{"closest_prior_art":[{"name":"Agency Structure Attribution Balance","overlap":"Near-complete methodological collision: fixes the explanatory target; inventories focal, distributed, opposing, implementing, and affected actors; maps opportunity and structural constraints; traces dated actions and omissions; classifies causal roles; tests actor substitution and structural relaxation; pairs micro and macro evidence; audits narrative focality; preserves rival models and uncertainty; and separates causal attribution from praise, blame, or liability.","remaining_difference":"The proposal specializes this published archetype to six emergency-power decisions in a completed 120-day state episode and uses the resulting attribution specifically to inform constitutional safeguards.","source_ids":["SRC1"]},{"name":"New York State COVID-19 After Action Report","overlap":"Uses a detailed event timeline, executive-order inventory, operational records, stakeholder evidence, state-local coordination analysis, federal conditions, implementation effects, and recommendations for future emergency readiness. It specifically distinguishes Executive Chamber centralization from established agencies and local capabilities.","remaining_difference":"It is an outcome- and operations-oriented after-action review, not a bounded restraint-attribution design using explicit officeholder-substitution and one-condition-at-a-time structural counterfactuals for constitutional drafting.","source_ids":["SRC3"]},{"name":"Improving Legislative Oversight of Emergency Authorities","overlap":"Examines concrete uses of gubernatorial authority, legislative capacity, reporting gaps, renewal and termination, federal-funding dependencies, and alternative state oversight mechanisms, then recommends renewal information, sunsets, and post-emergency reporting.","remaining_difference":"It evaluates legal allocation and oversight directly rather than estimating whether particular uses or nonuses resulted from the officeholder, institutional checks, implementation capacity, coalitions, or external conditions.","source_ids":["SRC2"]},{"name":"Governors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic","overlap":"Codes governors' executive orders affecting local governments over time and tests institutional autonomy, gubernatorial party, and ideological alignment as explanations for preemption and empowerment.","remaining_difference":"It is a comparative aggregate study rather than a six-decision within-episode process trace with feasibility coding, narrative-focality auditing, officeholder substitution, and safeguard-specific conclusions.","source_ids":["SRC4"]}],"contrastive_claim_falsifier":"The residual claim is falsified if two independent reviewers cannot reliably distinguish legal availability from practical feasibility or actor from structural roles in the permitted record, or if the completed map produces no decision-level safeguard implication beyond an ordinary legal inventory, chronology, and after-action review.","contrastive_claim_remaining":"Despite the substantial methodological collision, an application-specific claim remains testable: for one fixed 120-day emergency episode, public-record coding of six authority decisions will reproducibly distinguish at least one officeholder-dependent choice or timing effect from formal constraint, implementation capacity, coalition interaction, or external conditions, and that distinction will alter which safeguard is plausibly relevant.","experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_second_slot_policy60_20260806","gates":{"adequate_source_search":{"rationale":"The bounded search covered the intervention directly, older emergency and martial-law terminology, oversight and after-action practices, and combinations involving actor substitution, structural counterfactuals, timelines, and state-local implementation. Four opened sources span four publishers and include official guidance, first-party work, and primary research.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"bounded_next_test":{"rationale":"Selecting six completed decisions, independently coding a fixed set of public fields, preserving disagreements, and stopping at an uncertainty table is finite and feasible. Existing work demonstrates accessible executive-order lists, timelines, legal authorities, and codable state-local relationships.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"distinct_testable_claim":{"rationale":"The general attribution architecture is already disclosed by SRC1, but the narrower empirical claim—reproducible discrimination among explanations for six emergency-power decisions and a resulting safeguard-relevant difference—has a clear observable success and failure condition and is not established by the retained sources.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"no_obvious_safety_or_authority_stop":{"rationale":"A read-only retrospective pilot using public laws, orders, calendars, court records, minutes, and lawfully released materials presents no obvious stop. The proposal appropriately reserves legal validity and reform authority, excludes privileged or compulsory evidence and personal-merit judgments, and specifies halt conditions for restricted information or ongoing proceedings.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3"],"status":"PASS"},"supported_problem":{"rationale":"The sources show that emergency decisions reflect interacting executive choices, legislative oversight structures, federal-resource consequences, agency capacity, and state-local authority. The New York review also shows how an executive-centered approach can displace established institutions. They do not directly establish that the hypothetical commission relies on a personal-restraint narrative, so support is partial rather than complete.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"}},"prior_art_disposition":"SUBSTANTIAL_COLLISION","problem_evidence":{"finding":"The general attribution problem is visible: official and empirical sources show that signed gubernatorial orders coexist with legislative constraints, federal funding, agency operations, local autonomy, ideology, and implementation effects. Evidence that a particular constitutional commission has compressed a former governor's restraint into a personal or mechanically structural story was not located.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED"},"research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_light_screen_20260806","schema_version":1,"screen_id":"E13P146","screen_survival":false,"search_lanes":{"component_combination":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["\"emergency authority\" \"after-action\" governor legislative oversight timeline executive orders","\"actor substitution\" counterfactual process tracing public policy decision","\"structural counterfactual\" executive power institutional constraints governor"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"]},"direct_problem_and_intervention":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["emergency powers after action review governor decisions institutional constraints legislative oversight judicial review state COVID","state constitutional commission emergency powers COVID lessons executive authority report","after action report state COVID governor executive orders legislative judicial local implementation lessons learned"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"]},"products_practices_and_standards":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["state emergency powers reform sunset legislative renewal reporting requirements governor NCSL","site:nga.org emergency powers lessons learned governors COVID institutional review","state pandemic after action report executive orders local implementation legislative engagement institutional decision making"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3"]},"synonyms_and_historical_terms":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["gubernatorial emergency authority historical \"martial law\" state constitution sunset legislative review","process tracing emergency executive orders actor institutional constraints counterfactual governor","emergency powers reform evidence based lessons governors pandemic safeguards analysis"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC4"]}},"sources":[{"claims_supported":["Provides an almost element-for-element prior disclosure of balanced actor-structure attribution, including focality audits, opportunity maps, causal-role classification, actor substitution, structural relaxation, paired timelines, distributed actors, alternative models, uncertainty, and responsibility boundaries.","Identifies crisis management and institutional design as applications while warning that counterfactuals are not observed facts and that source visibility cannot substitute for causal magnitude."],"publisher":"The Encyclopedia of Abstractions","source_id":"SRC1","source_type":"OTHER","title":"Agency Structure Attribution Balance","url":"https://abstractopedia.org/archetypes/agency_structure_attribution_balance/"},{"claims_supported":["Finds that California emergency law can leave the legislature unable to object to a specific executive action without terminating the entire emergency, potentially jeopardizing other response activities or federal funding.","Recommends structured renewal information, sunsets for extended emergencies, more targeted legislative oversight, and post-expiration reporting on how emergency authorities were used."],"publisher":"California Legislative Analyst's Office","source_id":"SRC2","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Improving Legislative Oversight of Emergency Authorities","url":"https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/5029"},{"claims_supported":["Uses extensive research, stakeholder engagement, a timeline, executive-order lists, leadership reports, and operational data to review New York's pandemic response.","Finds that the Executive Chamber's centralized approach displaced pre-existing plans and that an executive order limiting local emergency powers hampered local response according to participants.","Demonstrates an established adjacent after-action practice but does not perform explicit officeholder-substitution or structural-relaxation tests."],"publisher":"The Olson Group, Ltd.","source_id":"SRC3","source_type":"FIRST_PARTY_PRODUCT","title":"New York State COVID-19 After Action Report","url":"https://www.olsongroupltd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/NYS-COVID-19-After-Action-Report-06142024-FINAL.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["Examines all governors' executive orders affecting local governments during the first five months of the COVID-19 pandemic.","Finds time-varying associations between preemption and gubernatorial party or ideological alignment, while local-government autonomy was the most consistent institutional correlate of centralization.","Shows that gubernatorial emergency action can be empirically decomposed into officeholder and institutional factors rather than inferred solely from signed orders."],"publisher":"Oxford University Press","source_id":"SRC4","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","title":"Governors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic","url":"https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/51/3/396/6328707"}],"world_novelty_boundary":"This bounded four-source screen establishes neither world novelty nor patentability. It cannot determine market size, expert acceptance, realized value, or whether an unsearched jurisdiction, archive, patent, dissertation, consultancy method, or unpublished commission practice already implements the same emergency-specific design. It does establish a substantial collision with a publicly described general attribution architecture; only the episode-specific empirical application and safeguard consequence remain unresolved."}