{"schema_version":1,"experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp11_mechanism_context_external20_20260804","research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp11_external_scrutiny_20260804","cell_id":"deadweight_loss_reduction__systems_cybernetics","opaque_id":"deadweight_loss_reduction__systems_cybernetics__B","search_lanes":{"direct_problem":{"queries":["safety instrumented system nuisance trips benign transient dynamic trip logic state dependent interlock","process plant nuisance trips safety interlock operator bypass pressure"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC5"],"no_result_note":null},"closest_prior_art":{"queries":["dynamic process safety interlock operating envelope redundant sensors nuisance trip reduction","dynamic alarm suppression state based alarming ISA 18.2 nuisance alarms","nuclear reactor protection system dynamic trip setpoint bypass permissive"],"source_ids":["SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC7"],"no_result_note":null},"historical_terminology":{"queries":["1990s dynamic trip setpoint process protection system nuisance scram permissive interlock","historical safety system voting logic 2oo3 nuisance trip availability"],"source_ids":["SRC3","SRC6"],"no_result_note":null},"products_practices_standards":{"queries":["IEC 61511 nuisance trip spurious trip safety instrumented systems bypass management","ISA 18.2 state based alarming dynamic alarm suppression official","Emerson DeltaV dynamic alarming state based suppression first party"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC4","SRC5","SRC6"],"no_result_note":null},"non_english_regional":{"queries":["Fehlauslösung Sicherheitsabschaltung zustandsabhängige Verriegelung redundante Sensoren","déclenchement intempestif système instrumenté de sécurité logique dynamique état procédé","误跳闸 安全联锁 状态 条件 冗余 传感器"],"source_ids":["SRC7","SRC8"],"no_result_note":"Regional-language searches found relevant German and French materials; retained sources include German TÜV guidance and a French-language Schneider Electric safety manual."},"composition_subproblems":{"queries":["correlated sensor failure redundant voting safety system common cause nuisance trip","shadow mode safety control logic validation replay interlock","operator alarm bypass normalization nuisance trips safety culture","safe operating envelope real time process state constraint control"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"],"no_result_note":null}},"sources":[{"source_id":"SRC1","title":"Managing alarms and preventing alarm floods at industrial facilities","url":"https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/csb_alarm_management_study.pdf","publisher":"U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board","date_or_year":"2022","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","language":"English","claims_supported":["Poorly managed alarms and nuisance alarms contribute to operator overload and unsafe responses.","Alarm-system design must account for operating state, prioritization, rationalization, and human factors rather than simply adding alerts.","Operators and facility management are identifiable adopters, while regulatory and safety-management obligations constrain changes."]},{"source_id":"SRC2","title":"Alarm Systems: A Guide to Design, Management and Procurement (EEMUA Publication 191, overview)","url":"https://www.eemua.org/Products/Publications/Print/EEMUA-Publication-191.aspx","publisher":"Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association","date_or_year":"2013","source_type":"OFFICIAL_STANDARD","language":"English","claims_supported":["Industrial practice recognizes nuisance alarms, alarm floods, and standing alarms as availability and safety problems.","Lifecycle alarm management includes rationalization, performance monitoring, change control, and state-based or dynamic alarming.","The alarm domain is adjacent rather than identical because alarm handling usually informs operators instead of directly granting continued machine operation."]},{"source_id":"SRC3","title":"Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems: Theory and Applications","url":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118776353","publisher":"Wiley","date_or_year":"2014","source_type":"SECONDARY_RESEARCH","language":"English","claims_supported":["Voting architectures such as 1oo2 and 2oo3 trade safety integrity against spurious-trip probability and availability.","Common-cause and correlated failures can invalidate naive benefits attributed to redundant evidence.","Reliability modeling provides a bounded way to compare missed-trip and false-trip performance before live deployment."]},{"source_id":"SRC4","title":"Alarm Management and ISA-18.2 / IEC 62682","url":"https://www.isa.org/intech-home/2019/march-april/departments/alarm-management-and-isa-18-2-iec-62682","publisher":"International Society of Automation","date_or_year":"2019","source_type":"TRADE_PROFESSIONAL","language":"English","claims_supported":["ISA-18.2 and IEC 62682 establish an alarm-management lifecycle including monitoring, assessment, management of change, and auditing.","Shelving, suppression by design, and out-of-service controls address alarms that are inappropriate in particular contexts.","State-based alarm management is established in industrial practice, creating close adjacent prior art to state-conditioned interlocks."]},{"source_id":"SRC5","title":"DeltaV Analyze and AgileOps EventKPI: Alarm management","url":"https://www.emerson.com/en-us/automation/control-and-safety-systems/deltav/deltav-alarm-management","publisher":"Emerson","date_or_year":"2024","source_type":"FIRST_PARTY_PRODUCT","language":"English","claims_supported":["Commercial distributed-control products implement alarm rationalization, monitoring, suppression, shelving, and state-based alarm behavior.","Productized dynamic alarm management shows that contextual classification of benign versus actionable conditions is routine for alarms.","The product evidence does not itself show an automatic safety-interlock permission system that preserves independently certified hard limits."]},{"source_id":"SRC6","title":"Safety Instrumented Systems: A Life-Cycle Approach","url":"https://www.isa.org/products/safety-instrumented-systems-a-life-cycle-approach","publisher":"International Society of Automation","date_or_year":"2017","source_type":"TRADE_PROFESSIONAL","language":"English","claims_supported":["Safety-instrumented functions are governed through hazard analysis, safety-requirements specification, verification, validation, operation, maintenance, modification, and decommissioning.","Spurious trips and availability are recognized design concerns, but changes must preserve required safety integrity.","An accountable owner and formal management-of-change or independent review are identifiable authorization paths."]},{"source_id":"SRC7","title":"Funktionale Sicherheit in der Prozessindustrie – Safety Instrumented Systems und IEC 61511","url":"https://www.tuvsud.com/de-de/indust-re/safety-security/functional-safety/safety-instrumented-systems","publisher":"TÜV SÜD","date_or_year":"2024","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","language":"German","claims_supported":["IEC 61511-based functional-safety practice assigns lifecycle responsibilities and requires proof that protective functions achieve the necessary integrity.","Changes to safety logic require competent authorization, verification, and documentation.","German practice recognizes availability alongside safety but does not permit availability gains to waive the specified protective function."]},{"source_id":"SRC8","title":"Guide de sécurité fonctionnelle – Systèmes instrumentés de sécurité et norme IEC 61511","url":"https://www.se.com/fr/fr/download/document/998-2095-02-11-12AR0_FR/","publisher":"Schneider Electric","date_or_year":"2012","source_type":"FIRST_PARTY_PRODUCT","language":"French","claims_supported":["French-language industrial guidance describes safety-instrumented-system lifecycle, independence, redundancy, diagnostics, validation, and proof testing.","Redundancy can improve availability only when architecture and common-cause failure are handled explicitly.","A live modification to certified interlocks requires formal safety validation; offline analysis is a permissible lower-risk first step."]}],"problem_evidence":{"status":"SUPPORTED","finding":"Industrial safety literature and official accident-prevention guidance establish that nuisance alarms, spurious protective actions, alarm floods, and poorly contextualized indications can reduce availability and encourage shelving, bypassing, or degraded operator response. The exact frequency and economic value for the proposed unnamed system are unverified, but the general problem is real.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC6"],"uncertainty":"Alarm evidence is stronger than evidence specifically documenting benign-transient trips by certified interlocks. Plant-specific adjudicated trip records are required to establish prevalence, value loss, and workaround pressure."},"adopter_evidence":{"status":"SUPPORTED","finding":"The accountable asset or system safety owner is an identifiable adopter and authorizer, operating through functional-safety lifecycle, management-of-change, validation, and—where applicable—regulator or independent assessor approval. Operators, maintenance, and safety engineers are implementation stakeholders rather than unilateral authorizers.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"],"uncertainty":"The particular legal regulator, certification body, and allocation of authority depend on sector and jurisdiction."},"implementation_evidence":{"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED","finding":"Established methods support contextual alarm suppression, voting architectures, reliability analysis, lifecycle validation, and offline or staged evaluation. These make a non-actuating replay technically plausible. The retained sources do not demonstrate the complete proposed package: a state-conditioned automatic permission for a safety interlock, redundant independent evidence, unchanged hard invariants, preregistered false-trip and hazard-detection comparison, burden monitoring, and automatic rollback.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"],"uncertainty":"Feasibility depends on access to synchronized logs, credible hazard labels, sensor independence, sufficient rare-event coverage, and whether certified logic can legally be modified."},"prior_art":{"disposition":"ADJACENT_PRIOR_ART","closest_analogues":[{"name":"State-based and dynamic alarm management under ISA-18.2 / IEC 62682","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC4","SRC5"],"same_problem":true,"same_causal_lever":true,"overlap":"Uses process state to suppress or reprioritize contextually inappropriate alarms, with lifecycle monitoring and management of change, directly addressing nuisance indications and operator overload.","remaining_difference":"Normally changes annunciation and operator workload, not the automatic permissive boundary of a certified safety trip while independent hard limits remain active."},{"name":"Redundant voting architectures for safety-instrumented functions","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC6","SRC8"],"same_problem":true,"same_causal_lever":false,"overlap":"Balances spurious-trip rate, dangerous failure probability, and availability using redundant channels, diagnostics, and formal validation.","remaining_difference":"Primarily changes sensor or logic architecture and fixed voting rules; it need not classify transient operating states through a state-conditioned envelope."},{"name":"IEC 61511 functional-safety lifecycle and management of modification","source_ids":["SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"],"same_problem":false,"same_causal_lever":false,"overlap":"Provides the authority, hazard analysis, validation, audit, and rollback framework needed for any safety-logic change.","remaining_difference":"It is governance infrastructure, not evidence that the proposed adaptive permission reduces false trips without degrading hazard detection."}],"contrastive_claim_remaining":"For one named unit and eligible transient class, an offline state-conditioned permissive using demonstrably independent evidence can reduce blinded-adjudicated nonhazardous trip predictions versus the certified static interlock, while producing zero additional missed hazardous-trip predictions, no preregistered loss of detection margin, and no material increase in modeled operator burden; independent hard limits remain unchanged.","contrastive_claim_falsifier":"Falsified if replay or shadow results show no material reduction in adjudicated false trips; any hazardous event that the certified logic would trip but the candidate would permit; worse detection margin beyond the preregistered bound; evidence channels with unacceptable correlation or unverifiable state estimation; or insufficient labeled events to estimate the claimed contrast.","confidence":"MODERATE","search_limitations":"Exactly eight retained direct sources were reviewed across six lanes. The search was bounded, several standards are paywalled or represented by official overview pages, product pages may change, and no plant-specific trip log, certification dossier, patent landscape, or comprehensive sector-by-sector regulatory search was available. Findings do not establish world novelty, patentability, freedom to operate, market size, or realized impact."},"researchability_gates":{"externally_supported_problem":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"Official and professional sources document nuisance alarms, spurious protective actions, operator overload, availability losses, and bypass-management concerns, although plant-specific magnitude remains to be measured.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC6"]},"identifiable_adopter_or_authorizer":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"A system safety or asset owner, working through formal functional-safety lifecycle and applicable independent or regulatory approval, is identifiable.","source_ids":["SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"]},"distinct_testable_incremental_claim":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"Adjacent practices leave a testable distinction at the safety-action boundary: state-conditioned automatic permission with unchanged independent hard limits, evaluated against both false trips and hazardous-state detection.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC6","SRC8"]},"bounded_next_evidence_step":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"A 30-day, one-unit, non-actuating replay or shadow evaluation with blinded event adjudication, preregistered detection margins, correlation checks, burden measures, and halt criteria is bounded and does not alter certified actuation.","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"]},"no_unresolved_safety_or_authority_stop":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"The first step is non-actuating and retains certified protection. Safety and authority become a stop before any live change unless independence, validation, management-of-change, competent approval, and applicable regulatory requirements are satisfied.","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"]},"adequate_search_evidence":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"The bounded search covered all six required lanes with exactly eight direct sources, multiple independent publishers, official guidance, a standards body, first-party products, historical terminology, regional-language terminology, and component combinations.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"]}},"strict_success":true,"screen_survival":true,"remaining_research_value":"MODERATE","recommended_next_step":"Obtain synchronized trip, process-state, sensor-quality, override, restart, and maintenance logs for one unit; pre-register eligible transients, blinded hazard adjudication, minimum false-trip reduction, zero incremental missed-hazard predictions, detection-margin and sensor-correlation bounds, operator-burden limits, and data-sufficiency criteria; then run the 30-day non-actuating replay under the accountable safety owner's approval. Do not modify live certified logic unless a later formal safety lifecycle review authorizes it.","world_novelty_boundary":"This bounded public-source review supports only a contrastive research claim relative to the retained analogues. It cannot establish world novelty, patentability, freedom to operate, market size, or realized impact; undiscovered patents, proprietary implementations, sector-specific rules, and nonindexed practices may anticipate or bar the proposal."}