{"closest_prior_art":[{"name":"UK Better Regulation Framework","overlap":"Requires pre-implementation options and impact assessments, early independent Regulatory Policy Committee scrutiny, an initial monitoring-and-evaluation plan, analysis of distributional and unintended impacts, and later comparison of estimated and actual impacts. Departments must complete required review materials before collective agreement or introduction to Parliament.","remaining_difference":"It does not require a versioned operational-consequence model that tests hearing delay, access burden, or procedural-impact distributions against rule-specific tolerances and converts a breach into a bounded menu of lawful parameter adjustments before promulgation.","source_ids":["SRC3"]},{"name":"OECD model methodology for regulatory impact assessment at regulatory authorities","overlap":"Combines ex-ante scenario, sensitivity, and possible Monte Carlo analysis with legal and institutional-capacity feasibility tests, baselines, targets, uncertainty communication, monitoring, feedback, revision or recalibration, and possible small-scale piloting.","remaining_difference":"Its targets and feedback principally support option appraisal and later regulatory learning; it does not specify a mandatory pre-promulgation tolerance-breach gate, frozen prediction trace, accountable disposition menu, or model-error demotion rule for operational and procedural consequences.","source_ids":["SRC2"]},{"name":"Canadian Cabinet Directive on Regulation","overlap":"Mandates regulatory impact analysis of proposed rules, including government implementation and administration costs, administrative burden, distribution across affected groups, timing, infrastructure, funding, implementation planning, and possible evaluation metrics before publication and decision by the proper rulemaking authority.","remaining_difference":"It does not require calibrated forecasts of implementation load and procedural burden against an approved envelope, a forecast-triggered correction mapping, or backtesting of frozen forecasts.","source_ids":["SRC1"]},{"name":"Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Federal Environmental Regulation","overlap":"Empirically compares preregulatory estimates with realized regulatory outcomes, addresses distributional metrics, uncertainty and counterfactual baselines, and recommends infrastructure for future retrospective analysis.","remaining_difference":"It evaluates regulations after implementation and does not create a pre-promulgation commitment gate or prescribe bounded lawful adjustments to a pending draft.","source_ids":["SRC4"]}],"contrastive_claim_falsifier":"The distinction would be falsified by documentation that an existing rulemaking system already requires, before final promulgation, frozen quantitative forecasts of operational and procedural outcomes against rule-specific approved tolerances, maps a confident breach to bounded lawful draft parameters, requires a recorded disposition by the statutory decision-maker, and later scores those same forecasts to recalibrate or demote the model. Empirically, the claimed advantage would also fail if the preregistered shadow study did not improve prediction loss and envelope-violation classification over ordinary review without unacceptable delay or asymmetric error.","contrastive_claim_remaining":"A narrow, testable distinction remains: adding to ordinary RIA an auditable pre-promulgation model that forecasts operational and procedural consequences against explicit rule-specific tolerances, maps a predicted breach to still-lawful adjustable parameters, requires accountable human disposition before publication, and backtests the frozen forecasts against identically defined realized outcomes.","experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_second_slot_policy60_20260806","gates":{"adequate_source_search":{"rationale":"The bounded search covered direct terminology, RIA and older policy-cycle terminology, current government frameworks, simulation and uncertainty methods, and ex-ante/ex-post component combinations. Four opened sources from four publishers were retained, including three official sources and one primary-research article.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"bounded_next_test":{"rationale":"A fixed-agency retrospective shadow study using only information available before past promulgations is bounded, reversible, and directly measures incremental forecast accuracy, envelope classification, subgroup error, and legal availability of suggested adjustments. OECD guidance supports feasibility testing and piloting, while the empirical study demonstrates workable ex-ante/ex-post comparisons and their methodological limits.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"distinct_testable_claim":{"rationale":"Existing practice substantially covers ex-ante impact analysis, scrutiny, implementation feasibility, uncertainty, monitoring, and retrospective comparison. The remaining tolerance-breach-to-lawful-adjustment gate and frozen model-calibration trace are nevertheless specific, observable, and falsifiable.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"no_obvious_safety_or_authority_stop":{"rationale":"The authorized first step is offline and retrospective, preserves statutory human decision authority, excludes individual-case decisions and automated promulgation, and includes privacy, asymmetry, provenance, explainability, and rollback stops. OECD feasibility guidance likewise calls for legal-mandate, data, capacity, risk, mitigation, and piloting checks. No obvious categorical stop is visible, although agency-specific records authority and privacy review remain prerequisites.","source_ids":["SRC2"],"status":"PASS"},"supported_problem":{"rationale":"Official frameworks recognize government implementation cost, administrative burden, distributional effects, institutional capacity, unintended consequences, uncertainty, and the need to compare expected with realized impacts. Primary research documents nonuniform gaps between preregulatory estimates and observed outcomes. Evidence is sufficient to make the problem visible, though these sources do not directly quantify hearing delay, access barriers, or the cost of correcting a published rule.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"}},"prior_art_disposition":"ADJACENT_PRIOR_ART","problem_evidence":{"finding":"The problem is partly supported: implementation capacity and burden are established subjects of pre-rule analysis, and forecast-versus-realized discrepancies are empirically observable. The retained evidence does not directly establish how often administrative rules create hearing backlogs or access barriers, nor how costly later amendment and reliance disruption are.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED"},"research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_light_screen_20260806","schema_version":1,"screen_id":"E13P115","screen_survival":true,"search_lanes":{"component_combination":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["regulatory impact assessment simulation model ex ante rulemaking implementation capacity forecast","empirical study ex ante regulatory impact assessment predictions ex post realized impacts","primary research regulatory impact assessment ex ante ex post forecast accuracy","\"accuracy of regulatory cost estimates\" retrospective study prospective estimates publisher"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC4"]},"direct_problem_and_intervention":{"no_result_note":"No retained source described the complete proposed pre-promulgation operational-and-procedural tolerance gate; exact-phrase results resolved to neighboring RIA and retrospective-review practices.","queries":["\"pre-promulgation\" forecast implementation administrative rule","administrative rulemaking \"forecast\" \"backlog\" impact analysis"],"source_ids":[]},"products_practices_and_standards":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["site:oecd.org regulatory impact assessment implementation monitoring evaluation uncertainty ex ante regulation","site:canada.ca Cabinet Directive on Regulation regulatory impact analysis implementation compliance performance measurement evaluation plan","site:gov.uk better regulation framework impact assessment implementation monitoring review regulation"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"]},"synonyms_and_historical_terms":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["site:gao.gov rulemaking retrospective review forecast costs benefits implementation outcomes","site:acus.gov retrospective review agency rules planning metrics data rulemaking","regulatory impact assessment simulation model ex ante rulemaking implementation capacity forecast","primary research regulatory impact assessment ex ante ex post forecast accuracy"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"]}},"sources":[{"claims_supported":["Canadian regulators must conduct RIA for regulatory proposals before publication.","RIA covers government implementation and administration costs, administrative burden, distribution across affected groups, implementation timing and infrastructure, and possible evaluation metrics.","The draft and Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement proceed to the proper regulation-making authority rather than replacing its decision."],"publisher":"Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Government of Canada","source_id":"SRC1","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Cabinet Directive on Regulation","url":"https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/laws/developing-improving-federal-regulations/requirements-developing-managing-reviewing-regulations/cabinet-directive-regulation.html"},{"claims_supported":["The model RIA methodology includes ex-ante delivery, legal, institutional-capacity, monitoring, and evaluation feasibility tests.","It supports scenario and uncertainty analysis, including sensitivity testing and Monte Carlo simulation where proportionate.","Its M&E framework uses baselines, targets, data sources, roles, feedback loops, revision or recalibration, risk mitigation, and possible piloting."],"publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","source_id":"SRC2","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Applying Regulatory Impact Assessment at Regulatory Authorities","url":"https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/10/applying-regulatory-impact-assessment-at-regulatory-authorities_18a99d8f/0b5ea522-en.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["The framework requires early options assessment and, for covered measures, independent scrutiny before collective agreement on a preferred regulatory provision.","It requires initial monitoring-and-evaluation planning, consideration of uncertainty, distributional and unintended effects, and circumstances requiring earlier review or amendment.","Post-implementation review compares estimated and actual impacts, while required impact materials constrain progression toward legislative introduction."],"publisher":"UK Department for Business and Trade","source_id":"SRC3","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Better Regulation Framework Guidance 2023","url":"https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67587ba55a2e4d4b993bfa83/better-regulation-framework-guidance-2023.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["The study presents nine retrospective case studies and 34 ex-ante/ex-post comparisons across 24 environmentally oriented regulations.","It finds a slight but nonuniform tendency to overestimate costs and benefits or effectiveness.","It identifies uncertainty, counterfactual-baseline construction, data limitations, and the rarity of rigorous retrospective analysis as material constraints."],"publisher":"Cambridge University Press","source_id":"SRC4","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","title":"Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Federal Environmental Regulation","url":"https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/retrospective-analysis-of-us-federal-environmental-regulation/891E36D3DBCEB79C969278488E5E1897"}],"world_novelty_boundary":"This bounded public-web screen found substantial neighboring regulatory-impact, scrutiny, implementation-feasibility, monitoring, and retrospective-evaluation practice, but no opened source containing the complete proposed combination. That absence supports only an ADJACENT_PRIOR_ART disposition; it cannot establish world novelty, patentability, market size, expert acceptance, realized value, or absence of undiscovered agency procedures, procurement systems, patents, or nonpublic implementations."}