WORKING (nine-step procedure, run once each, in order):

STEP 1 — Specify the decision.
Pick exactly one safeguard for an automated maintenance agent that mostly performs routine, reversible actions but occasionally performs catastrophic, unrecoverable ones. Success requires BOTH: (a) no single mistaken judgment can cause unrecoverable loss, AND (b) routine reversible maintenance proceeds without meaningful slowdown. The auditor's "feels safer / easier to write in policy" remark is a stated preference, not a success criterion — it is not load-bearing.

STEP 2 — Identify operative primes (search_prime / search_by_facets / get_prime).
Ran a semantic meta-model query plus a six-facet decomposition. Operative hits:
- reversibility_and_irreversibility (the action set splits into a spectrum: most reversible/low-cost-to-undo, a few irreversible/prohibitive-to-undo). get_prime confirms the Type-1 (one-way door) vs Type-2 (two-way door) distinction: the control should be matched to the door type, not applied uniformly.
- authority_delegation_under_uncertainty (get_prime): the "zone of acceptance" — pre-authorize a scope of routine action without case-by-case approval, reserve human judgment for what exceeds scope, and audit ex post. Warns directly against the calibration failure where requiring explicit approval for everything turns the safeguard into theater and where uniform scope ignores heterogeneous risk.
- accountability / provenance / traceability (facet "durable record of every action"): a durable, reconstructable log of all actions.
- threshold / risk: impact-based routing of cases.

STEP 3 — Salience-rank.
1) reversibility_and_irreversibility — names the actual hazard structure (rare irreversible mixed with frequent reversible). Decisive.
2) authority_delegation_under_uncertainty — names the control structure (scope-bounded auto-action + reserved review).
3) threshold/risk — the routing rule that separates the two classes.
4) accountability/traceability — the durable record enabling ex-post correction.
Lower salience: precedent, institution, reputation, falsifiability (general, not load-bearing here).

STEP 4 — Prune.
Drop reputation, institution, precedent, falsifiability, recurrence, temporal_decay (background, not decisive). Keep: reversibility, authority-delegation-under-uncertainty, threshold/risk, accountability.

STEP 5 — Build a typed relational model.
Entities: Agent (actor); Action {reversible | irreversible}; impact_estimate(Action) → scalar; Reviewer (independent human/hold); Log (durable, append-only).
Relations: Action.class drives routing → irreversible/high-impact → Reviewer-hold-before-execute; reversible/low-impact → auto-execute → Log. Failure modes: (F1) an irreversible action executes on one bad judgment with no independent check → unrecoverable loss; (F2) every action queued for human approval → reviewer fatigue/bottleneck → routine work stalls AND rubber-stamping erodes the check exactly where it matters.

STEP 6 — Construct a domain-stripped meta-model.
"A stream of mostly-undoable acts contains a few un-undoable ones. Design a control so that no single error can trigger an un-undoable act, while undoable acts flow freely. Either gate every act (uniform), or gate only the acts whose impact crosses a threshold (selective), keeping a durable record of all."

STEP 7 — Query archetypes whose source primes match (find_archetypes_for_prime / get_archetype).
find_archetypes_for_prime(authority_delegation_under_uncertainty) → emergency_authority_activation_and_constraint (family: bounded_exceptional_authority_and_crisis_governance). get_archetype retrieved. Its logic: reserve the heavyweight control for trigger conditions (severity tier map / threshold), keep routine flow under ordinary fast authority, preserve an audit/accountability record, and require independent oversight proportional to power. Canonical formula: legitimate authority = trigger × bounded power × oversight × record. find_archetypes_for_prime(reversibility_and_irreversibility) → cycle_efficiency_and_reversibility_assessment (assess each transition by its cost-of-reversal — reinforces matching control to door-type).

STEP 8 — Apply each candidate's logic to BOTH approaches and reconcile.
Reversibility logic: control should scale with cost-of-reversal. Approach A applies a maximal control (human gate) uniformly to all actions including the vast reversible majority — a type error: it pays the heaviest price on the cheapest, safest doors. Approach B routes by estimated impact, putting the gate on exactly the un-undoable doors — correct matching.
Authority-delegation logic: pre-authorize a scope of routine action, reserve review for what exceeds scope, audit ex post. Approach A pre-authorizes nothing — it is the "abdication-by-bottleneck" anti-pattern the prime warns about; reviewer fatigue degrades the check into rubber-stamping (the calibration/theater failure), and the very volume that floods the human makes the rare catastrophic case MORE likely to be waved through. Approach B is the zone-of-acceptance done correctly: routine acts flow, the threshold is the novelty/severity trigger, the durable record supplies ex-post accountability.
Emergency-authority archetype: trigger × bounded power × oversight × record. Approach B instantiates all four (threshold trigger, scoped hold, independent review, durable log). Approach A collapses trigger and oversight into one always-on choke point — no severity tiering, oversight not proportional to risk.
Reconcile: all three candidates converge on Approach B. The only thing favoring A is the auditor's "feels safer / easier to write down" — an ergonomic/legibility preference, not a safety property, and the reversibility/fatigue analysis shows A is plausibly LESS safe on the catastrophic class because uniform load degrades the human check where it is needed most.

STEP 9 — Evaluate fit against failure conditions vs success criteria.
Success criterion (a): no single mistaken judgment causes unrecoverable loss. Approach A: every irreversible action does get a human look, but that look is buried under thousands of trivial approvals → fatigue/rubber-stamping → a single bad rubber-stamp can still execute an unrecoverable action. Partial, fragile. Approach B: irreversible/high-impact actions are held for independent review with the reviewer's attention concentrated on the few cases that matter; reversible actions are by definition recoverable from the durable record. Satisfies (a) robustly.
Success criterion (b): routine reversible maintenance proceeds without meaningful slowdown. Approach A: fails outright — every routine action waits on a human. Approach B: routine reversible actions proceed automatically. Satisfies (b).
Approach A fails (b) and only weakly satisfies (a). Approach B satisfies both. Choose B.

===DECISION_BEGIN===
DECISIVE_FACTOR: The protection should be concentrated on the rare actions that cannot be undone, because forcing a human to sign off on every action both stalls routine work and, by burying the dangerous cases in a flood of trivial ones, makes a single careless approval of a catastrophic action more likely rather than less.
CHOICE: B
JUSTIFICATION: Almost all of the agent's actions are routine and reversible, so making a person approve each one would grind ordinary maintenance to a halt while adding no real protection. The danger lives entirely in the small set of actions that can't be undone, so those are the ones that should be held back for an independent check before they run. Reviewers who only have to scrutinize the genuinely risky cases stay alert, whereas reviewers drowning in trivial approvals start waving everything through — including the one that destroys data. Keeping a complete, durable record of every action means the reversible ones can always be traced and corrected after the fact.
===DECISION_END===
