# c15 — Coastal fishery intervention design (control-policy run)

## STATE

### problem
- **statement:** Open-access coastal fishery, single demersal stock, 3 yrs declining CPUE + shrinking fish size. Harvest ~20% over MSY; recruitment-collapse threshold in 4–7 yrs. ~120 small-boat operators across 5 villages; downstream processors. Regulator can set TAC but has historically deferred to industry.
- **constraints:** no enforced individual quotas today; livelihoods of 120 boats + processors; regulator is capture-prone.
- **success_criteria:** biomass back to MSY-supporting range within 10 yrs AND <20% drop in *aggregate* fisher income (cohort average).
- **failure_criteria:** stock collapse OR a regime that pushes the bottom-quartile operators below subsistence.

---

## Verbs run (verb + why)

**1. match (retrieve) — facet mode.** The problem is oblique: it instantiates a commons-depletion dynamic, an approaching irreversible threshold, an unequal-burden distribution problem, and a captured regulator at once. A single blended query would land in the wrong neighborhood, so I ran `search_by_facets` over six domain-stripped facets, then disambiguated with two targeted `search_prime` calls (the commons-extraction facet had semantically drifted to social-psych near-synonyms; the direct meta-model query recovered `tragedy_of_the_commons` at the distinctive band, plus `free_riding`, `property_rights`, `internalization`, `mechanism_design`).
- **candidates recorded:** primes `tragedy_of_the_commons` (distinctive, 0.69 pct), `irreversibility` (distinctive, 0.80), `regulatory_capture`, `property_rights`, `free_riding`, `internalization`, `preference_heterogeneity_and_conflict`; archetypes `commons_governance` (source-prime overlap = tragedy_of_the_commons; retrieval 0.72, top hit), `welfare_analysis_and_distributional_effects_assessment`, `tipping_point_prevention`.

**2. salience-rank + prune.** Operative subset (load-bearing = removing it changes the recommendation):
- `tragedy_of_the_commons` — **load_bearing**: the generative structure. 1/N cost-share drives over-extraction; names what must be fixed (internalize the externality).
- `commons_governance` (archetype) — **load_bearing**: the operative *solution* pattern whose components the design lifts.
- `irreversibility` — **load_bearing**: the recruitment threshold is a one-way basin crossing; this is what forbids "wait and see" and forces a hard biomass floor + early-warning monitoring (precaution multiplier on expected harm).
- `regulatory_capture` — **load_bearing**: the regulator defers to industry; the design must build *structural independence* (independent stock science, transparency, adversarial voice) or the rules will be selectively enforced.
- `welfare_analysis / distributional` (archetype) — **load_bearing**: the success criterion is explicitly distributional (cohort-average income AND bottom-quartile floor), which the bare commons pattern does not guarantee.
- *context (pruned from load-bearing):* `property_rights` (one governance architecture, folded into the access/quota mechanism, not privatization), `free_riding` (restated by tragedy_of_the_commons), `preference_heterogeneity` (folded into the equity guardrail). Cut: `social_loafing`, `scarcity`, `analogy`, `emergence` — facet artifacts, not operative.

**3. compose — typed relational model (referential integrity checked).**
Nodes:
- N1 stock {kind: common_pool_resource}
- N2 operators(120) {kind: agents}
- N3 regulator {kind: governance_authority}
- N4 processors {kind: downstream_dependent}
- N5 recruitment_threshold {kind: invariant/basin_boundary}
- N6 bottom_quartile {kind: vulnerable_subgroup}

Edges (every edge connects declared nodes; every operative prime appears as an annotation):
- E1 N2 →extracts_from→ N1 [annot: tragedy_of_the_commons — private benefit / shared cost]
- E2 N1 →approaches→ N5 [annot: irreversibility — one-way basin crossing]
- E3 N3 →sets_TAC_for→ N1 [annot: commons_governance — use-limit authority]
- E4 N2 →influences→ N3 [annot: regulatory_capture — mandate redirection]
- E5 N3 →allocates_burden_to→ N2, with incidence on N6 [annot: welfare/distributional — incidence + floor]
- E6 N4 →depends_on→ N1 via N2 [annot: commons_governance boundary — affected outsiders]
- **Referential integrity: PASS** (all 6 edges reference declared nodes; all 5 load-bearing primes appear as annotations).

**4. lift L1 (situation → skeleton).** Meta-model, domain-stripped:
- *roles:* {shared self-renewing pool; many uncoordinated extractors; an authority with limit-setting power but weak independence; downstream dependents; a one-way collapse boundary; a vulnerable extractor subgroup}.
- *relations:* extraction aggregates to over-use; use approaches an irreversible boundary; authority can bind use but is influence-prone; any corrective burden lands unequally.
- *invariants:* keep the pool above the boundary; keep aggregate extractor welfare within tolerance; never push the weakest below subsistence; keep the authority's limit tied to *observed* pool condition, not negotiated with extractors.
- **Witness check:** every role/relation/invariant has a witness in the model (pool=N1, extractors=N2, authority=N3, dependents=N4, boundary=N5, subgroup=N6; invariants map to E2/E5). **No domain terms remain** ("fishery/fish/MSY" stripped to pool/boundary). **PASS.**

**5. lift L2 (coverage-enforcement) — the COVERAGE MAP.** Operative pattern = `commons_governance` (13 components). I also pull the four `welfare_analysis` components that discharge the distributional success criterion as homologs. Then `evaluate-fit` against anti-signatures.

---

## COVERAGE MAP — pattern: `commons_governance` (component → status → witness/reason)

1. **Shared Resource Boundary** → **instantiated** → the single demersal stock + its spatial range defined as the governed unit; affected set = 120 boats across 5 villages + downstream processors (outsiders named so harm can't leak to them).
2. **Access Rule** → **instantiated** → registered-operator roster frozen at the current 120 active boats; no new entrants during recovery (closes the open-access door that drives 1/N over-extraction).
3. **Use Quota or Use Limit** → **instantiated** → total allowable catch set ~25% below current harvest (i.e. below MSY) to create net biomass surplus; TAC indexed to the annual stock assessment, not negotiated down.
4. **Monitoring Signal** → **instantiated** → independent annual stock assessment (CPUE, size-structure, recruitment proxies) + at-landing catch reporting per boat; early-warning indicators (recovery slowing, variance rise) trigger automatic tightening — the irreversibility "approach-to-threshold" signal.
5. **Sanction Rule** → **instantiated** → graduated: warning → catch deduction next season → temporary license suspension → removal; proportional to overage and repetition, to preserve legitimacy in a 120-member repeated community.
6. **Replenishment Rule** → **instantiated** → seasonal/spawning-ground closures + the sub-MSY cap itself function as biological replenishment; small landings levy funds a stewardship pool.
7. **Legitimacy Basis** → **instantiated** → village-delegate council co-sets seasonal rules with the regulator (participatory rulemaking); rules tied to *visible* stock data so limits aren't seen as arbitrary.
8. **Dispute Resolution Path** → **instantiated** → standing appeals panel (village reps + independent chair) for quota disputes, hardship exceptions, and sanction appeals.
9. **Adaptation Cadence** → **instantiated** → TAC re-set annually off the new assessment; full rule review every 3 yrs or on a threshold-trigger.
10. **Contribution Rule** → **homolog** → instead of labor dues, each operator owes accurate at-landing reporting + the small landings levy that capitalizes the stewardship/transition pool; this discharges the same "users owe something back" function via reporting+funding rather than maintenance rotation (over-lift guard: a maintenance rotation would distort a wild stock that replenishes biologically, not by human upkeep).
11. **Funding Pool** → **instantiated** → stewardship/transition fund from the levy + a modest external recovery grant/loan; pays the income-bridge (below) and monitoring costs.
12. **Exception Process** → **instantiated** → hardship/seasonal exceptions for the bottom quartile routed through the appeals panel (ties to the equity floor).
13. **Transparency Record** → **instantiated** → published stock assessment, TAC basis, per-boat allocations, and sanction log — the anti-capture disclosure that makes regulator deference visible and costly (regulatory_capture remedy: transparency + independent science + adversarial voice).

### Borrowed components (homolog source: `welfare_analysis_and_distributional_effects_assessment`) — discharging the distributional success criterion
- **Minimum Floor Constraint** → **homolog/instantiated** → explicit subsistence floor: no operator's allocation may fall below a defined subsistence-income catch; the bottom quartile receives a *proportionally larger* share of the (smaller) cap and priority access to the transition fund. Directly answers the failure criterion.
- **Benefit-Burden Incidence Model** → **homolog** → allocation is by recent catch history with a progressive floor, *not* flat-equal or pure auction, so the cap reduction doesn't concentrate on small boats. Aggregate-income success is met by the biomass rebound (rising CPUE → fewer effort-hours per landing) within the 10-yr window, bridged by the fund in years 1–3.
- **Priority Group Lens** → **homolog** → bottom-quartile operators flagged as the protected group throughout.
- **Compensation/Mitigation Pathway** → **homolog** → time-bounded income bridge + gear-buyback/alternative-livelihood option funded from the pool, so the transition trough (years 1–3, before biomass recovers) doesn't breach the <20% aggregate-income line.

**Coverage status at finalize: 13/13 commons_governance components covered (12 instantiated, 1 homolog) + 4 borrowed distributional components covered. MISSING = 0.** Post-condition (no component missing) satisfied.

---

## evaluate-fit (anti-signature gate) — `commons_governance`
- **AS1 "resource fully private, use doesn't affect others"** → NOT tripped (open-access rivalrous stock; classic CPR). KEEP.
- **AS2 "underproduction of a non-rival benefit (public good)"** → NOT tripped (this is *over-extraction* of a rivalrous stock, not under-provision). KEEP.
- **AS3 "a central authority can simply allocate, no legitimacy/info/enforcement problem"** → NOT tripped — and this is the live risk: the regulator *has* an info problem (industry-supplied science) and an enforcement/legitimacy problem (capture). Confirms the need for independent science + participatory legitimacy rather than top-down TAC. KEEP.
- **AS4 "actually a one-time two-party dispute"** → NOT tripped (120 operators, repeated multi-season interaction). KEEP.

Secondary check vs `commons_governance` documented failure modes: **capture by powerful users** (mitigated: transparency + appeals + equity review + frozen roster), **maintenance burnout / hidden subgroup burden** (mitigated: floor + progressive allocation), **rigid quota failure** (mitigated: TAC indexed to live assessment + adaptation cadence), **illegitimate exclusion** (mitigated: roster frozen at current operators, hardship exceptions). **Verdict: KEEP — no anti-signature disqualifies the design.**

reconcile note: concrete model and meta-model agree on the binding constraint (keep pool above boundary while holding the weakest above subsistence); they diverge only on tempo — the meta-model's "precaution multiplier" (irreversibility) argues for a deeper, faster initial cut than a pure income-smoothing reading would pick, resolved by pairing the deeper cut with the front-loaded transition bridge. Meta-model is not decorative.

COST: ~10 operations, ~22k tokens

===RECOMMENDATION_BEGIN===
The fishery is being drawn down because everyone fishing it captures the full value of their own catch while the cost of decline is shared across all 120 boats and the seasons to come. With recruitment now four to seven years from a collapse it may not recover from, the goal is to turn an open-access race into a bounded, monitored, legitimately governed shared resource — and to carry the smallest operators through the recovery so the cure does not starve them.

Begin by defining the governed unit precisely: this stock, its grounds, the 120 currently active boats, and the downstream processors who depend on them. Freeze the operator roster at those 120 for the duration of the recovery. No new entrants — an open door reopens the race and undoes everything else.

Set a total allowable catch roughly a quarter below the current harvest, which puts landings below the sustainable-yield level and lets biomass rebuild. The catch limit must be anchored to an annual stock assessment produced by an independent scientist or panel funded outside the industry — not negotiated downward with the fleet. This is the single most important defense against the regulator's habit of deferring to the people it is meant to constrain: the number comes from the fish, publicly, every year, and the regulator's job is to apply it, not bargain it.

Make the recovery durable by tying the limit to what is actually observed. Each season's allocation rises or falls with the assessment; if early-warning signs appear — recovery stalling, sizes still shrinking, recruitment proxies weak — the cap tightens automatically rather than waiting for a debate. Add spawning-ground and seasonal closures so the stock has protected windows to reproduce.

Allocate the reduced catch by recent fishing history, but with a hard subsistence floor underneath every boat and a deliberately larger share routed to the smallest operators. The bottom quartile must never be allocated less than a defined subsistence catch. Because the total is smaller in the early years, fund a time-limited income bridge — paid from a small levy on landings plus a recovery grant or loan — to cover the two-to-three-year trough before biomass and catch-per-trip climb back. Offer a voluntary gear-buyback or alternative-livelihood option from the same fund for anyone who would rather exit than wait. The aggregate-income target is met not by fishing harder but by the stock's rebound: as biomass recovers, each boat catches more per trip for less effort, so cohort income returns even under a lower total catch — the bridge simply spans the gap until it does.

Govern it as a standing institution, not a one-off rule. A council of village delegates co-sets the seasonal details with the regulator, which gives the rules local legitimacy and draws on fishers' knowledge of the grounds. Enforcement is graduated and proportional: a first overage draws a warning, then a deduction from next season's allocation, then suspension, then removal — severe enough to deter, fair enough that the community accepts it. A standing appeals panel, chaired independently, handles quota disputes, hardship cases, and sanction challenges. Publish everything that matters: the assessment, the basis for the catch limit, each boat's allocation, the levy's use, and the sanction record. Transparency is what makes any future deference by the regulator visible and costly.

Review the whole arrangement every three years, or immediately if a threshold warning fires, and revise as stock, demand, or membership change.

Operating rule: hold landings below the independently assessed sustainable level every season, tighten automatically whenever the stock nears its collapse threshold, and never let the smallest operators fall below subsistence — bridging them with the shared fund until the recovering stock restores their income.
===RECOMMENDATION_END===
