{"closest_prior_art":[{"name":"Agency / Structure Attribution Balance","overlap":"Near-exact conceptual match: fixes the explanatory target; inventories focal and distributed actors; separates person from position; classifies causal roles; traces evidence across levels; maps information and constraints; performs actor-substitution and structural-relaxation counterfactuals; preserves competing models and uncertainty; and separates causation from blame or liability.","remaining_difference":"The proposal specializes the published archetype to a composite-pressure-vessel qualification workflow, packages it as a read-only annex before corrective-action approval, and adds engineering-specific records, certification boundaries, and stop rules. These are domain and governance adaptations rather than a distinct causal method.","source_ids":["SRC1"]},{"name":"CAST Handbook: How to Learn More from Incidents and Accidents","overlap":"CAST reconstructs the physical process, models the safety-control structure, analyzes individual controllers and system interactions, rejects blame-centered and single-root-cause explanations, and connects findings to actionable systemic recommendations.","remaining_difference":"CAST does not prescribe the proposal's explicit paired comparison between a qualified alternate role occupant and one-at-a-time relaxation of documented structural constraints.","source_ids":["SRC2"]},{"name":"Formalised AcciMap","overlap":"AcciMap retrospectively maps actors, decisions, information flows, organizational levels, causal links, system-wide contributing factors, and feasible recommendations. Its empirical evaluation also compares independently produced maps and shows variation in organizational-level attribution.","remaining_difference":"It does not specifically distinguish role authority from occupant choice through a bounded alternate-occupant counterfactual, nor require paired actor and structural probes within a certification annex.","source_ids":["SRC4"]},{"name":"DOE Human Performance Handbook problem-analysis practice","overlap":"DOE guidance explicitly warns that fixation on individual culpability produces ineffective corrective actions, calls for latent organizational weaknesses and controls to be examined, reconstructs what each person knew and sought to accomplish, and traces organizational weaknesses to event consequences.","remaining_difference":"It supplies the diagnosis and contextual investigation practice but not the proposal's named actor–structure matrix or paired substitution/constraint-relaxation tests.","source_ids":["SRC3"]}],"contrastive_claim_falsifier":"Using the same frozen failure packet, compare the proposed annex with an authorized application of CAST or formalised AcciMap. The incremental claim is falsified if independent reviewers find no additional evidence-supported person–position distinction, causal interaction, uncertainty classification, reviewer agreement, or corrective-action target attributable specifically to the paired actor-substitution and structural-relaxation probes.","contrastive_claim_remaining":"The defensible remaining claim is narrow and implementation-specific: in a completed composite-pressure-vessel qualification failure, embedding an already-published actor–structure attribution pattern as a read-only, certification-bounded annex may add discriminating evidence beyond the organization's existing review or an ordinary CAST/AcciMap application. The general method and its named core mechanisms are already publicly described; only incremental utility in this workflow remains testable.","experiment_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_second_slot_policy60_20260806","gates":{"adequate_source_search":{"rationale":"The bounded search covered the exact title and intervention, approval-signature and pressure-vessel formulations, older human-error and bad-apple terminology, CAST/AcciMap/DOE practices, and combinations involving actor substitution, structural relaxation, information flow, and organizational constraints. Four retained sources from four publishers were opened, including official guidance and primary research.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"bounded_next_test":{"rationale":"The proposed test is limited to one closed case, a frozen comparison and decision window, two reviewers, an enumerated existing-record packet, no hazardous rerun, and board authorization before operational use. Independent-map comparison is a researchable design, although SRC4 indicates that organizational-level causal mappings can have limited inter-reviewer consistency.","source_ids":["SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"},"distinct_testable_claim":{"rationale":"Incremental workflow utility is testable, but the stated contrastive mechanism is not distinct: SRC1 already specifies the same actor–structure evidence matrix, person–position distinction, actor substitution, structural-constraint relaxation, cross-scale process tracing, plural synthesis, uncertainty, and responsibility boundary. CAST, AcciMap, and DOE guidance cover much of the safety-investigation implementation context.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"FAIL"},"no_obvious_safety_or_authority_stop":{"rationale":"No obvious stop applies to the authorized first step because it is read-only, uses a completed case and existing access controls, cannot change hardware or official disposition, and preserves board authority. Its responsibility boundary and independent-review posture agree with the cautions in SRC1 and SRC3. The stated provenance, coercion, information-boundary, and unauthorized-influence conditions appropriately trigger suspension.","source_ids":["SRC1","SRC3"],"status":"PASS"},"supported_problem":{"rationale":"The general problem is directly visible: SRC2 and SRC3 describe blame or individual-error fixation as obscuring systemic causes and weakening corrective action, while SRC4 shows that analysts can disagree substantially about organizational factors and cross-level causal links. The proposal's particular chief-engineer and rupture facts were not independently verified.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PASS"}},"prior_art_disposition":"SUBSTANTIAL_COLLISION","problem_evidence":{"finding":"Public guidance and research support the general risk that focal-person or shallow root-cause accounts omit organizational contributors and yield weak corrective actions, and they show that cross-level attribution can vary among reviewers. Evidence supports the problem type but not the proposal's specific pressure-vessel episode or claimed contents of its official review.","source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"],"status":"PARTLY_SUPPORTED"},"research_id":"eoa_inverse_innovation_exp13_light_screen_20260806","schema_version":1,"screen_id":"E13P165","screen_survival":false,"search_lanes":{"component_combination":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["\"actor substitution\" \"structural relaxation\" causal attribution","alternate operator same information authority counterfactual accident investigation","AcciMap actor map info flow map organizational levels accident analysis","CAST control structure human error blame organizational factors recommendations"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC4"]},"direct_problem_and_intervention":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["\"Causal-Role Attribution Annex\" pressure vessel","\"chief engineer\" approval signature rupture failure review causal attribution","pressure-vessel failure review approval chain organizational causal factors corrective action","accident investigation person position actor substitution organizational causes engineering failure"],"source_ids":["SRC1","SRC2","SRC3"]},"products_practices_and_standards":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["NASA mishap investigation root cause organizational factors fault tree change analysis","DOE accident investigation human performance organizational weakness root cause handbook","CAST handbook post-incident causal analysis safety control structure","composite overwrapped pressure vessel qualification failure investigation standard"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3"]},"synonyms_and_historical_terms":{"no_result_note":null,"queries":["bad apple theory accident causation blame human error systems approach","root cause seduction hindsight bias accident investigation","AcciMap Rasmussen risk management framework systemic accident analysis","local rationality individual culpability latent organizational weaknesses event investigation"],"source_ids":["SRC2","SRC3","SRC4"]}},"sources":[{"claims_supported":["Publishes the proposal's core actor–structure attribution pattern and nearly all named mechanisms.","Specifies actor-substitution and structural-constraint-relaxation probes, evidence matrices, process tracing, position maps, plural synthesis, uncertainty, and responsibility boundaries.","Shows that the proposal is principally a domain-specific specialization rather than a new general method."],"publisher":"The Encyclopedia of Abstractions","source_id":"SRC1","source_type":"OTHER","title":"Agency Structure Attribution Balance","url":"https://abstractopedia.org/archetypes/agency_structure_attribution_balance/"},{"claims_supported":["CAST is a structured post-incident causal-analysis method focused on physical processes, safety-control structures, controller actions, system interactions, and recommendations.","It identifies oversimplified root-cause analysis, hindsight, unrealistic human-error models, and blame as barriers to learning.","It substantially overlaps the proposed annex's systemic, non-blaming, cross-level investigation logic."],"publisher":"MIT Partnership for Systems Approaches to Safety and Security","source_id":"SRC2","source_type":"OTHER","title":"CAST Handbook: How to Learn More from Incidents and Accidents","url":"https://psas.scripts.mit.edu/home/get_file4.php?name=CAST_Handbook.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["Official guidance says analysts should focus on what could have prevented an event rather than who caused it.","It states that culpability fixation obscures latent organizational weaknesses and effective corrective actions.","It recommends reconstructing each individual's goals, focus, knowledge, controls, and organizational context and supports independent oversight."],"publisher":"U.S. Department of Energy","source_id":"SRC3","source_type":"OFFICIAL_GUIDANCE","title":"Human Performance Handbook, Volume 1","url":"https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/doe-hdbk-1028-2009_volume1_0.pdf"},{"claims_supported":["Primary empirical evaluation of formalised AcciMap using multiple teams and an external review.","AcciMap maps actors, decisions, information flows, organizational levels, causal relationships, and recommendations.","The study found notable variation in identified factors and causal links, especially at organizational levels, supporting both the problem's researchability and the need to measure reviewer agreement."],"publisher":"Springer Nature","source_id":"SRC4","source_type":"PRIMARY_RESEARCH","title":"An evaluation of the formalised AcciMap approach for accident analysis in healthcare","url":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10111-021-00669-w"}],"world_novelty_boundary":"This bounded public-web screen establishes only that a near-exact general archetype and substantial adjacent safety-analysis practices are publicly described. It cannot establish world novelty, patentability, market size, expert acceptance, realized value, or whether unpublished, proprietary, classified, or differently indexed pressure-vessel practices provide an even closer match."}