# Independent verification — c30 (peer time-exchange / credit-commons)

## Method
Independent retrieval via `search_by_facets` on six domain-stripped facets (idle token degrades the medium; reward decoupled from cost → flooding; individually-rational degradation of a shared resource; reinforcing collapse loop; over-rewarded cheap options crowd out need). Per-facet + fused rankings read.

## Operative patterns this problem most calls for (independently identified)
- **Commons Governance** — strongest standalone hit (0.7171) on the "individually rational behavior degrades a shared resource" facet. The shared resource = the exchange's liquidity + the trust that a banked hour can be redeemed; hoarding/deficit-walking/flooding all degrade it. Integrating frame.
- **Payoff Restructuring** — top of the fused ranking (0.7149 / 0.7038). The system "asks for one behavior and pays for another": it pays to hold credits and to dump over-rewarded cheap services. The over-reward/arbitrage gap is squarely this archetype.
- (Supporting) **Balancing Loop Stabilization** — 0.773 on the reinforcing-collapse facet; the down-spiral is an uncorrected loop needing a target-return structure. Treated as supporting since the design's governance loop discharges it; not scored as a separate primary to avoid double-counting, but its distinctive components (deadband, saturation, anti-gaming) are checked against the design where relevant.

The design names commons_governance + payoff/price/circulation/balancing sub-patterns — this matches my independent read. Coverage judged FROM THE DESIGN ALONE below.

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## Coverage map — Pattern A: COMMONS GOVERNANCE
(components: Shared Resource Boundary, Access Rule, Use Quota/Limit, Monitoring Signal, Sanction Rule, Replenishment Rule, Legitimacy Basis, Dispute Resolution Path, Adaptation Cadence, Contribution Rule, Funding Pool, Exception Process, Transparency Record)

| Component | Status | Witness / reason (design alone) |
|---|---|---|
| Shared Resource Boundary | instantiated | Opening rule names "the exchange itself — its liquidity and the trust the banked hour can be redeemed" as the shared asset; membership defines who draws on it. |
| Access Rule | instantiated | New members get a starter grant; soft bands gate drawing (near floor, must give before drawing further) → who may draw and how much. |
| Use Quota / Use Limit | instantiated | Hard per-category weekly cap on credits earnable from one easy service. |
| Monitoring Signal | instantiated | Review group watches a dashboard: active give-and-take count, circulation rate, balance spread; plus per-category supply-vs-requests. |
| Sanction Rule | homolog | Graduated non-punitive consequences: idle-credit melt, soft balance bands with nudges, automatic price down-weighting — proportional, legitimacy-preserving (function = make over-use/neglect costly). |
| Replenishment Rule | instantiated | Needs-pool bounties post bonus credits to fill under-served categories; restores the depleted resource (scarce help). |
| Legitimacy Basis | instantiated | Members ratify the weighting scheme periodically by vote; changes explained; rules published. |
| Dispute Resolution Path | instantiated | Elected review group hears appeals on pricing and on poor-quality help. |
| Adaptation Cadence | instantiated | Quarterly recompute of weights; group turns dials (melt rate, weights, caps, grant/bounty size) when out of range. |
| Contribution Rule | instantiated | Soft bands require give-and-take before continued drawing; positive ceiling + melt make pure holding pointless. |
| Funding Pool | instantiated | Melt does not vanish — it flows into the community-needs pool that funds bounties. (Design names this as homolog; function is fully present → instantiated.) |
| Exception Process | correctly_declined | Folded into the appeals/review group; a separate exception machine would add structure the small community does not need (over-lift guard). |
| Transparency Record | instantiated | Three always-visible items (own balance/band, current weights + which categories short, exchange health) + published rule changes. |

Commons subtotal: instantiated 11, homolog 1, declined 1, missing 0.

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## Coverage map — Pattern B: PAYOFF RESTRUCTURING
(components: Payoff Map, Actor Strategy Profile, Desired Equilibrium Description, Incentive Adjustment, Penalty/Reward Rule, Monitoring & Verification Signal, Enforcement Capacity, Distributional Fairness Review, Gaming & Adaptation Review, Feedback Update Cadence, Outside Option Review, Risk Transfer Boundary, Appeal/Exception Path)

| Component | Status | Witness / reason (design alone) |
|---|---|---|
| Payoff Map | instantiated | Design diagnoses the current perverse payoffs explicitly: holding pays, dumping cheap over-rewarded services pays; each rule is aimed at a named payoff. |
| Actor Strategy Profile | instantiated | Three actor strategies addressed — hoarders, deficit-drifters, floods of cheap services — each with a tailored lever. |
| Desired Equilibrium Description | instantiated | Stated target: steady give-and-take; "cheaper to hold than to use, more rewarding to supply scarce than easy." |
| Incentive Adjustment | instantiated | Need-multiplier reweights earn-rate by supply-vs-requests; melt makes holding mildly costly; bounties raise reward for scarce help. |
| Penalty or Reward Rule | instantiated | Clear triggers: over-supplied category earns <1/hr; idle balance above cushion melts %/month; cap forfeits excess from one service. |
| Monitoring & Verification Signal | instantiated | Supply-vs-requests data drives weights; appeals on poor-quality help guard against rewarding bad proxy output. |
| Enforcement Capacity | instantiated | Melt and caps are automatic (self-enforcing); group has fixed dials it actually controls. |
| Distributional Fairness Review | instantiated | Lifeline preserved (anyone may request essential help regardless of balance); melt only above a comfortable cushion so savers aren't punished; starter grant prevents cold-start penalty. |
| Gaming & Adaptation Review | instantiated | Anticipates the volume-arbitrage gaming; pairs pricing with hard caps + dynamic down-weighting so the flood gap closes even before prices catch up (closes the arbitrage gap directly). |
| Feedback Update Cadence | instantiated | Quarterly recalibration of weights/caps/melt vs observed behavior. |
| Outside Option Review | homolog | The exit failure modes (drifters leaving, hoarders disengaging) are directly counter-incentivized by bands + grant + lifeline (function = keep the better option viable vs. exit), though "outside option" not named as such. |
| Risk Transfer Boundary | correctly_declined | No third party bears a reassigned downside risk here; forcing a liability-shift framing would distort a system whose stakes are internal credit balances. |
| Appeal or Exception Path | instantiated | Elected review group hears pricing and quality appeals; gradual, explained changes. |

Payoff subtotal: instantiated 11, homolog 1, declined 1, missing 0.

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## Anti-signature / failure-condition walk (this scenario)
- **Commons** — "resource fully private": NO (mutually depleting). "underproduction of a non-rival good not overuse": deficit-drift is partly under-contribution, but design supplies provision (bounties + grant), so not disqualifying. "central authority can allocate without legitimacy/info problems": NO — needs member buy-in. "one-time two-party dispute": NO, recurring. → not disqualified.
- **Payoff** — "actors already prefer desired behavior, lack capability": partly (some can't see needs) → addressed by the visible info surface, not only incentives. "single-actor, no interdependence": NO. "ethically unacceptable behavior": n/a. "change can't be observed/enforced/funded": NO — melt+caps automatic, bounties funded by melt. "behavior driven by identity/culture not payoff": NO. → not disqualified.
- **Balancing-loop** (supporting) — "no observable signal / no actuator": NO (dashboard + dials). "target contested/adaptive": target ratified by vote. "one-off not recurring": recurring quarterly loop. Distinctive guards present: deadband (soft bands + gradual quarterly reprice avoid thrash/oscillation); saturation/escalation (group escalates dials when out of range). → not disqualified.
- The arbitrage/over-reward gap is CLOSED not captured: design instantiates gap-closure (need-multiplier + hard per-category caps + dynamic down-weighting), and adds friction/decay (idle melt) so a few easy services cannot drain value — the specific drain the prompt warns about. Confirmed handled.

## Referential-integrity / lift spot-check
Every load-bearing prime the design names (commons, incentive/reciprocity, price, turnover/liquidity, feedback) appears as an edge annotation in its model, and edges connect declared nodes. The domain-stripped skeleton has concrete witnesses and carries no domain terms. Adequate; not the focus of this coverage check.

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## Tally (both primary patterns)
- instantiated: 22
- homolog: 2
- correctly_declined: 2
- missing: 0

## VERDICT: PASS

No component of either operative archetype is left missing. The two patterns the problem most calls for (Commons Governance, Payoff Restructuring) are each covered in full; declines (commons Exception Process; payoff Risk Transfer Boundary) are genuine non-applications justified on over-lift grounds, and the two homologs (graduated melt/band sanctions; exit/outside-option counter-incentives, plus the Funding Pool which is in fact fully instantiated) discharge their functions. Critically, the over-reward/arbitrage gap is closed (need-multiplier + hard caps + down-weighting) and value-drain friction/decay is present (idle melt feeding the needs pool), so the prompt's specific failure modes — runaway hoarding, deficit drift, cheap-service domination — are each structurally answered.
