# Condition c18 — working

## STATE

### problem
- statement: An open-access coastal fishery on a single demersal stock is overharvesting ~20% above MSY; CPUE and average fish size declining 3 yrs; recruitment-collapse threshold in 4–7 yrs. ~120 small-boat operators across 5 villages + downstream processors depend on it. Regulator can set total allowable catch (TAC) but historically defers to industry.
- constraints: no enforced individual quotas today; livelihoods depend on continued harvest; regulator capture/deference is real; heterogeneous operators (a vulnerable bottom quartile).
- success_criteria: biomass back to MSY-supporting range within 10 yrs AND <20% drop in *aggregate* fisher income (cohort average).
- failure_criteria: stock collapse OR a regime that pushes the bottom quartile below subsistence.

### verbs run (history)
1. **match (search_by_facets)** — oblique, multi-structure problem, so I decomposed it into 6 facets (uncoordinated extraction; slow approach to irreversible threshold; private-vs-collective incentive divergence; captured authority; shrinking allocation without sinking the weakest; self-reinforcing decline). *Why:* a single blended query would land only in the commons neighborhood and bury the governance + distributional facets.
2. **match (search_prime, meta-model)** — confirmed the structural core. *Why:* cross-check the facet fusion.
3. **match (search_archetype)** — retrieve the solution pattern. *Why:* need an intervention template, not just a diagnosis.
4. **get_prime tragedy_of_the_commons / regulatory_capture / margin_of_safety** + **get_archetype commons_governance** — pull full records for the load-bearing primes and the central archetype (its component list = my coverage spine). *Why:* need components, anti-signatures, and remedies.
5. **salience-rank / prune** — see below.
6. **lift (L2) coverage check** against commons_governance components — see below.
7. **evaluate-fit (gate)** on commons_governance anti-signatures — see below.
8. STOP — no component `missing`; recommendation ready.

### operative_primes (salience-ranked, pruned to operative subset)
- `tragedy_of_the_commons` — **load_bearing** (structural core: rivalrous + non-excludable → 1/N cost-share → Nash over-extraction toward collapse). This *is* the problem.
- `commons_governance` (archetype) — **load_bearing** (the intervention template: bound, rule, monitor, sanction, replenish, legitimize/adapt).
- `regulatory_capture` — **load_bearing** (the historical deference is structural, not incidental; an intervention that hands design to "the industry" will be inverted — the remedy is independence + adversarial voice + transparency, not stricter paper rules).
- `margin_of_safety` — **load_bearing** (the collapse threshold is irreversible and the stock estimate is uncertain → cap must sit *below* point-estimate MSY, and the income floor must buffer the bottom quartile against estimate error).
- `constrained_resource_allocation` / scarcity / equity — **context** (shrinking-allocation facet; folded into the allocation rule and the distributional floor rather than treated as a separate engine).
- Pruned/declined: `speculative_bubble`, `social_identity_theory`, `deadlock` — retrieval neighbors that don't carry load here (no asset-price reflexivity; identity not the lever; not a two-party stalemate).

### lift (L2) — coverage map over commons_governance components
- **Shared Resource Boundary** — *instantiated*: single demersal stock, defined fishing grounds, 120 named operators across 5 villages, processors as affected outsiders.
- **Access Rule** — *instantiated*: close the de-facto open access; only registered incumbent operators hold access (no new entrants during rebuild) — protects the existing cohort whose livelihood is the constraint.
- **Use Quota / Use Limit** — *instantiated*: a scientifically set TAC pegged *below* MSY during rebuild, split into per-boat shares that are weighted/floored to protect small boats.
- **Monitoring Signal** — *instantiated*: catch landings + dockside reporting + the biologist's annual CPUE/size-at-age survey; condition-triggered review.
- **Sanction Rule** — *instantiated*: graduated sanctions (warning → share reduction → suspension) proportional to overage, repetition, intent.
- **Replenishment Rule** — *instantiated*: rebuild trajectory toward MSY biomass; spatial no-take refuge + gear/size limits to protect spawners and recruits.
- **Legitimacy Basis** — *instantiated*: co-management board with elected village seats sets rules *within* a science-bounded envelope; consent + local knowledge.
- **Dispute Resolution Path** — *instantiated*: appeals channel on share disputes and hardship cases.
- **Adaptation Cadence** — *instantiated*: annual TAC reset keyed to the survey; harvest-control rule that auto-tightens near the threshold.
- **Contribution Rule / Funding Pool** — *instantiated*: small landings levy funds monitoring, the survey, and the transition support fund.
- **Exception Process** — *instantiated*: hardship exemptions / floor top-ups for the bottom quartile.
- **Transparency Record** — *instantiated*: public catch + stock dashboard (also the anti-capture mechanism).
- **(over-lift guard)** Cap-and-trade / full ITQ market: *correctly_declined as the primary instrument* — unrestricted tradable quota tends to consolidate shares away from small boats (trips the failure criterion). Used only in a *constrained* form (leasing within a cap, no permanent sale to outside capital) so the structure isn't distorted.

No component is `missing` → stop condition satisfied.

### evaluate-fit (gate) — commons_governance anti-signatures
- "resource fully private / use doesn't affect others" — not tripped (rivalrous, shared).
- "underproduction of a non-rival benefit (public-goods)" — not tripped (this is over-extraction, the commons case).
- "central authority can simply allocate without legitimacy/info/enforcement problems" — not tripped (regulator is capture-prone and lacks compliance buy-in → governance, not fiat, is required).
- "one-time two-party dispute" — not tripped.
Verdict: **keep**. The capture anti-pattern from regulatory_capture additionally fires → bake in independence (science envelope the regulator cannot vote away), redundancy (village seats + independent survey + public dashboard), and adversarial transparency.

### reconcile (model vs meta-model)
Concrete model says "protect 120 boats' income." Meta-model says "prevent 1/N over-extraction crossing an irreversible threshold while keeping the weakest above a floor." They diverge on the *cap level*: a pure income-preservation reading would set the cap near current catch; the meta-model insists the cap drop below MSY now (front-load restraint) because the threshold is irreversible. Resolution preferring both views: cut total catch sharply but *redistribute the burden progressively* (uniform percentage cuts hit small boats hardest) and *bridge income with a transition fund*, so aggregate income holds while biomass recovers.

===RECOMMENDATION_BEGIN===
Treat this as a shared stock that is being drawn down faster than it renews because each boat keeps the full value of its own catch while the cost of depletion is spread across everyone — so no appeal to restraint will hold unless the rules of access themselves change. The design has four interlocking parts: a science-anchored catch limit, a fair way to divide it, a transition cushion for the people the cut would otherwise sink, and a governance arrangement that the regulator cannot quietly hand back to the industry.

First, set a total allowable catch that is deliberately below the best estimate of maximum sustainable yield for the rebuild period — roughly a 25–30% reduction from current landings in year one — rather than merely trimming to the MSY point estimate. The stock estimate is uncertain and the collapse threshold is irreversible, so the limit must carry a buffer: underestimating renewal costs a little forgone catch, while overestimating it costs the whole fishery. Tie the limit to a written harvest-control rule: each year the limit is reset from the biologist's survey of catch-per-unit-effort and average fish size, and it tightens automatically — sharply — if the stock drifts toward the danger zone, loosening only as biomass climbs back into the productive range. This makes the limit a transparent function of stock condition, not an annual negotiation the strongest operators can win.

Second, divide the limit into per-boat shares rather than leaving a single pooled quota that triggers a race to fish it first. Freeze access to the current registered operators for the rebuild — no new entrants — so the burden of recovery is not used to displace the existing cohort. Allocate shares progressively: give every boat an equal baseline share sufficient for a viable trip, then distribute the remainder in proportion to recent catch history. This protects the smallest operators, because a flat percentage cut applied to everyone falls hardest on boats that were already near subsistence. Permit short-term leasing of unused share within the cohort so a fisher having a bad season can still earn, but prohibit permanent sale of shares to outside capital — unrestricted trading reliably consolidates the fishery into a few hands and pushes the bottom quartile out, which is precisely the outcome to avoid.

Third, build an explicit income floor and bridge. Fund it with a small levy on landings plus, where available, time-limited public or buyer-backed transition money, and use it three ways: a guaranteed minimum payment that tops up the bottom-quartile boats whenever their share-constrained income falls below a subsistence line; paid stewardship work during the low-catch years (survey assistance, gear retrieval, habitat and spawning-area protection) that keeps crews employed and the stock recovering at the same time; and modest buy-forward or storage arrangements with processors so the downstream buyers, who also depend on the stock, help finance the recovery rather than pressing for higher catches. The target is that aggregate cohort income stays within 20% of today even as total catch falls, because the cut is concentrated where it can be absorbed and the floor catches the rest.

Fourth — and this is what makes the rest credible — restructure who decides. The regulator has historically deferred to the industry, so do not rely on it writing stricter rules it will then enforce loosely. Place rule-making in a co-management board with elected seats from each of the five villages and the processors, but bound that board inside a scientific envelope it cannot vote away: the independent stock survey sets the outer limit on catch, and the board allocates and adapts within it. Keep the survey funded independently of the operators it constrains, publish a plain public dashboard of stock condition and every boat's catch against its share, and give competing voices — crew, the smallest operators, an outside scientific reviewer — standing to contest decisions before they take effect. Enforce with graduated, proportional sanctions: a first overage draws a warning and a deduction from next year's share; repeated or deliberate violation draws suspension. Add simple monitoring the community trusts — dockside landing records cross-checked against the survey — because limits that are not visibly observed will be ignored.

The operating rule, in one line: hold the catch below a conservatively buffered, survey-set limit and tighten it automatically as the stock nears danger; divide that limit progressively among the current boats with a guaranteed floor and stewardship pay for the weakest, allowing leasing but not sale of shares within the fleet; and vest the rules in a village-and-buyer board that may adjust allocation but never the science-set ceiling, under a public dashboard and graduated sanctions. Recover first by buffering against irreversibility, keep the fleet intact by spreading the cut progressively and cushioning the bottom, and protect both by making the ceiling something no single interest can quietly raise.
===RECOMMENDATION_END===

COST: ~6 operations (6 encyclopedia tool calls: 1 search_by_facets, 1 search_prime, 1 search_archetype, 3 get_prime, 1 get_archetype), ~17,000 tokens.
