{"schema_version":1,"experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp06_four_proposal_generalization60_20260803","cell_id":"representation_independent_interface_contract__aviation_aeronautics","arm":"COMPLETE_PROPOSAL_PORTFOLIO","candidate_id":"ripc-aviation-flight-guidance-mode-contract-004","proposal_index":4,"version":0,"title":"Behavioral Flight-Guidance Mode Contract for Coherent Automation Annunciation","problem":"A flight-guidance computer communicates engagement, arming, capture, reversion, target validity, and command authority to cockpit displays, alerting logic, recorders, simulators, and test equipment through internal mode enumerations, bitfields, or implementation-shaped event sequences. Clients interpret those details independently. Refactoring the controller state machine, changing event scheduling, or substituting another implementation can therefore produce transiently contradictory indications, different rejection behavior, or different reversion sequences even when the message schema and common nominal modes remain unchanged. The program lacks a representation-independent definition of the crew-observable flight-guidance mode behavior that a replacement must preserve.","actors":["Flight-guidance and automatic-flight-control engineers","Cockpit display and alerting engineers","Avionics integration and verification teams","Flight-data recording and analysis teams","Training-simulator engineers","Human-factors and flight-test specialists","Pilots who observe automation indications but do not participate in the proposed first test","Avionics design, safety, and certification authorities"],"observable_state":"In a bounded interface and trace audit, the condition is observable if clients branch on controller-private mode numbers or bit combinations, infer transitions from message timing, reconstruct authority locally, rely on undocumented event order, or display different active, armed, captured, reverted, failed, or rejected states for logically equivalent controller traces. Additional evidence includes impossible combinations such as two commanding modes on one axis, an active mode without a valid target, a reversion without a reason, or disagreement among display, recorder, and simulator interpretations of the same published state.","consequence":"An internal controller change can alter cockpit annunciation, alert timing, recorded mode history, simulator behavior, or test verdicts without being classified as a change to externally meaningful automation behavior. A crew-facing indication could become stale or inconsistent with the controller's declared command authority, while implementation-specific tests could also block a valid redesign merely because private substates or event ordering changed.","affected_objective":"Preserve coherent, auditable crew-observable flight-guidance engagement and reversion behavior across controller implementations without freezing private control laws or state-machine structure.","intervention":"Define an opaque FlightGuidanceModeState component whose abstract value records, for each controlled axis or function, availability, armed mode, active commanding mode, capture phase, valid target reference, authority source, degradation status, reversion reason, and monotonically identified public revision. Public operations submit typed engagement or disengagement requests, observe an atomic snapshot, consume contract-level transition events, compare revisions, and request sanctioned diagnostics. Preconditions specify request identity, supported mode, valid target, aircraft-state eligibility supplied by the test environment, and requester authority. Postconditions specify accepted, rejected, pending, active, reverted, disengaged, and failed outcomes; rejection and failure categories; state mutation rules; annunciation obligations; and side-effect boundaries. Behavioral laws prohibit more than one active commanding mode per governed axis, require every active mode to identify its authority and valid target class, make reversion publish the replacement state and reason atomically, and prevent private intermediate substates from appearing as public modes. Internal controller substates, control-law equations, scheduler tasks, bit allocation, filters, and transition-table layout remain hidden. Every controller implementation or interface mapper must pass the same black-box trace and state-machine conformance oracle before being considered behaviorally substitutable. This contract governs mode interaction and annunciation semantics; it does not certify control-law stability, handling qualities, or aircraft-level safety.","structural_mapping":[{"archetype_element":"Abstract behavioral surface","domain_realization":"Operations include request_engagement, request_disengagement, observe_snapshot, consume_transition, compare_revision, and diagnostic_summary over an opaque flight-guidance mode handle."},{"archetype_element":"Abstract state model","domain_realization":"The public state comprises per-axis availability, armed and active modes, capture phase, target-validity class, command authority, degradation, reversion reason, and revision, independent of controller-private substates."},{"archetype_element":"Hidden representation","domain_realization":"Internal state-machine nodes, mode numbers, bitfields, control laws, scheduler timing, filter states, transition tables, and diagnostic memory are non-contractual."},{"archetype_element":"Representation invariant and abstraction function","domain_realization":"Each valid controller state maps to exactly one coherent public mode state; private substates that have the same crew-observable meaning map to the same abstract value, while invalid private combinations cannot be published as valid snapshots."},{"archetype_element":"Behavioral laws and invariants","domain_realization":"At most one commanding mode is active per governed axis; active modes carry a valid authority and target class; accepted requests have declared pending or transition behavior; rejected requests do not mutate public state; reversion exposes its reason and replacement state atomically; duplicate request identifiers are idempotent; and snapshots at one revision are observationally stable."},{"archetype_element":"Error and side-effect semantics","domain_realization":"The contract distinguishes unsupported mode, invalid target, ineligible aircraft state, conflicting request, unavailable function, stale revision, timeout, and internal failure. A failed observation does not invent a mode, and a rejected request causes no hidden engagement side effect."},{"archetype_element":"Conformance oracle","domain_realization":"One implementation-parameterized suite drives request, sensor-validity, authority-transfer, capture, cancellation, degradation, and recovery traces and observes only public states, events, rejection categories, and allowed timing classes."},{"archetype_element":"Substitutability rule","domain_realization":"A candidate implementation is eligible for further avionics assurance only if it passes every semantic trace, invariant, leakage, and declared timing check. Passing does not establish control-law equivalence, aircraft integration approval, or certification."},{"archetype_element":"Leakage control and stewardship","domain_realization":"A watchlist covers private mode numbers, transient event order, diagnostic codes, polling cadence, timestamp precision, error wording, and latency. Changes to crew-observable semantics require avionics, human-factors, and safety review; conforming private-state changes remain local."}],"mechanism_mapping":[{"mechanism_slug":"abstract_data_type_specification","role":"Defines flight-guidance mode state by crew-observable values and transitions and requires a representation invariant and abstraction function from each private controller state machine.","counterfactual_removal":"Without the abstract state and mapping, the proposal would merely rename controller bits and could not determine whether two different private state decompositions have the same public meaning."},{"mechanism_slug":"opaque_type_or_module_boundary","role":"Withholds private controller states, bitfields, and scheduler details so clients can depend only on engagement requests, atomic snapshots, and declared transitions.","counterfactual_removal":"Displays and test systems could continue branching on private mode numbers or intermediate substates, recreating the substitution barrier."},{"mechanism_slug":"design_by_contract_clause","role":"Allocates obligations for request validity, targets, authority, acceptance, rejection, mutation, reversion, failure, and annunciation on each operation.","counterfactual_removal":"Identical message signatures could conceal different rejection and reversion semantics, leaving clients to infer fault allocation and state changes."},{"mechanism_slug":"black_box_contract_test_suite","role":"Runs the same public-trace tests against the incumbent, a model implementation, and any candidate mapper or controller implementation.","counterfactual_removal":"Each integration team could pass its own implementation-shaped tests while display, recorder, and simulator behavior still diverged."},{"mechanism_slug":"property_based_conformance_test","role":"Generates request and condition-event sequences and checks exclusivity, target validity, atomic reversion, idempotence, stable revisions, and recovery invariants after every transition.","counterfactual_removal":"Scripted nominal scenarios could miss rare interleavings, duplicate requests, simultaneous invalidation, and transition-sequence defects."},{"mechanism_slug":"reference_implementation_differential_test","role":"Uses a deliberately small executable public-state model to compare contract-level snapshots and events for bounded traces without duplicating the candidate's control laws.","counterfactual_removal":"General invariants would not determine every expected engagement and reversion result, leaving sequence-specific semantic disagreements without an oracle."},{"mechanism_slug":"metamorphic_behavior_test","role":"Checks relations such as duplicate-request idempotence, equivalence of polling and subscription observations at the same revision, and preservation of unaffected-axis state under an independent-axis request where the contract declares independence.","counterfactual_removal":"Some relational obligations would require enumerating exact traces individually, making representation-sensitive gaps more likely."},{"mechanism_slug":"representation_leakage_probe","role":"Compares every observable mode number, event ordering, timestamp, diagnostic, timing class, and error detail with the promised contract and seals or sanctions the residual surface.","counterfactual_removal":"Clients could infer private controller substates from timing or diagnostics despite the nominally opaque type."},{"mechanism_slug":"abstraction_barrier_code_review","role":"Reviews new avionics-client dependencies and diagnostic exports for reliance on controller behavior that is observable but not promised.","counterfactual_removal":"Convenience mappings and test hooks could gradually expose private state or turn incidental event order into a permanent client dependency."},{"mechanism_slug":"semantic_versioning_and_deprecation_gate","role":"Separates compatible additions and private-state changes from breaking changes to mode meaning, transition laws, rejection behavior, or annunciation obligations.","counterfactual_removal":"A crew-observable behavioral change could be shipped as an internal refactor, or a conforming private redesign could trigger unnecessary client changes."}],"causal_chain":["Cockpit displays, recorders, simulators, and verification tools receive flight-guidance state through implementation-shaped enumerations, bit combinations, and event traces.","Clients independently infer engagement, capture, authority, rejection, and reversion meaning from those private details.","A controller refactor or substitution changes private state decomposition, scheduling, or transient event order while retaining compatible message shapes.","Clients then disagree about the same automation state or expose transient combinations that were never intended as public behavior.","The intervention defines one opaque public mode state, precise request and observation operations, transition laws, invariants, errors, annunciation obligations, and allowed timing semantics.","Each controller or mapper projects its private state through an abstraction function and is tested by the same generated black-box trace oracle and leakage audit.","A private implementation change that preserves the behavioral contract becomes distinguishable from a crew-observable mode change requiring explicit avionics, human-factors, safety, and certification review."],"baseline":"Retain shared mode enums, bitfield documentation, controller-specific interface mappings, and scenario regressions. Display, recorder, simulator, and test teams continue interpreting controller outputs separately and coordinating whenever the internal state machine changes.","nearest_rivals":["Freeze the incumbent mode enumeration and bit allocation. This preserves current mappings but exposes representation and constrains future controller decomposition without defining complete transition or error semantics.","Map every new controller state back to legacy bits with an adapter. This can support migration temporarily but perpetuates ambiguous legacy combinations and supplies no independent criterion for correct mapping.","Publish only a typed avionics message schema. This fixes field shape and allowed values but does not define engagement laws, atomic reversion, request rejection, authority, or operation-sequence behavior.","Replicate the controller state machine inside each display or simulator. This gives clients detailed behavior but creates multiple implementations that can drift and couples them directly to private controller evolution.","Use recorded golden traces from the incumbent. Exact traces can detect differences but may freeze scheduler artifacts and private intermediate states that are irrelevant to crew-observable meaning.","Rely on end-to-end piloted-simulator scenarios. Integrated scenarios can reveal salient failures but provide limited coverage of transition interleavings and make interface defects difficult to localize."],"remaining_contrastive_claim":"Relative to these rivals, the proposal's testable contrast is that defining crew-observable flight-guidance modes as an opaque, law-governed state with atomic authority and reversion semantics can distinguish behavioral compatibility from enum, schema, or trace identity. It does not claim equivalence of control laws or adequacy for aircraft-level approval.","authority_safety":{"decision_authority":"The designated avionics system design authority, supported by human-factors, flight-safety, verification, flight-test, and certification authorities, controls the public mode contract and any use in aircraft or approved training systems. Software teams may build and test the abstraction but cannot authorize operational integration.","authorized_first_step":"Construct a disconnected software-in-the-loop harness using approved synthetic traces and a bounded set of non-flight controller-model traces. Encode the proposed public state model before comparative testing, wrap the incumbent trace interpreter, add an independent executable model and seeded faulty mappers, and compare only laboratory outputs.","excluded_actions":["No modification or loading of aircraft flight-guidance, automatic-flight-control, display, or alerting software","No connection to flight hardware, operational aircraft buses, or live aircraft sensors","No change to cockpit annunciations, pilot procedures, training material, or approved simulator behavior","No piloted evaluation based solely on the proposed software contract","No use of conformance results as evidence of control-law stability, handling qualities, airworthiness, or certification compliance","No promotion of an experimental mapper or implementation into an integration baseline"],"halt_rollback":"Stop if the wrapper changes incumbent laboratory outputs, masks an authority or target-validity discrepancy, cannot represent an operationally meaningful mode distinction, exposes controlled avionics data, or yields disagreements that the responsible design authority cannot classify. Roll back by removing the isolated harness adapters and test models; all approved software, interface definitions, and verification baselines remain unchanged."},"negative_tests":{"strongest_counterevidence":"A bounded dependency audit shows that every client already consumes only a reviewed public mode state with explicit transition, authority, error, and annunciation semantics, and controlled changes to private mode numbering, substate decomposition, event scheduling, and bit allocation produce no client-visible divergence.","problem_falsifier":"For the scoped clients and discriminating traces, every observable assumption traces to an explicit contract promise, and independently implemented mappings produce identical public snapshots, transitions, rejection categories, authority states, and declared timing behavior despite private-state perturbations.","intervention_falsifier":"The abstraction cannot represent both a known-valid incumbent trace and a known-valid alternate controller mapping without exposing private substates, suppressing a crew-relevant distinction, or admitting seeded contradictions such as dual active modes or unexplained reversion. The proposed public state would then be an unsuitable substitution boundary.","risks":["The abstract state may omit a transient or combined mode distinction needed for safe crew interpretation.","An overly detailed contract may freeze the incumbent state machine under new names.","An overly coarse contract may allow materially different annunciation or authority behavior.","The executable reference model may reproduce incumbent assumptions instead of independently expressing the contract.","Generated event sequences may include impossible aircraft conditions or omit relevant coupled-axis transitions.","Timing classes may be either too strict for valid implementations or too loose for coherent annunciation.","Sanctioned diagnostics may leak private substates and become client dependencies.","Teams may mistake interface conformance for evidence that control laws or aircraft-level automation are safe."]},"next_evidence_step":"Select a bounded set of lateral or vertical mode scenarios covering engagement, arming, capture, cancellation, target invalidation, sensor loss, authority transfer, reversion, duplicate request, and recovery. Before running traces, specify the abstract states, allowed transitions, invariants, request preconditions, rejection categories, atomicity rules, and permitted timing classes. Implement an independent executable public-state model, wrap the incumbent laboratory trace interpreter, and create seeded faulty mappers that expose a private substate, publish dual active modes, mutate state after rejection, lose a reversion reason, accept a stale request twice, or reorder an atomic replacement into contradictory snapshots. Run the identical black-box, property-based, metamorphic, differential, and leakage checks. Record whether each defect is rejected and classify every incumbent-model disagreement as a mapper defect, contract gap, invalid generated scenario, or omitted crew-relevant distinction. This produces laboratory interface evidence only.","prior_art_status":"UNSEARCHED","diversity_from_prior_proposals":"Proposal 1 addressed ground-based air-traffic conflict tools coupled to waypoint and uncertainty representations of predicted future flight volumes; it used containment and intersection queries to govern predictor substitution. Proposal 2 addressed aircraft-development clients coupled to coefficient grids and interpolation details of an aerodynamic response dataset; it used an immutable flight-condition-to-force-and-moment mapping to govern numerical re-encoding. Proposal 3 addressed maintenance clients coupled to storage tables and derived columns in a configuration, usage, and accomplishment ledger; it used evidence-event transitions, supersession, historical snapshots, and conflict preservation to govern backend substitution. This proposal addresses the crew-observable semantics at the boundary of a flight-guidance controller. Its causal path runs from leaked controller modes and event scheduling through a private state-machine change to inconsistent annunciation, recording, simulation, or verification. Its intervention centers on engagement requests, commanding authority, capture, atomic reversion, and public mode invariants rather than space-time occupancy, aerodynamic evaluation, or maintenance evidence. It is independently adoptable by an avionics integration program and is not a feature, population variant, or implementation detail of proposals 1, 2, or 3.","revision_record":{"parent_version":null,"progress_targets_addressed":["Generated the fourth sealed complete proposal","Established material independence from sealed proposals 1, 2, and 3"],"conceptual_changes":["Instantiated the archetype as a crew-observable flight-guidance mode state independent of controller-private state-machine representation.","Separated mode-interface substitutability from control-law equivalence and aircraft-level safety approval."],"operational_changes":["Restricted initial evidence to a disconnected software-in-the-loop harness.","Excluded aircraft software changes, flight hardware, piloted evaluation, operational integration, and certification claims."],"evidence_changes":["Specified generated mode-transition traces, an independent executable state model, seeded faulty mappings, metamorphic observation relations, and leakage auditing."],"claim_changes":["Limited the claim to distinguishing behavioral mode compatibility from enum, schema, or exact-trace identity.","Made no novelty, prevalence, demand, effect-size, handling-quality, safety, or certification claim."]}}