# Fishery Intervention Design — Nine-Step Working

## Step 1 — Problem statement (decision, bounds, success/failure)

**Decision:** Choose an intervention design for a single-stock, effectively open-access coastal demersal fishery that returns biomass to the MSY-supporting range without destroying the livelihoods that depend on it.

**State / bounds:**
- Resource: one demersal stock, self-renewing, currently harvested ~20% above MSY; declining CPUE and shrinking mean fish size for 3 years (classic growth-overfishing + recruitment-overfishing signature).
- Hard nonlinearity: recruitment-collapse threshold reachable in 4–7 years on current trajectory — a tipping point with likely hysteresis (recovery path harder than the decline path).
- Actors: ~120 small-boat operators across 5 villages; downstream processing buyers; a regulator holding total-allowable-catch (TAC) authority but with a history of deferring to industry (regulatory capture / non-binding rules).
- Open access in practice: no enforced individual quotas; first-mover extraction incentive.

**Success:** biomass back into MSY-supporting range within 10 years AND <20% drop in *aggregate* (cohort-averaged) fisher income. **Failure:** stock collapse OR a regime that pushes the bottom quartile of operators below subsistence.

## Step 2 — Operative prime abstractions (verb: search_prime, search_by_facets, get_prime)

Ran `search_prime` on the domain-stripped meta-model and `search_by_facets` over eight structural facets. Surfaced and pulled full records (`get_prime`) for the load-bearing ones:
- **tragedy_of_the_commons** — the spine: rivalrous + non-excludable resource, 1/N cost-share, Nash over-extraction toward collapse; Ostrom design-principles remedy set.
- **property_rights** — the structural remedy: define an excludable, severable, transferable entitlement so consequences route back to the decision-maker.
- **mechanism_design_and_incentive_structure** — make compliance the rational equilibrium rather than relying on coercion/exhortation.
- **threshold_and_criticality** — the recruitment-collapse tipping point, singular sensitivity, hysteresis; argues for a margin of safety and avoiding the crossing.
- Also live (from facets): informal_enforcement / monitoring / oversight_capacity (enforcement under hidden violation), reversibility_horizon & irreversibility (time pressure), fairness / equity / auction_theory (allocation), separation_of_powers / no_one_is_above_the_rules (capture), iterative_reciprocity (repeated-game cooperation), optimism_bias / system_archetypes (ignored slow signal).

## Step 3 — Salience rank (load-bearing relevance)

1. tragedy_of_the_commons (the diagnosis — everything else hangs off it)
2. property_rights / excludable severable entitlement (the core remedy lever)
3. mechanism_design_and_incentive_structure (turns rules into self-enforcing equilibrium; also governs allocation fairness)
4. threshold_and_criticality (sets urgency, the cap level, the safety margin)
5. monitoring + informal_enforcement + graduated sanctions (compliance under hidden cheating)
6. legitimacy / participatory rule-making + regulatory-capture correction (the deferring regulator)
7. equity / fairness allocation + protect-the-weakest invariant (subsistence floor)
8. iterative_reciprocity / repeated interaction (a small, repeat-interacting 120-actor community — cooperation is feasible)

## Step 4 — Prune to operative subset (~3–9) + rationale

Keep: **tragedy_of_the_commons, property_rights (entitlement), mechanism_design, threshold_and_criticality, monitoring/graduated-enforcement, legitimacy/participation, equity/protect-weakest.** Drop optimism_bias/system_archetypes (descriptive, not actionable here), drop auction_theory as the *primary* allocation rule (pure auction would price out the bottom quartile — trips the failure condition), drop public_goods (wrong structure: this is over-extraction of a rival resource, not under-provision).

## Step 5 — Context-specific typed model (nodes / labeled edges / primes)

```
[Stock S] --renews_at--> R(S)   (recruitment; near threshold θ; hysteresis)   :: threshold_and_criticality
[120 Operators across 5 Villages] --extract_from--> [Stock S]                 :: tragedy_of_the_commons (1/N cost-share)
[Operator_i] --bears(1/N · cost)+captures(full benefit)--> over-extraction    :: incentive misalignment
[Regulator] --holds_authority(set TAC)--> [Stock S]                           :: property_rights / mechanism_design
[Regulator] --historically_defers_to--> [Industry]                            :: capture (weakens legitimacy + enforcement)
[Processing Buyers] --demand--> catch ; --finance/advance--> [Operators]       :: downstream dependency, transition lever
[Bottom-quartile operators] --depend_on--> subsistence_income                  :: equity / protect-weakest invariant
missing_edge: [Operator_i] --cannot_exclude--> [Operator_j]                    :: open access -> the defect to repair
```

## Step 6 — Meta-model (domain stripped)

Many independent agents draw from one shared, self-renewing, rival, non-excludable stock; each captures full private gain and bears only 1/N of the depletion cost, so the uncoordinated equilibrium over-extracts toward an irreversible threshold. An authority can impose a binding aggregate limit but is captured by the agents. Repair = (a) set a binding aggregate cap below current take with a safety margin to the threshold; (b) convert open access into severable, enforceable individual entitlements so consequences route back to each decider; (c) design the entitlement + transition so the rational move is compliance and the weakest agents stay above subsistence; (d) add trusted monitoring + graduated sanctions + legitimate participatory rule-making to defeat hidden cheating and capture; (e) exploit repeated interaction in the small, bounded community.

## Step 7 — Query solution archetypes (verb: find_archetypes_for_prime, get_archetype, search_archetype)

- `find_archetypes_for_prime(tragedy_of_the_commons)` → **commons_governance** (source), plus related: iterative_reciprocity, public_goods_provision, reciprocity_protocol_design, harmful_emergence_containment.
- `get_archetype(commons_governance)` → the central match. Components: resource boundary, access rule, use quota/limit, monitoring signal, graduated sanction rule, replenishment rule, legitimacy basis, dispute path, adaptation cadence, funding pool, exception process, transparency record. Mechanisms: quota system, graduated sanctions, participatory rule-making, monitoring dashboard, replenishment fund, cap-and-trade, congestion pricing, commons charter.
- `get_archetype(iterative_reciprocity_and_repeated_interaction)` → repeated-game / shadow-of-the-future cooperation; useful supporting layer for a 120-actor repeat community, with forgiveness/re-entry and anti-retaliation guardrails.
- `search_archetype` fallback also surfaced critical_mass_building / activation_energy and overoptimization_guardrail (peripheral).

## Step 8 — Reason via both views; reconcile

**Context view + meta-model both converge on commons_governance** as the spine, instantiated as a rights-based catch-share with a binding science-linked cap, monitoring, graduated sanctions, legitimacy via co-management, and a replenishment/adaptation loop. Property-rights + mechanism-design supply the *form* of the entitlement (severable, transferable, but constrained); threshold_and_criticality fixes the cap *below* MSY initially with a margin so the stock climbs away from θ; equity supplies the allocation rule and subsistence floor; iterative_reciprocity supplies the community-enforcement layer. The two views agree; no contradiction to reconcile beyond choosing allocation form.

## Step 9 — Anti-signatures / trigger checks; drop trips; final design

- **commons_governance triggers:** all four met (many actors, finite renewable stock, private-gain/shared-cost, exclusion/privatization-alone illegitimate). Anti-signatures NOT tripped (not fully private; not under-provision of a non-rival good; central admin allocation insufficient given capture + monitoring problem; not a two-party dispute). **Keep.**
- **Pure property-rights/ITQ caution (T4, T6, T5 tensions):** unconstrained tradable quota concentrates shares, can dispossess the bottom quartile (trips the failure condition) and re-enacts enclosure. **Keep the entitlement, constrain it** (ownership caps, non-transferability of an initial subsistence tranche, community holding).
- **Pure auction allocation:** trips protect-weakest. **Dropped as primary allocator.**
- **mechanism_design T5 (crowding-out / fairness) + T3 (capture):** mitigate via participation + transparency + independent science trigger.
- **threshold T2 (invisible-until-crossed) + T6 (stabilization cost):** front-load the cap and add early-warning monitoring (CPUE, mean size, recruitment proxies).

COST: ~13 operations, ~46,000 tokens

===RECOMMENDATION_BEGIN===

The core failure is open access: each boat captures the full value of every extra fish but bears only a sliver of the depletion it causes, so collectively rational restraint never emerges and the stock slides toward a recruitment threshold that, once crossed, is far harder to climb back from than it was to fall past. The intervention must do three things at once — cap total take below the danger zone, route the consequences of each boat's harvesting back onto that boat, and do both without pushing the weakest operators below subsistence. None of these works alone; sequencing and legitimacy are everything.

Begin by setting a binding total catch limit that is genuinely enforced, not advisory. Set it deliberately below maximum sustainable yield for the first recovery phase — target roughly a 25–30% cut from current take, which removes the ~20% overshoot and adds a safety margin so biomass moves away from the collapse threshold rather than hovering at it. Tie the limit to an independent annual stock reading (catch-per-unit-effort, average fish size, and a recruitment proxy) through a pre-agreed rule: the cap rises automatically as the stock recovers and tightens automatically if indicators worsen. Writing the adjustment rule down in advance, with science rather than negotiation setting the number each year, is the structural fix for a regulator that has historically bent to the industry — it removes the annual discretionary decision that capture exploits.

Divide the total limit into individual harvest shares so each operator holds a defined, enforceable claim to a slice of the catch. This converts the resource from a race into an owned asset: a boat that conserves no longer simply hands its restraint to rivals, and a boat that overshoots its share faces a real, attributable consequence. But unconstrained tradable shares would let a few buyers accumulate the fishery and dispossess the bottom quartile — exactly the outcome that defines failure here. So constrain the shares: allocate the initial split partly on historical landings and partly as an equal per-operator base so the smallest boats get a floor; cap how much any single holder may own; make a subsistence tranche of each operator's share non-transferable; and let leasing or sale of the remainder happen only within the fishery's own community, not to outside capital. This keeps the efficiency of tradable entitlements while protecting the weakest.

Soften the income shock during the cut, because a 25–30% catch reduction otherwise risks breaching the income floor before recovery delivers larger, more valuable fish. Phase the cap down over two to three years rather than imposing it overnight. Fund a transition pool — financed by a modest landings levy, the processing buyers (who need the stock to survive and can offer forward purchase commitments), and any available public conservation money — to support temporary effort reduction, gear improvements, and retraining or alternative income for those who exit. Pay particular attention to the bottom quartile: targeted bridging payments or buyback of shares from those choosing to leave both relieves pressure on the stock and concentrates remaining shares among the operators who stay, raising their per-boat income as the stock rebounds. Because demersal fish grow and command higher prices at larger size, much of the income lost to lower volume returns within a few years as catch composition shifts toward bigger fish — make this visible to operators so the short-term sacrifice is credible.

Make the rules legitimate and self-policing. Stand up a co-management body with elected representatives from all five villages, the regulator, and the buyers, with authority to set local rules within the science-driven cap, resolve disputes, and handle hardship exceptions. Because this is a small, bounded community of repeat players who will meet again, lean on that: published landings, at-sea and landing-site monitoring, and graduated sanctions — a warning, then escalating penalties, then suspension of shares for repeat offenders — applied evenly to everyone including the largest holders. Even-handed enforcement is what makes honest operators keep cooperating rather than defecting once they see others cheat unpunished.

Watch the leading indicators continuously and treat worsening signs as a trigger to tighten, not a topic to debate.

Final operating rule: hold total catch below the level the stock can replace until the independent indicators show recovery, allocate that capped catch as enforceable individual shares that are floored and capped to protect the smallest operators, and adjust the cap each year by the pre-committed science rule under a co-management body that monitors honestly and sanctions everyone alike — letting the stock and the per-boat value recover together.

===RECOMMENDATION_END===
