# FC3 — Condition C (control policy with scoped coverage check) — working

## STATE.problem
- **statement:** Many independent users draw on a shared resource that degrades slowly and is permanently lost past a threshold; use is hard to meter directly. Pick ONE governance rule: (A) one uniform per-user quota fixed in advance, or (B) monitoring of resource state + graduated sanctions for over-use + a collective-adjustment process as conditions change.
- **constraints:** use is hard to meter directly; degradation is slow then a hard irreversible threshold; users are independent and heterogeneous; conditions change over time.
- **success_criteria:** resource stays above the point of permanent loss AND users remain viable.
- **failure_criteria:** resource crosses the irreversible threshold (collapse); OR users are constrained below viability.

## Verbs run

### 1. match (retrieve)
Queried the catalog with the domain-stripped meta-model ("many independent agents draw on a shared finite stock that regenerates slowly and collapses irreversibly past a threshold; restraint is unrewarded, defection invisible, aggregate over-extraction destroys the commons") and a 5-facet decomposition.

- `search_prime` → **tragedy_of_the_commons** (score 0.728, *distinctive* band, mixed-framed) as the top contentful hit; neighborhood: free_riding, public_goods, scarcity, social_dilemma, cooperation. Also surfaced **reversibility_and_irreversibility** (0.729) — the threshold/permanent-loss facet.
- `search_by_facets` → fused archetype ranking led by **contribution_visibility_design**, **reflexive_self_monitoring**, and **commons_governance**; the "uniform fixed rule applied to heterogeneous/changing conditions" facet surfaced preference_heterogeneity_and_conflict + institutional_lag (the anti-pattern signal for Approach A). The "monitoring/graduated sanctions/collective adjustment" facet surfaced monitoring, governance, informal_enforcement, adaptive_capacity.
- Source-prime overlap recorded: tragedy_of_the_commons → archetype **commons_governance** (source prime); related primes include feedback, incentive_compatibility, equity, accountability, boundary, access_control.

**candidates:** `[{archetype: commons_governance, source_prime_overlap: [tragedy_of_the_commons, public_goods, resource_management], retrieval_score: high/distinctive}]`

### 2. salience-rank
- **tragedy_of_the_commons** — *load_bearing.* The whole situation IS this structure: rivalrous, non-excludable (hard to meter), 1/N cost-share, threshold to collapse. Removing it changes everything.
- **reversibility_and_irreversibility** — *load_bearing.* The "permanently lost past a threshold" clause turns ordinary over-use into catastrophic, non-recoverable failure → raises the cost of mis-calibration and makes adaptiveness valuable (you cannot iterate after collapse).
- **commons_governance** (archetype) — *load_bearing.* It is the operative SOLUTION pattern the two approaches are competing instances of. Approach B ≈ a fuller instantiation; Approach A ≈ a single component (a use-limit) detached from the rest.
- feedback / incentive_compatibility / institutional_lag — *context* (they explain why a static rule lags a changing, irreversible resource, but they sit inside the governance pattern).

### 3. compose (referential integrity)
`model` (typed relational):
- nodes: U=users (agent, many, heterogeneous), R=shared_resource (substrate, slow-degrading, hard threshold), S=resource_state (signal), Q=use_decision (action), G=governance_rule (operator), T=threshold (invariant boundary).
- edges:
  - U —draws_on→ R  (prime_annotation: tragedy_of_the_commons / operator: uncoordinated rational use)
  - R —has→ T  (prime_annotation: reversibility_and_irreversibility / invariant: irreversible loss past threshold)
  - U —1/N_cost_share→ R  (prime_annotation: tragedy_of_the_commons / invariant)
  - G —constrains→ Q  (prime_annotation: commons_governance / access+use rule)
  - S —observes→ R  (prime_annotation: commons_governance / monitoring signal)
  - G —reads→ S  (adaptation cadence; absent in Approach A)
- Referential integrity check: every edge references declared nodes (U,R,T,Q,G,S all declared); every load-bearing prime appears as an annotation. PASS.

### 4. lift — L1 (situation → meta_model)
- **roles:** many independent appropriators; a shared subtractable stock with a hard irreversible failure boundary; a use-action that is privately beneficial and collectively costly; an unobservable/low-observability extraction channel; an environment whose carrying capacity drifts over time.
- **relations:** aggregate(use) vs. carrying_capacity; private_benefit > (1/N)·collective_cost → over-extraction; distance-to-threshold is state-dependent and not directly metered.
- **invariants:** (i) once the threshold is crossed, no recovery; (ii) a control rule's safety depends on tracking the *actual* state, which moves; (iii) heterogeneous/variable users mean a single fixed number is simultaneously too loose for some and binding-below-viability for others.
- Witness check: every role/relation/invariant has a witness in `model` (U, R, T, the 1/N edge, S, G-reads-S). No domain terms remain in the skeleton. PASS.

### 5. evaluate-fit (gate) on the operative pattern, instantiated as Approach B
Anti-signatures of **commons_governance** (well-typed over the archetype):
- "Resource is fully private; use does not affect others." — **NOT tripped.** Use is shared and rivalrous (one user's draw degrades the stock for all).
- "Underproduction of a non-rival shared benefit (→ public_goods_provision)." — **NOT tripped.** The failure is OVER-use / depletion of a rival, subtractable stock, not under-contribution.
- "A central authority can directly allocate without legitimacy/information/enforcement problems." — **NOT tripped.** Use is hard to meter (information problem) and the threshold drifts (the static-allocation precondition fails) → simple administrative allocation is exactly what's unsafe here.
- "Actually a one-time two-party dispute." — **NOT tripped.** Many independent users, repeated draw.
**Verdict: keep.** The situation lands squarely in commons_governance's trigger conditions (many actors affect one finite resource; users don't bear full cost; pure exclusion/privatization is infeasible because use is hard to meter), and trips none of its anti-signatures.

### 6. lift — L2 SCOPED COVERAGE CHECK (the single operative pattern Approach B relies on: **commons_governance**)
Pattern components named, each marked instantiated / homolog / correctly_declined / missing (none missing):

| Component | Status | Witness / reason |
|---|---|---|
| Shared Resource Boundary | **instantiated** | "a shared resource" with a defined point of permanent loss; users = the independent appropriators. Both approaches presuppose this. |
| Access Rule / Use Limit | **instantiated** | Approach B allocates use; the limit is *coupled to state* rather than fixed. (Approach A also has this one component — but only this one.) |
| Monitoring Signal | **instantiated** | "monitoring of the resource's state" — directly named in Approach B. This is the homolog for the unmetered-use problem: you cannot meter each user, so you monitor the *aggregate state / distance-to-threshold* instead. |
| Sanction Rule | **instantiated** | "graduated sanctions for over-use" — named in Approach B; graduated = proportional, preserves user viability + legitimacy. |
| Adaptation Cadence | **instantiated** | "a collective-adjustment process as conditions change" — named in Approach B; this is the component Approach A structurally lacks. |
| Legitimacy Basis | **homolog** | "collective" adjustment process supplies participatory legitimacy; users who help set the rule accept its enforcement. Discharges the same function (compliance without pure force) via the collective process rather than an external charter. |
| Dispute Resolution Path | **homolog** | folded into the collective-adjustment / graduated-sanction process (appeals against a sanction, edge-case handling are resolved through the same collective forum). Function discharged; no separate tribunal needed at this granularity. |
| Replenishment Rule | **correctly_declined** (over-lift guard) | The substrate is a slowly self-regenerating natural stock kept above threshold by *restraint*, not by active repair/funding; building an explicit replenishment-fund/maintenance-rotation would over-build for a resource whose renewal is automatic below the use ceiling. The state-coupled limit already preserves regeneration headroom. |
| Contribution Rule / Funding Pool | **correctly_declined** (over-lift guard) | This is a depletion (over-extraction) commons, not a maintenance/under-contribution commons; specifying who funds upkeep would distort a sub-structure (natural renewal) handled naturally. Declining is correct, not a gap. |
| Exception Process | **correctly_declined** (over-lift guard) | Subsumed by the adaptation cadence; a separate exception channel would over-engineer the rule. |
| Transparency Record | **homolog** | the monitoring signal made visible to the collective IS the transparency record that lets the adjustment process and sanctions be trusted. |

**Coverage verdict:** every component is instantiated, homolog, or correctly_declined. **No component is `missing`.** → The L2 stop condition is satisfied for Approach B. (Note for contrast: under Approach A, the operative pattern would have Monitoring Signal = *missing*, Adaptation Cadence = *missing*, Sanction Rule = *missing*, Legitimacy/Dispute = *missing* — A instantiates only one of the pattern's load-bearing components, so the design could NOT legitimately stop on A.)

### 7. reconcile (model vs. meta_model)
- Apply Approach A's logic to the concrete `model`: a fixed uniform quota Q* sets G independent of S. Concrete reading — if Q* is set safe for the *current* carrying capacity, a downward drift in R moves the threshold T toward aggregate use, and because G never reads S, the rule does not tighten → silent threshold crossing (irreversible). If Q* is set conservatively, heterogeneous users with high legitimate need fall below viability.
- Apply Approach A's logic to the `meta_model`: invariant (ii) — a control rule's safety depends on tracking a moving state — is *violated by construction* by any rule fixed in advance; invariant (iii) — one number can't fit heterogeneous/variable users — is violated too.
- The two views **agree** that Approach A is unsafe precisely because the resource is both *drifting* and *irreversible*: the concrete model shows the silent-crossing failure path, and the meta-model shows it's structural, not a tuning error. The meta-model is therefore NOT decorative — it independently rules out "just set Q* well."
- Approach B's logic in both views: G reads S and the collective tightens before T is reached; graduated sanctions keep deterrence proportional so viability is preserved; the adjustment cadence tracks the drift. Both readings converge on B as the only one that respects invariants (i)–(iii). No collapse of one view into the other.

## Decision rationale (plain terms)
The resource fails permanently and irreversibly once a threshold is crossed, the safe level *moves* as conditions change, and you can't directly meter individual use. A single number fixed in advance is blind to the moving state: set it loose and the stock crosses the point of no return silently; set it tight and you crush the users you're trying to keep viable. The only rule that can keep BOTH the resource above the irreversible line AND users viable is one that watches the resource's actual condition, responds proportionally to over-use, and is revised collectively as conditions change. Approach A instantiates exactly one piece of what protection requires and is missing the feedback that makes it safe against an irreversible, drifting threshold; Approach B supplies the feedback, the proportional deterrent, and the adjustment that the irreversibility demands.

===DECISION_BEGIN===
DECISIVE_FACTOR: Because the resource drifts and fails irreversibly while individual use can't be metered, only a rule that tracks the resource's actual state and is adjusted over time can avoid silently crossing the point of no return while keeping users viable.
CHOICE: B
JUSTIFICATION: A single fixed quota set in advance is blind to a safe level that moves with conditions, so it either lets the resource slip past the irreversible threshold unnoticed or is set so tight it pushes users below viability. Monitoring the resource's actual condition lets the rule tighten before the threshold is reached, and graduated sanctions keep the deterrent proportional so users stay viable. A collective process that revises the rule as conditions change keeps it matched to the moving safe level rather than to assumptions that no longer hold. That combination is the only one that can satisfy both requirements at once given irreversibility and unmeterable use.
===DECISION_END===
