{"schema_version":1,"experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp11_mechanism_context_external20_20260804","research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp11_external_scrutiny_20260804","cell_id":"invariant_mode_decomposition_design__economics_finance","opaque_id":"invariant_mode_decomposition_design__economics_finance__B","search_lanes":{"direct_problem":{"queries":["dealer balance sheet joint deleveraging funding liquidity asset sales systemic liquidity stress eigenvalue mode","site:bis.org dealer deleveraging funding liquidity asset sales market liquidity systemic risk","site:newyorkfed.org primary dealers funding liquidity leverage asset sales market liquidity systemic","Adrian Shin liquidity leverage broker dealers aggregate balance sheet PDF"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC5","SRC8"],"no_result_note":null},"closest_prior_art":{"queries":["dynamic mode decomposition financial systemic risk liquidity dealers","Koopman operator financial systemic risk early warning liquidity","financial institutions transition matrix eigenvalues systemic instability balance sheet panel","bank panel VAR eigenvectors systemic risk early warning out of sample liquidity"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC4"],"no_result_note":null},"historical_terminology":{"queries":["Brunnermeier Pedersen market liquidity funding liquidity margins PDF","spectral decomposition joint deleveraging financial institutions funding asset sales","balance-sheet contagion illiquidity contagion eigenvalue financial network","procyclical leverage liquidity spiral broker dealers"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5"],"no_result_note":null},"products_practices_standards":{"queries":["site:bis.org/bcbs liquidity coverage ratio HQLA 30 days net stable funding ratio one year standard PDF","site:bis.org/bcbs principles sound liquidity risk management supervisors market-wide stress asset sales","site:federalreserve.gov broker dealer liquidity stress test supervisory authority consolidated supervised entities liquidity risk","site:sec.gov broker-dealer liquidity stress testing funding maturity HQLA rule"],"source_ids":["SRC5","SRC6","SRC7"],"no_result_note":null},"non_english_regional":{"queries":["riesgo sistémico liquidez financiación desapalancamiento conjunto entidades financieras valores propios supervisor","risque systémique liquidité financement désendettement simultané banques valeurs propres superviseur","Systemisches Liquiditätsrisiko gemeinsame Bilanzverkürzung Banken Eigenwerte Aufsicht","金融 系统性 流动性 风险 去杠杆 特征值 银行 预警"],"source_ids":["SRC8"],"no_result_note":null},"composition_subproblems":{"queries":["bank panel VAR eigenvectors systemic risk early warning out of sample liquidity","financial institutions transition matrix eigenvalues systemic instability balance sheet panel","randomized stepped wedge trial bank liquidity buffer funding maturity supervisor","dealer liquidity buffer term funding intervention randomized experiment HQLA maturity transformation"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC3","SRC4","SRC6","SRC7"],"no_result_note":null}},"sources":[{"source_id":"SRC1","title":"Evaluation of systemic risk in a financial system using dynamic mode decomposition","url":"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6031928","publisher":"SSRN / Nara Institute of Science and Technology authors","date_or_year":"7 January 2026","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","language":"English","claims_supported":["Applies dynamic mode decomposition to banking statements and market data for major US financial institutions before the 2007–2008 crisis.","Approximates financial-system dynamics with a Koopman operator and formulates instability using its eigenvalues.","Directly collides with the proposal's general operator-eigenmode monitoring concept, but the available abstract does not report a dealer-liquidity panel, sealed alert comparison, or randomized modal intervention."]},{"source_id":"SRC2","title":"Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity","url":"https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/22/6/2201/1592184","publisher":"The Review of Financial Studies / Oxford University Press","date_or_year":"2009; published online 26 November 2008","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","language":"English","claims_supported":["Models mutually reinforcing funding and market-liquidity deterioration.","Shows how destabilizing margins can generate liquidity spirals and common liquidity deterioration across securities.","Supports the proposed funding-withdrawal, margin, asset-sale, and market-liquidity mechanism, but not its proposed empirical modal representation."]},{"source_id":"SRC3","title":"Liquidity and Leverage","url":"https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr328.html","publisher":"Federal Reserve Bank of New York","date_or_year":"May 2008; revised December 2010","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","language":"English","claims_supported":["Documents strongly procyclical marked-to-market leverage among financial intermediaries.","Finds that changes in dealer repos, a principal balance-sheet adjustment margin, forecast changes in market risk.","Supports monitoring aggregate dealer balance-sheet adjustment rather than relying exclusively on static firm ratios."]},{"source_id":"SRC4","title":"Pathways towards instability in financial networks","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms14416","publisher":"Nature Communications / Springer Nature","date_or_year":"21 February 2017","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","language":"English","claims_supported":["Shows that financial-network stability can deteriorate while individual-bank leverage remains unchanged.","Uses the largest eigenvalue of an interbank leverage matrix to classify stability and recommends eigenvalue analysis for financial-stability monitoring.","Identifies illiquidity contagion through funding withdrawal and discusses extending the spectral framework to coupled liquidity-shortage layers.","Provides close spectral prior art, but its operator is an exposure-network contagion matrix rather than an estimated month-to-month joint dealer-state transition."]},{"source_id":"SRC5","title":"Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision","url":"https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm","publisher":"Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements","date_or_year":"25 September 2008","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","language":"English","claims_supported":["Recognizes that liquidity risk can affect markets as a whole and that a single institution's shortfall can have system-wide repercussions.","Reports that firms historically failed to incorporate market-wide funding disruption into stress tests.","Identifies national supervisors and banks as responsible actors and calls for liquid-asset cushions, severe stress scenarios, collateral management, and supervisory action."]},{"source_id":"SRC6","title":"Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools","url":"https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm","publisher":"Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements","date_or_year":"7 January 2013","source_type":"OFFICIAL_STANDARD","language":"English","claims_supported":["Establishes a standardized requirement for unencumbered high-quality liquid assets sufficient for a 30-day liquidity-stress scenario.","Demonstrates that the proposal's HQLA-buffer lever is established prudential practice at the institution level.","Does not establish a two-percent buffer increment, modal targeting, random assignment, or dealer-level causal effect."]},{"source_id":"SRC7","title":"SREP Supervisory Methodology, Element 4: Risks to liquidity","url":"https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/activities/srep/2022/html/ssm.srep202202_supervisorymethodology2022.en.html","publisher":"European Central Bank Banking Supervision","date_or_year":"Methodology page, copyright 2025","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","language":"English","claims_supported":["Identifies ECB Joint Supervisory Teams as users of granular reporting, forward-looking liquidity assessment, and supervisory stress tests.","Assesses short-term liquidity, refinancing needs, maturity mismatches, asset encumbrance, and the balance between short- and long-term funding.","States that supervisors may impose liquidity measures, establishing an identifiable authorizer for ECB-supervised credit institutions, though not for an unspecified cross-jurisdiction dealer panel."]},{"source_id":"SRC8","title":"我国银行体系系统性风险测度与评估 (Measurement and Evaluation of Systemic Risk for China's Banking System)","url":"https://jmsc.tju.edu.cn/jmsc/article/abstract/202002230256","publisher":"管理科学学报 (Journal of Management Sciences in China), Tianjin University","date_or_year":"Accepted 30 October 2021","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","language":"Chinese with English abstract","claims_supported":["Uses annual-report data for 45 major Chinese commercial banks with scenario analysis and stress testing.","Finds overlapping external investment assets to be a principal contagion mechanism, interbank lending to amplify contagion, and asset liquidity to be a key factor.","Provides regional evidence that system-wide structure and shared assets matter beyond isolated firm conditions, without implementing dynamic modes."]}],"problem_evidence":{"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED","finding":"The underlying problem is well supported: dealer repo adjustment is procyclical and predictive of market risk, funding and market liquidity can form reinforcing spirals, and spectral network research shows system stability can deteriorate while individual leverage remains unchanged. The narrower assertion that a recurring, estimable joint dealer funding-withdrawal/asset-sale mode specifically delays supervisory recognition has not yet been demonstrated.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC8"],"uncertainty":"The evidence combines theory, historical dealer data, bank-network models, and supervisory experience. None directly validates the proposed fixed-dealer monthly state vector, its recurrence, or its added warning value."},"adopter_evidence":{"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED","finding":"Prudential supervisors are identifiable in principle: Basel guidance assigns liquidity oversight to national supervisors, and ECB Joint Supervisory Teams assess liquidity, funding maturity, stress results, and can impose liquidity measures. However, the proposal does not specify a jurisdiction or resolve divided authority over banks, broker-dealers, and market conduct.","source_ids":["SRC5","SRC7"],"uncertainty":"A concrete legal authorizer cannot be named until the dealer panel, regulated entities, data owner, and jurisdiction are fixed; ECB authority over supervised credit institutions does not establish authority over every leveraged dealer contemplated by the proposal."},"implementation_evidence":{"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED","finding":"HQLA cushions, maturity-profile supervision, granular reporting, and liquidity stress testing are established and make a retrospective shadow evaluation operationally plausible. No retained source supports the proposed two-percent quantities, five-day and one-month modal responses, or a 2-by-2 cluster-randomized stepped-wedge manipulation of dealer balance sheets.","source_ids":["SRC5","SRC6","SRC7"],"uncertainty":"Data completeness, sample size, interference mapping, consent, legal authority, treatment cost, and safe unwind feasibility remain unverified. Existing prudential requirements are not evidence that random assignment is lawful or safe."},"prior_art":{"disposition":"ADJACENT_PRIOR_ART","closest_analogues":[{"name":"Dynamic-mode/Koopman systemic-risk metric for major US financial institutions","source_ids":["SRC1"],"same_problem":true,"same_causal_lever":true,"overlap":"Uses financial-institution statements and market data, approximates system dynamics with a Koopman operator, and evaluates instability through operator eigenvalues.","remaining_difference":"The retained description does not show a fixed dealer panel centered on funding withdrawal and asset sales, preregistered stability and spectral-gap gates, sealed comparison with firm thresholds and network stress tests, or randomized HQLA and maturity interventions."},{"name":"Largest-eigenvalue monitoring of interbank leverage-network instability","source_ids":["SRC4"],"same_problem":true,"same_causal_lever":false,"overlap":"Shows formally that system instability can emerge while individual leverage remains unchanged and recommends spectral stability monitoring.","remaining_difference":"It decomposes a specified exposure/contagion network rather than learning a local month-to-month transition operator over dealer and market states; liquidity shortage is discussed as an extension, and no randomized modal control is tested."},{"name":"Basel/ECB liquidity cushions, funding-maturity assessment, and supervisory stress testing","source_ids":["SRC5","SRC6","SRC7"],"same_problem":true,"same_causal_lever":false,"overlap":"Targets liquidity resilience with HQLA, maturity-profile monitoring, granular supervisory information, stress tests, and possible supervisory measures.","remaining_difference":"These practices act through institution-level standards and supervisory judgment, not a learned risky-mode coordinate or gain, held-out modal alert comparison, or randomized mode-targeted policy test."}],"contrastive_claim_remaining":"A credible incremental claim remains: in a preregistered monthly fixed-dealer panel, a frozen transition-mode alert built from funding, margin, exposure, asset-sale, and market-liquidity states can outperform both institution-level thresholds and a frozen network stress test at the same alert budget; conditional on separate authority and feasibility, the two named liquidity controls may then have distinct randomized effects on that retained mode's amplitude and gain.","contrastive_claim_falsifier":"The contrastive claim would be eliminated by prior work implementing substantially the same dealer-state transition operator, sealed comparative alert evaluation, and mode-targeted HQLA/maturity intervention, or empirically by failure of any preregistered residual, stability, gap, predictive, placebo, causal, or subgroup-harm gate.","confidence":"MODERATE","search_limitations":"This was a bounded public-web search, not a systematic review. The newest DMD paper was assessable chiefly through its public abstract because full-text retrieval was restricted. Confidential supervisory models, vendor systems, unpublished trials, non-indexed regional literature, and additional terminology may contain closer art. The search cannot establish world novelty, patentability, freedom to operate, market size, or realized impact."},"researchability_gates":{"externally_supported_problem":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"Independent theory, dealer evidence, network research, and official guidance support coupled funding-market liquidity stress and the possibility that firm-level conditions fail to reveal system-wide instability. The proposed modal form remains a hypothesis, but the underlying problem is externally grounded.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC8"]},"identifiable_adopter_or_authorizer":{"status":"INDETERMINATE","rationale":"Supervisors and ECB Joint Supervisory Teams are identifiable adopter classes, but no jurisdiction, panel membership, or allocation of authority among banking and securities regulators is specified for the contemplated dealers and trial.","source_ids":["SRC5","SRC7"]},"distinct_testable_incremental_claim":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"Despite close spectral prior art, the dealer-specific learned transition modes, frozen out-of-sample comparison against both stated comparators, and distinct randomized amplitude-versus-gain effects form a separable, falsifiable increment.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC3","SRC4","SRC6","SRC7"]},"bounded_next_evidence_step":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"A legal/data/prior-art audit followed by a frozen retrospective shadow evaluation is bounded, reversible, and can reject the proposal before any live control. Its stated quantitative transition, stability, gap, precision-recall, and lead-time gates provide clear stopping rules.","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC5","SRC7"]},"no_unresolved_safety_or_authority_stop":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"No live intervention is needed for the authorized first step. Confidentiality controls, model-risk review, and jurisdiction-specific legal approval must be resolved before any trial; keeping the live trial outside the present authorization avoids an immediate safety or authority stop.","source_ids":["SRC5","SRC7"]},"adequate_search_evidence":{"status":"PASS","rationale":"All six required lanes were searched adversarially, including historical terminology, standards and supervisory practice, Chinese and European terminology, and combinations of operator, panel, spectral, alert, liquidity-buffer, maturity, and randomized-design subproblems. Eight retained sources span six independent publisher families and include primary research, official guidance, and an official standard.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4","SRC5","SRC6","SRC7","SRC8"]}},"strict_success":false,"screen_survival":true,"remaining_research_value":"MODERATE","recommended_next_step":"Choose one jurisdiction and named supervisor; document authority over each dealer and variable; obtain a data-completeness and confidentiality assessment; then preregister and run only the frozen retrospective shadow evaluation against the two comparators. Do not design or authorize the live stepped-wedge trial unless every retrospective gate passes and separate legal, ethics, model-risk, consent, interference, subgroup-cost, and unwind reviews approve it.","world_novelty_boundary":"The search found adjacent operator-eigenmode, network-eigenvalue, dealer-liquidity, and prudential-control art but no retained source containing the full proposed problem-intervention package. That bounded result is not evidence of world novelty and makes no determination of patentability, freedom to operate, market size, adoption, or realized impact."}