{"schema_version":1,"experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp07_retrospective_selector60_20260803","cell_code":"E7C009","selector_replication":2,"assessments":[{"blind_id":"CANDIDATE_A","problem_reality_importance":76,"causal_archetype_fit":88,"distinctiveness_prior_art_resilience":61,"operational_specificity":89,"falsifiability_test_quality":72,"adopter_partner_path":75,"deployability_complexity":55,"authority_safety_reversibility":92,"strict_potential":68,"empirical_partner_potential":77,"scrutiny_priority":73,"biggest_visible_risk":"A no-stakes scripted auction may not reveal the hoarding, signaling, side agreements, and risk preferences that determine whether internal-credit bidding improves real allocation.","rationale":"The scarce-window rivalry is concrete, and the auction is causally central rather than decorative. Rules, authority, liabilities, rollback, and rival baselines are unusually specific. However, internal second-price credits, bonds, caps, and collusion screening create substantial administrative and behavioral complexity, while the proposed shadow evidence cannot strongly validate behavior under consequential scarcity."},{"blind_id":"CANDIDATE_B","problem_reality_importance":84,"causal_archetype_fit":87,"distinctiveness_prior_art_resilience":72,"operational_specificity":88,"falsifiability_test_quality":84,"adopter_partner_path":80,"deployability_complexity":58,"authority_safety_reversibility":91,"strict_potential":78,"empirical_partner_potential":87,"scrutiny_priority":84,"biggest_visible_risk":"The supposedly neutral interchange representation and semantic gates may embed one foundation's assumptions, making the comparison circular rather than genuinely common.","rationale":"The default-interface choice creates real scarcity and lock-in, and the proposal tightly connects common trials, semantic gates, secured exit duties, separated rulemaking, and challenger access. Its decisive uncertainty—whether auditors can compare candidates without prejudging the foundational dispute—is explicitly testable on copied artifacts with a plausible consortium partner. Implementation is demanding, but failure conditions could meaningfully stop deployment."},{"blind_id":"CANDIDATE_C","problem_reality_importance":69,"causal_archetype_fit":74,"distinctiveness_prior_art_resilience":53,"operational_specificity":86,"falsifiability_test_quality":82,"adopter_partner_path":76,"deployability_complexity":70,"authority_safety_reversibility":93,"strict_potential":61,"empirical_partner_potential":74,"scrutiny_priority":66,"biggest_visible_risk":"The challenge may add contest machinery to what is fundamentally an expert proof-review and formalization-triage decision, consuming the same scarce specialist attention it allocates.","rationale":"Correctness gates, standardized proof packets, staged reopening, and a randomized shadow comparison are bounded and testable. Yet the claimed strategic problem is less convincingly established than the scarcity itself, several prohibited behaviors are difficult to observe, and much of the intervention resembles disciplined peer-review practice. The archetype may therefore be useful but not causally essential."},{"blind_id":"CANDIDATE_D","problem_reality_importance":82,"causal_archetype_fit":85,"distinctiveness_prior_art_resilience":57,"operational_specificity":92,"falsifiability_test_quality":89,"adopter_partner_path":89,"deployability_complexity":78,"authority_safety_reversibility":94,"strict_potential":75,"empirical_partner_potential":86,"scrutiny_priority":82,"biggest_visible_risk":"The governed arena may prove to be a formalized version of ordinary competent competition-problem editorial practice, leaving little meaningful contrastive claim after prior-art scrutiny.","rationale":"The six-slot portfolio problem is concrete, the rival incentives are credible, and portfolio-level selection is causally aligned with the set-level objective. Retired problems permit a safe, inexpensive, decision-relevant comparison that can test defect detection, ambiguity, grading reliability, redundancy, confidentiality, and reviewer burden. Its main weakness is prior-art vulnerability: validation, pilot solving, anonymized review, and balanced-set construction all look like practices a mature organizer could already combine."}],"rank_order":["CANDIDATE_B","CANDIDATE_D","CANDIDATE_A","CANDIDATE_C"],"top_choice":"CANDIDATE_B","portfolio_observation":"B and D offer the strongest partner-resolvable uncertainties: both permit bounded artifact-based trials with consequential stop rules. B has the better chance of retaining a structural contrast around exit security and challenger governance, while D is easier to test but more exposed to standard-practice prior art. A is mechanistically distinctive but behaviorally hard to validate without stakes; C is safe and testable but least clearly requires a contest archetype.","confidence":"MODERATE"}