{"closest_prior_art":[{"name":"AEMO 2025 Transition Plan for System Security","overlap":"Uses region-specific security studies to identify transition points requiring material operational changes, emerging security gaps, investments, technologies, and coordinated actions during an inverter-heavy energy transition.","remaining_difference":"It is a system-level planning framework, not a per-area passport that preregisters rival continuity-versus-rupture mechanisms, tests entry and return paths on archived disturbances, compares alternative transition chronologies, and ties the resulting diagnosis to legacy-function treatment and reversible gates.","source_ids":["SRC2"]},{"name":"NREL Research Roadmap on Grid-Forming Inverters","overlap":"Treats grid-forming adoption as a system transition involving mixed grid-following, grid-forming, and synchronous resources; covers stability, protection, recovery, modeling, validation, interoperability, phased deployment, and progression from laboratory tests to commissioning.","remaining_difference":"It supplies a research and deployment roadmap but not the proposed operational decision instrument: a typed multi-resolution evidence ledger, explicit rival mechanism classifier, hysteresis/return-path probe, and controlled comparison against penetration-based planning for one transmission area.","source_ids":["SRC1"]},{"name":"NERC EMT modeling guideline combined with IEEE 2800.1","overlap":"Requires or recommends validated, facility-specific models; representation of controls, operating modes, settings, and protection; revision traceability; disturbance-based validation; commissioning checks; and transmission-level IBR performance and protection requirements, including accommodation of grid-forming equipment.","remaining_difference":"These practices govern model quality, interconnection, and equipment performance. They do not jointly diagnose whether an area's governing control-and-protection regime is drifting, crossing a topology-dependent threshold, or reorganizing, nor select gradual, parallel, zonal, hybrid, or cutover chronology from that diagnosis.","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC4"]}],"contrastive_claim_falsifier":"Using the same preregistered disturbances and validated models, the passport is falsified as a distinct intervention if its scale-dependent mechanism labels do not reliably separate cases needing different transition treatment on the four holdout events, or if the ordinary planning, EMT, protection, and commissioning workflow yields the same actionable gate, fallback, and legacy decisions.","contrastive_claim_remaining":"For a defined transmission area, a preregistered multi-scale mechanism diagnosis—including topology-stratified disturbance evidence and entry-versus-return perturbation tests—changes at least one justified transition regime, readiness gate, fallback, coexistence sunset, or legacy-function treatment relative to penetration-based planning plus ordinary EMT, protection, and commissioning practice.","experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_second_slot_policy60_20260806","gates":{"adequate_source_search":{"rationale":"The bounded search covered the exact proposal phrase and direct intervention, grid-forming and older low-inertia/weak-grid/converter-dominated terminology, operator transition plans and interconnection practices, and combinations involving protection, EMT validation, thresholds, mixed controls, and staged deployment. Four opened direct sources from four publishers were retained; three are official or standards sources. An exact-phrase miss was not treated as novelty evidence.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"bounded_next_test":{"rationale":"The proposed retrospective study is finite and auditable: twelve archived disturbances across at least three materially different conditions, offline sweeps using validated models, four held-out events, preregistered invariants and falsifiers, and comparison with baseline decisions. No live settings need change.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC3"],"status":"PASS"},"distinct_testable_claim":{"rationale":"The remaining claim is not merely that more data are useful. It predicts that mechanism and return-path diagnosis will change a specific gate, transition chronology, fallback, or legacy treatment relative to established planning and commissioning applied to the same evidence; the holdout comparison can refute that prediction.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"],"status":"PASS"},"no_obvious_safety_or_authority_stop":{"rationale":"The first step is read-only retrospective replay and offline simulation. Live setting changes, reduced protection coverage, and uncommissioned controls are excluded; later action remains with the operator's reliability authority, independent protection review, approvals, owner safety envelopes, preserved configurations, and explicit stop-and-restore boundaries. The retained guidance reinforces model verification and protection review rather than revealing an obvious prohibited first step.","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"supported_problem":{"rationale":"The sources show that increasing IBR participation creates sub-second stability, voltage-recovery, current-limiting, and protection concerns; that conventional models have failed to reproduce observed ride-through behavior when control or protection logic was omitted; and that operators already identify regional transition points requiring material changes in security management. This supports the problem's coupled and topology-sensitive character, though the sources do not establish universal hysteresis.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"}},"prior_art_disposition":"ADJACENT_PRIOR_ART","problem_evidence":{"finding":"The problem is visible. NREL identifies protection, fault response, recovery, mixed-control interoperability, and staged validation as unresolved barriers to bulk-grid GFM adoption. NERC reports disturbance-driven shortcomings in conventional models and requires facility-specific EMT representation and validation of actual modes, settings, and protections. AEMO uses region-specific security studies and explicit transition points, while IEEE 2800.1 addresses transmission IBR performance, protection, and GFM-related barriers. Evidence strongly supports coupled, non-penetration-only planning needs; direct evidence for hysteretic area-wide regime reorganization remains limited.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"SUPPORTED"},"research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_light_screen_20260806","schema_version":1,"screen_id":"E13P153","screen_survival":true,"search_lanes":{"component_combination":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["grid-forming inverter hysteresis path dependence threshold weak grid protection","converter-dominated power system transition roadmap legacy protection staged deployment","grid-forming converter interoperability testing commissioning legacy synchronous transition"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC3"]},"direct_problem_and_intervention":{"no_result_note":"The exact phrase \"Grid Control-Regime Transition Passport\" produced no direct match in the bounded search; this phrase miss was not treated as evidence of novelty.","queries":["\"Grid Control-Regime Transition Passport\"","\"grid-forming\" inverter transition plan protection commissioning rollback transmission","grid forming inverter roadmap system transition protection stability thresholds EMT studies"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2"]},"products_practices_and_standards":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["site:aemo.com.au \"Transition Plan for System Security\" grid forming protection roadmap system strength","site:nerc.com inverter based resource grid forming planning protection disturbance monitoring guideline EMT model validation","IEEE 2800.1 grid-forming equipment transmission protection interconnection"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"]},"synonyms_and_historical_terms":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["inverter dominated power system transition operational security framework protection fault levels staged commissioning","low inertia nonsynchronous generation regime change transition points system security","weak grid converter-dominated power system grid-forming protection roadmap"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"]}},"sources":[{"claims_supported":["Grid-forming adoption raises coupled questions involving frequency and voltage control, protection, fault ride-through, recovery, modeling, and simulation.","Future systems will mix synchronous machines with grid-following and grid-forming resources, and adoption is expected to proceed through staged validation, demonstration, standards, and commissioning.","Protection behavior and coordination are major unresolved barriers, and area-system simulation should cover contingencies and correlate with subsequent validation."],"publisher":"National Renewable Energy Laboratory / UNIFI Consortium","source_id":"SRC1","source_type":"SECONDARY_RESEARCH","title":"Research Roadmap on Grid-Forming Inverters","url":"https://unificonsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/ResearchRoadmap.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["AEMO defines transition points as events requiring material changes in the operational approach to system security.","Its structured transition planning uses region-specific security studies to identify emerging gaps, required investments, and collaborative actions.","System strength, inertia, network support, and technology developments are treated together rather than solely as a scalar penetration limit."],"publisher":"Australian Energy Market Operator","source_id":"SRC2","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"2025 Transition Plan for System Security (TPSS)","url":"https://www.aemo.com.au/energy-systems/major-publications/transition-plan-for-system-security-tpss/2025-transition-plan-for-system-security"},{"claims_supported":["Positive-sequence models and incomplete verification have failed to reproduce observed IBR disturbance behavior when relevant protection and control logic was omitted.","Transmission planners should use facility-specific EMT models representing actual operating modes, settings, protections, firmware, and revision history.","Models should be validated against testing or field disturbances and checked during interconnection, commissioning, and subsequent changes."],"publisher":"North American Electric Reliability Corporation","source_id":"SRC3","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Electromagnetic Transient Modeling for BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources—Recommended Model Requirements and Verification Practices","url":"https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC_Reliability_Guidelines/Reliability_Guideline-EMT_Modeling_and_Simulations.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["Transmission-connected IBR requirements span voltage and frequency ride-through, active and reactive power control, abnormal-condition support, power quality, negative-sequence injection, and system protection.","The amendment explicitly modifies IEEE 2800-2022 to reduce technical barriers for grid-forming equipment where justified by reliability and security needs."],"publisher":"IEEE Standards Association","source_id":"SRC4","source_type":"OFFICIAL_STANDARD","title":"IEEE P2800.1 / IEEE 2800a—Transmission IBR Interconnection Standard and Grid-Forming Amendment","url":"https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/2800.1/12387/"}],"world_novelty_boundary":"This bounded four-source screen found substantial adjacent operator planning, research-roadmap, EMT-modeling, commissioning, and interconnection-standard practice, but no opened source combining all passport elements into the same one-area contrastive decision workflow. That result does not establish world novelty, patentability, market size, expert acceptance, realized value, or absence of closer unpublished, proprietary, paywalled, differently named, or unindexed practice."}