop attribution.","Rare but consequential failures may not support stable comparative ranking.","Shops may reject difficult units, redefine exclusions, or alter fault classifications to improve case mix.","A warranty reserve may burden smaller qualified shops more than established suppliers.","Score holdback may delay payment or create disputes about causes outside shop control.","Multiple awards may divide volume below the level needed to sustain specialized tooling or competence.","Portfolio complementarity can become discretionary cover for favoritism.","Bid screens may confuse common material costs or technical constraints with coordination.","Public metric details may encourage shops to optimize documentation or removal coding rather than repair quality.","Incumbents may benefit from historical data and tooling that challengers had no opportunity to develop.","Operator pressure for aircraft availability may contaminate supposedly independent technical scoring.","A repair can meet all observed measures while harboring a long-latency defect beyond the bond period." ]},"next_evidence_step":"Pre-register a retrospective shadow study covering two narrowly specified rotable component families, a fixed historical work-order window, and a fixed subsequent service-observation window. Construct matched cohorts using only incoming condition, fault code, configuration, prior repair history, and measurable service exposure available across shops. Blind shop identities; apply noncompensable compliance gates, the proposed landed-cost and outcome score, a hypothetical warranty reserve, and portfolio allocation; then compare decisions with the recorded lowest-evaluated-price award, fixed quotas, and a fleet-level service contract rule. Report unmatched cases, censoring, rejection patterns, rank sensitivity, repeat-removal attribution, documentation corrections, warranty recovery, allocation concentration, and results under alternative predeclared matching specifications. Use the findings only to decide whether a prospective, contractually authorized pilot should be designed.","prior_art_status":"UNSEARCHED","diversity_from_prior_proposals":"Proposal 1 governs airline competition for scarce departure priority during capacity-constrained airport recovery. It addresses premature readiness declarations and surface-queue occupation through gate holding, capped priority credits, and repeated release nominations. Proposal 3 instead governs maintenance suppliers competing for recurring component-repair volume, addressing price and turnaround bids that can externalize delayed repair, documentation, and reliability costs. It neither allocates airport capacity nor depends on airline operational priority information. Proposal 2 governs engineering teams competing for scarce flight-control integration resources and addresses visible-benchmark overfitting through hidden simulation cases, safety-gated evaluation, resource caps, and complementary design downselection. Proposal 3 evaluates realized serial-level maintenance outcomes from recurring repair work rather than experimental controller performance, and its causal path runs from commercial underbidding and delayed quality consequences to matched field cohorts, secured warranty responsibility, and rolling supplier work share. Each proposal has different actors, contested prizes, observables, authority boundaries, intervention machinery, and evidence, and each can be adopted without implementing either of the others.","revision_record":{"parent_version":null,"progress_targets_addressed":["Third independently adoptable proposal","Material separation from proposals 1 and 2","Concrete maintenance actors and serial-level observables","Full bounded-rivalry structure","Mechanism removal counterfactuals","Safety-preserving retrospective evidence","Explicit diversity from every earlier proposal"],"conceptual_changes":[],"operational_changes":[],"evidence_changes":[],"claim_changes":[]}}