{"closest_prior_art":[{"name":"Canada's pre-ratification tabling, explanatory-memorandum, and implementing-legislation process","overlap":"Before consent to be bound, the process documents treaty obligations, responsible ministers, policy compatibility, federal-provincial jurisdiction, timing, domestic legal authority, reservations, withdrawal, and consultations. Where legislation is required, authorization to ratify is sought only after adoption, followed by a government decision whether to proceed.","remaining_difference":"The policy does not disclose a versioned obligation-to-domestic-law simulation, uncertainty-bounded scenario forecasts, an explicit readiness envelope, prediction-linked correction rules, or post-entry forecast-error calibration.","source_ids":["SRC1"]},{"name":"Australia's staged treaty-making and domestic-implementation process","overlap":"The process uses intergovernmental consultation, executive and parliamentary scrutiny, a recommendation on binding treaty action, passage of required implementing legislation before entry into force, completion of domestic procedures, and separate approval before depositing a multilateral instrument of ratification.","remaining_difference":"The guidance does not describe a predictive compatibility model that compares alternative implementation sequences against quantified or otherwise explicit tolerances, nor a retained forecast subsequently scored against implementation outcomes.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3"]},{"name":"Vienna Convention constraints on performance, authority, and reservations","overlap":"The Convention establishes that treaties in force must be performed in good faith, internal law generally cannot justify nonperformance, competence defects have narrow effects on consent, and reservations are unavailable when prohibited or incompatible with a treaty's object and purpose.","remaining_difference":"These substantive legal constraints do not supply the proposed domestic simulation, readiness gate, correction workflow, or empirical backtesting mechanism.","source_ids":["SRC4"]}],"contrastive_claim_falsifier":"The contrastive claim would be falsified by evidence that an existing treaty-review system already performs the full integrated cycle—versioned obligation-level domestic scenarios, bounded interpretive uncertainty, an explicit readiness envelope, legally screened prediction-linked dispositions before consent, and outcome-linked error backtesting—or by a preregistered retrospective study showing no improvement over ordinary expert review in prediction loss, gap classification, or lawful correction availability.","contrastive_claim_remaining":"Beyond established pre-ratification legal review, explanatory memoranda, legislative prerequisites, consultation, and constitutional approval, the remaining testable distinction is an auditable versioned consequence model that forecasts obligation-level domestic compatibility and readiness under alternative lawful sequences, compares forecasts with an explicit envelope, requires constitutional actors to dispose of each out-of-envelope result, and recalibrates against post-entry records.","experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_second_slot_policy60_20260806","gates":{"adequate_source_search":{"rationale":"The bounded search covered the proposal directly, implementation/compatibility synonyms, national-interest and impact-assessment practices, treaty-making procedures, implementing-legislation sequencing, and combinations involving models or simulations. Four opened official sources span three publishers and two national treaty systems plus the international-law baseline. No exact predictive-and-backtested combination was found, but a phrase miss is not treated as novelty evidence.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"bounded_next_test":{"rationale":"A preregistered retrospective shadow study within one constitutional system is bounded, nonbinding, and feasible using archived pre-ratification materials and later legislation or compliance records. Existing Canadian and Australian processes identify documentary baselines, commitment stages, legal authorities, and implementation prerequisites against which model-assisted forecasts can be compared.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"],"status":"PASS"},"distinct_testable_claim":{"rationale":"The retained practices already cover much of the checklist and staged gate, but do not disclose the integrated versioned simulation, explicit readiness envelope, uncertainty scoring, prediction-linked correction rule, and post-entry error calibration. Incremental predictive accuracy, calibration, uncertainty coverage, lawful-option rate, and delay can be prospectively specified and measured.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2"],"status":"PASS"},"no_obvious_safety_or_authority_stop":{"rationale":"The authorized first step is an offline shadow evaluation, while ratification and legislation remain with constitutionally designated actors. Official procedures confirm the need for executive, legislative, and intergovernmental roles, and the Convention supplies hard limits on internal-law excuses, competence claims, and reservations. Those constraints require legal review but do not prohibit the proposed nonbinding test.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"supported_problem":{"rationale":"The international-law baseline makes an in-force treaty binding and generally bars reliance on internal law to excuse nonperformance. Australian official material expressly identifies the risk of ratifying without required legislation and notes complications from divided federal and subnational powers. Canadian procedure likewise requires examination of domestic authority, responsible ministries, subnational jurisdiction, timing, and legislation before ratification.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"}},"prior_art_disposition":"ADJACENT_PRIOR_ART","problem_evidence":{"finding":"The problem is visible: domestic legislation, authority allocation, subnational competence, and implementation timing can remain consequential at the point of ratification, while international law generally leaves the state bound despite internal-law deficiencies. Official Canadian and Australian processes address this risk upstream, demonstrating that it is recognized rather than hypothetical.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"SUPPORTED"},"research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_light_screen_20260806","schema_version":1,"screen_id":"E13P134","screen_survival":true,"search_lanes":{"component_combination":{"no_result_note":"The searches did not locate a retained source combining treaty-obligation simulation, explicit compatibility tolerances, prediction-linked ratification disposition, and post-entry forecast backtesting; this bounded miss is not evidence of novelty.","queries":["model simulate treaty obligations domestic law implementation before ratification","treaty ratification readiness checklist implementing legislation prior to ratification government manual","treaty ratification impact assessment implementation plan government guidance"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2"]},"direct_problem_and_intervention":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["treaty ratification domestic implementation readiness assessment before ratification interagency review","treaty implementation compatibility domestic law prior to ratification checklist","Australia treaty making process legislation prior to ratification official"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"]},"products_practices_and_standards":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["Policy on Tabling Treaties Parliament implementation obligations legislation ratification","National Interest Analysis treaties implementing legislation consultation obligations ratification Australia","Vienna Convention Law of Treaties article 26 27 19 reservations official text"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC4"]},"synonyms_and_historical_terms":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["treaty legal scrubbing domestic implementation before ratification","treaty making process National Interest Analysis domestic legislation","domestication of international commitments ratification domestic law"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"]}},"sources":[{"claims_supported":["Canada distinguishes treaties requiring new legislation and requires adoption of implementing legislation before seeking authorization to express consent to be bound.","The accompanying explanatory memorandum covers main obligations, responsible ministers, policy compatibility, federal-provincial-territorial implications, timing, domestic legal authority, reservations, withdrawal, and consultation.","After tabling and any necessary legislation, the government retains the decision whether to bind Canada."],"publisher":"Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada Treaty Section","source_id":"SRC1","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament","url":"https://treaty-accord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx?lang=eng"},{"claims_supported":["Australia uses consultation, executive approval, parliamentary scrutiny, and a recommendation on whether binding treaty action should occur.","Required domestic legislative changes must pass before entry into force.","Depositing a multilateral instrument of ratification requires Executive Council approval after domestic procedures."],"publisher":"Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade","source_id":"SRC2","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Australia's treaty-making process","url":"https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/treaties/treaty-making-process"},{"claims_supported":["Ratification without required legislation risks leaving Australia in breach if Parliament later fails or refuses to legislate.","Internal legislative deficiencies are not a defense to an international claim of breach.","Implementation can involve both Commonwealth and state legislation because of divided governmental powers."],"publisher":"Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade","source_id":"SRC3","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"The Relationship Between Treaties and Domestic Law","url":"https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/the-relationship-between-treaties-and-domestic-law"},{"claims_supported":["Every treaty in force is binding and must be performed in good faith.","A party generally may not invoke internal law to justify failure to perform a treaty.","Reservations are restricted when prohibited by the treaty or incompatible with its object and purpose.","Violations of internal competence rules invalidate consent only under narrow Article 46 conditions."],"publisher":"United Nations International Law Commission","source_id":"SRC4","source_type":"OFFICIAL_STANDARD","title":"Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)","url":"https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf"}],"world_novelty_boundary":"This coarse four-source public-web screen found substantial adjacent official practice but no exact disclosure of the complete predictive, envelope-gated, and outcome-backtested combination. The result supports only bounded researchability and a remaining contrastive hypothesis; it does not establish world novelty, patentability, market size, expert acceptance, or realized value."}