# Audit-set: S1_fishery — Coastal fishery on a collapse trajectory

Below are 4 reasoning transcripts (W1..W4) for the same problem, each a different solver run. For EACH, classify whether the solver performed a COVERAGE CHECK, defined as: it (a) took a specific solution pattern it was relying on and named that pattern's FULL set of components/elements, AND (b) went through them and checked, component by component, whether the design instantiates each (or deliberately declines it / leaves it missing). Casually mentioning a few features is NOT a coverage check; the test is explicit, enumerated, component-by-component verification.

Classify each as: FULL (clear enumerated component-by-component check), PARTIAL (some enumeration but not a systematic per-component presence check), or NONE. One-line justification each. You do not know how these were produced; judge only what the transcript shows.

## Transcript W1
```
# Working (control policy — free verb order; discarded before grading)

**Problem.** Coastal demersal fishery; CPUE and mean size declining 3 yrs; harvest ~20% over MSY; recruitment-collapse threshold in 4–7 yrs; ~120 small-boat operators across 5 villages, open-access in practice, processors downstream; regulator has TAC authority but historically defers to industry. Must restore biomass to MSY range within 10 yrs AND keep aggregate income drop <20%, with no regime that pushes the bottom quartile below subsistence.

**meta_model.** Many independent rational actors draw from a shared, rivalrous, non-excludable renewable pool; each captures full private benefit of one more unit but bears only 1/N of the depletion cost, so aggregate take overshoots the renewal rate and the pool approaches an irreversible collapse threshold. The body that could impose restraint has authority but is captured-by-deference. A necessary cut must be distributed without pushing the weakest below a survival floor.

**Verbs run (in order, with one-line why):**
1. **match (search_by_facets)** — oblique multi-structure problem (commons + threshold + capture + distribution); decompose into facets. → core = tragedy_of_the_commons / social_dilemma; archetype = commons_governance; capture + threshold facets surface regulatory_capture and tipping_point_prevention.
2. **match (search_prime)** — confirm the over-extraction core with a clean meta-model query. → tragedy_of_the_commons (distinctive), social_dilemma, free_riding, externality, risk_pooling.
3. **lift / transport (get_archetype: commons_governance)** — pull the operative pattern's full logic (action steps, components, failure modes, invariants). → bound commons, rights+duties, monitoring, graduated sanctions, replenishment, legitimacy, adaptation; failure modes name capture-by-powerful-users and maintenance/burden dumped on an unprotected subgroup.
4. **lift (get_prime: tragedy_of_the_commons)** — extract the Ostrom design principles + concrete mechanisms (ITQ/catch-share, MPAs, community governance) and the caveat that pure privatization consolidates.
5. **transport (get_archetype: tipping_point_prevention)** — the 4–7 yr threshold needs pre-crossing intervention: act before proof is conclusive, precommit trigger rules, preserve the window, condition action on early-warning signals.
6. **evaluate-fit / reconcile (get_prime: regulatory_capture)** — gate the design against the captured-regulator reality; a rule-only fix fails under capture, so independence/redundancy/transparency must be built in, not assumed.
7. **salience-rank + prune** — operative subset: commons_governance (frame) carrying tragedy_of_the_commons (core) + tipping_point_prevention (timing) + regulatory_capture (anti-failure) + an equity/floor guard. Dropped: risk_pooling, bystander/solidarity (weak fit).
8. **lower / compose** — instantiate to the fishery: TAC trajectory, floored catch shares, monitoring, transition fund, co-governance council, condition-indexed operating rule.

**operative_primes:** tragedy_of_the_commons; (commons_governance archetype); tipping_point_prevention; regulatory_capture; + distributional floor.
**gate_log:** rejected pure-ITQ allocation (trips commons_governance "illegitimate exclusion" + tragedy_of_the_commons "privatization consolidates" → would sink bottom quartile, fails the floor criterion); rejected rule-only TAC (trips regulatory_capture — captured regulator enforces selectively); rejected blunt moratorium (fails the <20% income criterion and subsistence floor).

COST: ~6 operations, ~28k tokens
```

## Transcript W2
```
# Condition c18 — working

## STATE

### problem
- statement: An open-access coastal fishery on a single demersal stock is overharvesting ~20% above MSY; CPUE and average fish size declining 3 yrs; recruitment-collapse threshold in 4–7 yrs. ~120 small-boat operators across 5 villages + downstream processors depend on it. Regulator can set total allowable catch (TAC) but historically defers to industry.
- constraints: no enforced individual quotas today; livelihoods depend on continued harvest; regulator capture/deference is real; heterogeneous operators (a vulnerable bottom quartile).
- success_criteria: biomass back to MSY-supporting range within 10 yrs AND <20% drop in *aggregate* fisher income (cohort average).
- failure_criteria: stock collapse OR a regime that pushes the bottom quartile below subsistence.

### verbs run (history)
1. **match (search_by_facets)** — oblique, multi-structure problem, so I decomposed it into 6 facets (uncoordinated extraction; slow approach to irreversible threshold; private-vs-collective incentive divergence; captured authority; shrinking allocation without sinking the weakest; self-reinforcing decline). *Why:* a single blended query would land only in the commons neighborhood and bury the governance + distributional facets.
2. **match (search_prime, meta-model)** — confirmed the structural core. *Why:* cross-check the facet fusion.
3. **match (search_archetype)** — retrieve the solution pattern. *Why:* need an intervention template, not just a diagnosis.
4. **get_prime tragedy_of_the_commons / regulatory_capture / margin_of_safety** + **get_archetype commons_governance** — pull full records for the load-bearing primes and the central archetype (its component list = my coverage spine). *Why:* need components, anti-signatures, and remedies.
5. **salience-rank / prune** — see below.
6. **lift (L2) coverage check** against commons_governance components — see below.
7. **evaluate-fit (gate)** on commons_governance anti-signatures — see below.
8. STOP — no component `missing`; recommendation ready.

### operative_primes (salience-ranked, pruned to operative subset)
- `tragedy_of_the_commons` — **load_bearing** (structural core: rivalrous + non-excludable → 1/N cost-share → Nash over-extraction toward collapse). This *is* the problem.
- `commons_governance` (archetype) — **load_bearing** (the intervention template: bound, rule, monitor, sanction, replenish, legitimize/adapt).
- `regulatory_capture` — **load_bearing** (the historical deference is structural, not incidental; an intervention that hands design to "the industry" will be inverted — the remedy is independence + adversarial voice + transparency, not stricter paper rules).
- `margin_of_safety` — **load_bearing** (the collapse threshold is irreversible and the stock estimate is uncertain → cap must sit *below* point-estimate MSY, and the income floor must buffer the bottom quartile against estimate error).
- `constrained_resource_allocation` / scarcity / equity — **context** (shrinking-allocation facet; folded into the allocation rule and the distributional floor rather than treated as a separate engine).
- Pruned/declined: `speculative_bubble`, `social_identity_theory`, `deadlock` — retrieval neighbors that don't carry load here (no asset-price reflexivity; identity not the lever; not a two-party stalemate).

### lift (L2) — coverage map over commons_governance components
- **Shared Resource Boundary** — *instantiated*: single demersal stock, defined fishing grounds, 120 named operators across 5 villages, processors as affected outsiders.
- **Access Rule** — *instantiated*: close the de-facto open access; only registered incumbent operators hold access (no new entrants during rebuild) — protects the existing cohort whose livelihood is the constraint.
- **Use Quota / Use Limit** — *instantiated*: a scientifically set TAC pegged *below* MSY during rebuild, split into per-boat shares that are weighted/floored to protect small boats.
- **Monitoring Signal** — *instantiated*: catch landings + dockside reporting + the biologist's annual CPUE/size-at-age survey; condition-triggered review.
- **Sanction Rule** — *instantiated*: graduated sanctions (warning → share reduction → suspension) proportional to overage, repetition, intent.
- **Replenishment Rule** — *instantiated*: rebuild trajectory toward MSY biomass; spatial no-take refuge + gear/size limits to protect spawners and recruits.
- **Legitimacy Basis** — *instantiated*: co-management board with elected village seats sets rules *within* a science-bounded envelope; consent + local knowledge.
- **Dispute Resolution Path** — *instantiated*: appeals channel on share disputes and hardship cases.
- **Adaptation Cadence** — *instantiated*: annual TAC reset keyed to the survey; harvest-control rule that auto-tightens near the threshold.
- **Contribution Rule / Funding Pool** — *instantiated*: small landings levy funds monitoring, the survey, and the transition support fund.
- **Exception Process** — *instantiated*: hardship exemptions / floor top-ups for the bottom quartile.
- **Transparency Record** — *instantiated*: public catch + stock dashboard (also the anti-capture mechanism).
- **(over-lift guard)** Cap-and-trade / full ITQ market: *correctly_declined as the primary instrument* — unrestricted tradable quota tends to consolidate shares away from small boats (trips the failure criterion). Used only in a *constrained* form (leasing within a cap, no permanent sale to outside capital) so the structure isn't distorted.

No component is `missing` → stop condition satisfied.

### evaluate-fit (gate) — commons_governance anti-signatures
- "resource fully private / use doesn't affect others" — not tripped (rivalrous, shared).
- "underproduction of a non-rival benefit (public-goods)" — not tripped (this is over-extraction, the commons case).
- "central authority can simply allocate without legitimacy/info/enforcement problems" — not tripped (regulator is capture-prone and lacks compliance buy-in → governance, not fiat, is required).
- "one-time two-party dispute" — not tripped.
Verdict: **keep**. The capture anti-pattern from regulatory_capture additionally fires → bake in independence (science envelope the regulator cannot vote away), redundancy (village seats + independent survey + public dashboard), and adversarial transparency.

### reconcile (model vs meta-model)
Concrete model says "protect 120 boats' income." Meta-model says "prevent 1/N over-extraction crossing an irreversible threshold while keeping the weakest above a floor." They diverge on the *cap level*: a pure income-preservation reading would set the cap near current catch; the meta-model insists the cap drop below MSY now (front-load restraint) because the threshold is irreversible. Resolution preferring both views: cut total catch sharply but *redistribute the burden progressively* (uniform percentage cuts hit small boats hardest) and *bridge income with a transition fund*, so aggregate income holds while biomass recovers.
```

## Transcript W3
```
# B04 — Free control policy working

## STATE

**problem.** Single demersal stock, 3 yrs declining CPUE + shrinking fish size; harvest ~20% over MSY; recruitment-collapse threshold in 4–7 yrs. Open-access in practice (~120 small-boat operators, 5 villages, downstream processors). Regulator has TAC authority but historically defers to industry. Need: biomass back to MSY-range in 10 yrs AND <20% aggregate fisher-income drop; fail = stock collapse OR a regime pushing the bottom quartile below subsistence.

**meta_model.** Many independent users drawing from one finite, renewable shared stock under open access; private gain / shared-and-delayed cost; an approaching hard-to-reverse threshold; a corrective cut whose burden falls hardest on the weakest users; an overseer who has authority but defers to those it should constrain; convert uncontrolled access into bounded, legitimate entitlements without dumping the vulnerable.

## VERBS RUN (verb — why)

1. **match (search_by_facets)** — oblique multi-structure problem; decomposed into 6 facets (commons depletion / irreversible threshold / regressive burden / deferring regulator / access→entitlement / slow reversible-now decline). Surfaced commons_governance, tipping_point_prevention, hysteresis_management, regulatory_capture, property_rights/access_control, welfare/distributional + minimum_effective_intervention.
2. **match (get_archetype: commons_governance)** — confirm the spine; pulled boundary/access/quota/monitoring/sanction/replenishment/legitimacy/adaptation skeleton + capture & rigid-quota failure modes.
3. **match (get_archetype: tipping_point_prevention)** — the 4–7 yr threshold + "act before proof / preserve the intervention window" + precautionary-trigger logic, and the governance point that someone must be able to act before the crisis is undeniable (counters the deferring regulator).
4. **match (get_archetype: hysteresis_management)** — recruitment collapse is path-dependent: stopping overfishing won't auto-restore the stock; need an overshoot cut + separate exit threshold + staged de-escalation (rebuild faster than a linear MSY cut, and don't lift restrictions on the entry signal).
5. **match (get_prime: regulatory_capture)** — the deferring regulator is the live failure axis; harvested its anti-capture remedies (structural independence, redundancy/overlap, transparency, adversarial process, expertise independence).
6. **match (get_archetype: welfare_analysis_and_distributional_effects_assessment)** — the success/failure criterion IS a distributional constraint (aggregate income floor + protected bottom quartile); supplies equity guardrail + minimum-floor + credible-compensation-not-hypothetical logic.
7. **match (get_archetype: minimum_effective_intervention)** — discipline the size of the cut: use the smallest harvest reduction that reliably clears the rebuild threshold, because over-cutting is exactly what trips the failure condition (bottom quartile below subsistence). Graduated/proportional enforcement ladder.
8. **salience-rank** — load-bearing: commons_governance (frame) > distributional-welfare (the binding constraint) ≈ hysteresis/tipping (the rebuild dynamics) > regulatory_capture (governance fix) > minimum_effective_intervention (calibration). property_rights/access_control = mechanism inside the frame.
9. **prune** — dropped social_identity, bystander_effect, network_effect (crowded, low load); kept the 6 operative.
10. **compose** — nodes: stock (with collapse threshold), 120 operators (heterogeneous: top vs bottom quartile), 5 villages, downstream processors, regulator, biologist/assessment. edges: extract (operator→stock, currently racing), assess (biologist→stock), set-TAC + defer (regulator→industry), depend-on-income (operator/processor→stock). Annotated: open-access race = tragedy_of_commons; deferral = capture; threshold = tipping/hysteresis; cut-incidence = distributional.
11. **lower / transport** — map commons-governance components to fishery instruments (boundary=this stock+5 villages; access rule=licensed entitlement; use-limit=catch share tied to a science-set, overshoot-adjusted TAC; monitoring=catch+CPUE+size; sanction=graduated; replenishment=closures/refugia + buffer; legitimacy=co-management council; adaptation=annual harvest-control rule). Aligned roles; noted break: a flat per-boat or tradable-quota cut would concentrate loss on the bottom quartile → must add an equity floor + non-transferable basic allocation.
12. **evaluate-fit (gate) — distributional.** Anti-signature of a naive ITQ/cap-and-trade: regressive exclusion of low-capital operators; quota consolidation. TRIPPED by the failure criterion → keep a floor allocation + cap transferability + landings-to-local-processors clause.
13. **evaluate-fit (gate) — capture.** Plain "regulator sets a stricter TAC" trips capture (T1 expertise dependence, T5 invisible drift). → independent/transparent assessment, co-management with a non-industry-majority decision rule, precommitted harvest-control rule so the cut isn't re-litigated annually.
14. **evaluate-fit (gate) — minimum effective / hysteresis.** Don't moratorium (over-cut → subsistence failure) and don't under-cut (miss rebuild window). Set cut to smallest reliable rebuild trajectory with overshoot for the hysteretic stock; separate exit threshold from entry signal.
15. **reconcile** — abstract skeleton (bound→entitle→monitor→sanction→replenish→legitimize→adapt) reconciled with concrete floor + capture-proofing + buffered-income; produced the operating rule below.

`COST: ~9 encyclopedia operations (1 facet search + 5 archetype/prime fetches counted across 2 batched calls), ~30k tokens.`
```

## Transcript W4
```
# C19 — Coastal fishery intervention design (free-choice control policy)

## STATE / WORKING

### problem
- statement: open-access coastal fishery, single demersal stock; 3 yrs declining CPUE + shrinking fish size; harvest ~20% over MSY; recruitment-collapse threshold in 4–7 yrs; ~120 small-boat operators across 5 villages, downstream processors; regulator has TAC authority but historically defers to industry.
- success: biomass to MSY-supporting range within 10 yrs AND <20% drop in aggregate fisher income (cohort average).
- failure: stock collapse OR a regime that pushes bottom-quartile operators below subsistence.
- constraints: open-access in practice (no enforced quotas); regulator captured; nonlinear/irreversible threshold; heterogeneous, low-resilience cohort.

### verbs run (verb + why)
1. **match (search_prime + search_by_facets)** — anchor the problem. Single meta-model query returned `tragedy_of_the_commons` (distinctive, top). Facet decomposition (6 facets) cleanly separated the structures the blended query buries: facet-2 surfaced `irreversibility`/`threshold_and_criticality`; facet-3 surfaced `regulatory_capture`/`checks_balances`; facet-4 surfaced the distributional structure → archetype `welfare_analysis_and_distributional_effects_assessment` + `minimum_effective_intervention`/`proportionality_calibration`; facet-5 surfaced `time_preference_discounting_future`; facet-6 surfaced `property_rights`. Archetype fusion: `commons_governance` (top), `hysteresis_management`, `checks_and_balances_architecture`, `skin_in_the_game_alignment`.
2. **salience-rank** — load-bearing: tragedy_of_the_commons (the core misalignment), irreversibility/threshold (why timing matters, why we can't wait for consensus), regulatory_capture (why "ask the regulator nicely" fails), distributional-incidence (the binding failure criterion — bottom quartile). Context: free_riding, scarcity, time-discounting.
3. **prune** — cut to operative subset (5): commons-governance core; threshold/asymmetric-recovery; captured-governance legitimacy; distributional floor; consequence-alignment. Dropped twin-family near-synonyms (public_goods — wrong: this is over-extraction not under-provision; concurrency/load-balancing — wrong substrate).
4. **compose** — typed model. Nodes: stock (resource), 120 operators (users, heterogeneous), 5 villages (nested user-groups), regulator (authority, captured), processors (downstream beneficiary), biomass/CPUE (monitoring signal), collapse threshold (invariant boundary). Edges: operators→extract→stock (1/N cost-share, annotation: tragedy_of_the_commons); regulator→sets-TAC→operators (annotation: regulatory_capture, currently dominated); stock→signal→all (feedback, currently slow/discounted).
5. **lift L1** — meta-model: a shared regenerating stock crosses an irreversible threshold under uncoordinated rational extraction; the authority that could bound use is captured by the users; any binding correction concentrates loss on the least-resilient participants. Witnesses present for every role. No domain terms in the skeleton — projects to grazing, aquifers, antibiotics, shared compute.
6. **get_prime / get_archetype** — pulled tragedy_of_the_commons (confirmed Ostrom design-principles substructure: bounded membership, locally-appropriate rules, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution, nested enterprises, external recognition; and the three remedy architectures — rights, central, community), commons_governance (13 components), hysteresis_management (entry/exit threshold, state-memory, recovery path, relapse monitor, support taper), welfare_analysis (affected-party map, minimum floor, compensation pathway, subgroup disaggregation, priority-group lens), skin_in_the_game (exposure gap, stake-affordability adjustment, controllability).
7. **lift L2 — coverage check against commons_governance components (the discipline check):**
   - Shared Resource Boundary → INSTANTIATED (single stock, 120 operators / 5 villages defined as the membership).
   - Access Rule → INSTANTIATED (close de-facto open access; bound the eligible fleet to current operators, no new entrants during recovery).
   - Use Quota/Use Limit → INSTANTIATED, but with **over-lift guard**: the abstract "tradable individual quota" framing is *backed off* — naive ITQs would concentrate to capital and trip the bottom-quartile failure criterion. Use a community/village catch-share with a per-boat floor instead.
   - Monitoring Signal → INSTANTIATED (CPUE + size + landings at processor chokepoint), with over-lift guard on surveillance intensity (use the existing processor weigh-point, not per-boat tracking).
   - Sanction Rule → INSTANTIATED (graduated, village-administered).
   - Replenishment Rule → INSTANTIATED (seasonal/spawning closures, gear/mesh limits to fix shrinking size).
   - Legitimacy Basis → INSTANTIATED (co-management board; this also discharges the regulatory-capture problem — see checks-and-balances).
   - Dispute Resolution Path → INSTANTIATED.
   - Adaptation Cadence → INSTANTIATED (annual TAC tied to assessment — also the hysteresis exit logic).
   - Contribution Rule / Funding Pool → INSTANTIATED (landings levy funds the transition fund + monitoring).
   - Exception Process → INSTANTIATED (hardship path for bottom quartile).
   - Transparency Record → INSTANTIATED (public assessment + board minutes; the anti-capture mechanism).
   → No component `missing`. Stop condition satisfied.
8. **lift L2 — hysteresis_management overlay:** asymmetric entry/exit (collapse is the entry into an irreversible state; recovery threshold ≠ "stock looks ok one season"). INSTANTIATED: emergency deep cut now (threshold proximity), staged taper of the cut only on multi-year stability evidence, relapse monitor, support-taper schedule for the transition fund. This is why the cut is front-loaded and the relaxation is slow.
9. **lift L2 — welfare/distributional overlay:** Minimum Floor Constraint + Priority Group Lens + Compensation Pathway INSTANTIATED (per-boat guaranteed share + transition fund targeted at bottom quartile). Directly serves the binding failure criterion.
10. **evaluate-fit (gate):** commons_governance anti-signatures — fully private? no. Under-provision public good? no (over-extraction — correct archetype). Central authority can just allocate? no (capture + legitimacy + local info → community/polycentric, not pure command). One-time dispute? no. → keep. ITQ-as-primary dropped on distributional anti-signature. Pure central TAC dropped on capture anti-signature.
11. **reconcile:** model-view (concrete: regulator defers, so a TAC alone won't bind) vs meta-model-view (captured authority must be re-legitimated, not bypassed). Divergence resolved toward co-management with statutory backstop — the reading consistent with both: the regulator keeps formal TAC authority but is bound to a science-triggered rule + a co-management board, removing discretion that capture exploits.

### STOP — coverage map complete, no missing component, gates passed, distributional floor and threshold timing both addressed.
```
