# S1_fishery — Grader 1 scoring

Scored on substance only. Six dimensions, 1-10 each, with one-sentence justification.

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## Recommendation R1

1. Structural coherence: 9/10 — The three-legged logic (cap below danger, route consequences back to each boat, protect the weakest) is explicitly interlocked, and it states that none works alone, so removing the share floor or the science-rule would predictably break the system.
2. Failure-mode anticipation: 9/10 — It names specific failure paths (capture via annual discretion, consolidation by outside capital dispossessing the bottom quartile, breaching the income floor before recovery, defection when cheating goes unpunished) and pairs each with a concrete counter.
3. Implementability: 8/10 — Phased cap, community-only leasing, co-management body, and chokepoint-style monitoring are all executable, though the simultaneous standing-up of shares, a transition pool, and a five-village body is ambitious within the deferral-prone setting.
4. Mechanism grounding: 9/10 — Specific thresholds (25-30% cut), a pre-written adjustment formula, ownership caps, a non-transferable subsistence tranche, and graduated sanctions are all concrete and actionable.
5. Stakeholder/equity fit: 9/10 — Equal per-operator base plus historical landings, ownership caps, non-transferable subsistence tranche, community-only trading, and targeted bottom-quartile bridging directly engage heterogeneity and who bears the cost.
6. Threshold/time-horizon awareness: 9/10 — Explicitly sets the cap below MSY for a safety margin "away from the threshold," treats worsening signs as a trigger to tighten not debate, and makes the short-term-sacrifice/long-term-larger-fish tradeoff visible to operators.
TOTAL: 53/60

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## Recommendation R2

1. Structural coherence: 8/10 — Council, frozen roster, glide-path TAC, point-of-sale monitoring, and reciprocal obligations form a coherent whole where removing the buyer-reporting backbone would visibly break enforcement.
2. Failure-mode anticipation: 7/10 — Names council capture, evasion from a one-time shock, bottom-quartile collapse from flat cuts, and legitimacy corrosion from disproportionate punishment, but its counters are somewhat less sharply attached than the strongest entries.
3. Implementability: 8/10 — Point-of-sale reporting through buyers as the "monitoring backbone" is a genuinely low-cost, evasion-resistant mechanism, and frozen roster plus reserved small-boat seats are executable.
4. Mechanism grounding: 7/10 — Protected baseline plus proportional share, ~10% initial cut, point-of-sale reporting, and rotating no-take reserves are concrete, though the income-floor numbers and hardship top-up sizing stay looser than R1/R3.
5. Stakeholder/equity fit: 8/10 — Guaranteed small-boat seats, protected baseline share, hardship top-up, and a stabilization transfer in the steepest years directly defend the bottom quartile against capture.
6. Threshold/time-horizon awareness: 6/10 — Acts inside the 4-7 year window and adapts annually, but a ~10% initial cut barely removes the 20% overshoot, leaving little safety margin against an irreversible threshold and weaker urgency than the front-loaders.
TOTAL: 44/60

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## Recommendation R3

1. Structural coherence: 9/10 — Published-formula cap, progressive floor-plus-proportional shares, conflict-of-interest firewall, processor-record cross-check, and an emergency brake are tightly coupled; removing the firewall or the brake would predictably hollow the cap.
2. Failure-mode anticipation: 9/10 — Identifies lobbying the number down, regressive flat cuts sinking small boats, evasion under harsh rare punishment, and crossing the irreversible boundary, each with a named counter (formula, floor, graduated sanctions, precautionary-floor brake).
3. Implementability: 8/10 — Cross-checking landings against existing processor purchase records and a chartered conflict-firewalled body are realistic, though the conflict-of-interest voting bar may be politically hard where the regulator already defers.
4. Mechanism grounding: 9/10 — Three-year glide (one-third per year), subsistence-floor shares, levy on landings and processor margin, overage-deduction sanctions, and a rule-based emergency floor are highly specific and actionable.
5. Stakeholder/equity fit: 9/10 — Progressive distribution that concentrates the cut on the largest harvesters, a subsistence-floor share for every operator, and stewardship stipends targeted at the smallest boats squarely address equity and stress-robustness.
6. Threshold/time-horizon awareness: 9/10 — The explicit emergency brake "slamming to a precautionary floor the moment the collapse threshold is in reach" plus the glide-path framing of restraint-as-future-reward directly engage irreversibility and the time tension.
TOTAL: 53/60

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## Recommendation R4

1. Structural coherence: 8/10 — Frozen fleet, front-loaded cut, harder asymmetric recovery test, village shares with a floor, gear rules, chokepoint monitoring, and a science-bound regulator interlock well; removing the recovery-test asymmetry would let the emergency cut lift prematurely and break recovery.
2. Failure-mode anticipation: 9/10 — Names premature relaxation after one good season, ITQ consolidation in a poor fleet, juvenile removal signaled by shrinking size, and regulatory capture, each met with a concrete counter (multi-year recovery test, village shares, mesh/closure rules, science-triggered formula).
3. Implementability: 8/10 — Weigh-point levy and monitoring at existing chokepoints and village-level allocation against local knowledge are practical, though village-share internal allocation could itself become contentious.
4. Mechanism grounding: 8/10 — Quarter-to-third cut, minimum mesh size, closed spawning season, weigh-point levy, and a published harvest-control formula are concrete, though the per-boat floor and recovery-test thresholds are described qualitatively.
5. Stakeholder/equity fit: 8/10 — Village shares plus a guaranteed per-boat floor and a bottom-quartile-targeted transition fund engage heterogeneity, and it explicitly warns the cohort average can "hide ruin in the bottom quartile."
6. Threshold/time-horizon awareness: 9/10 — The asymmetric "easy to enter, hard to leave the danger zone" recovery test, front-loaded cut to pull clearly away from the threshold, and automatic tightening on renewed decline strongly engage irreversibility and the long-horizon proof requirement.
TOTAL: 50/60

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## Recommendation R5

1. Structural coherence: 9/10 — Four named interlocking parts (buffered limit, progressive shares, income floor/bridge, capture-proof governance) with a scientific envelope the board "cannot vote away"; removing the envelope or the floor predictably breaks the others.
2. Failure-mode anticipation: 9/10 — Names estimate uncertainty around an irreversible threshold, the race to fish a pooled quota, consolidation by outside capital, and the regulator quietly handing rules back, each with a specific counter (buffer, per-boat shares, sale ban, board-inside-envelope).
3. Implementability: 7/10 — Mostly executable, but a guaranteed minimum top-up whenever a boat falls below a subsistence line, paid stewardship work, and outside-reviewer standing add administrative load that may strain a deferral-prone regulator.
4. Mechanism grounding: 9/10 — 25-30% year-one cut, written harvest-control rule, equal baseline plus proportional remainder, lease-but-not-sell rule, levy plus buyer buy-forward, and warning-deduction-suspension sanctions are concrete and specific.
5. Stakeholder/equity fit: 9/10 — Progressive equal-baseline allocation, an explicit subsistence top-up for the bottom quartile, paid stewardship for the weakest, and standing for crew and smallest operators to contest decisions make it strongly equity-robust under stress.
6. Threshold/time-horizon awareness: 9/10 — Explicitly buffers below MSY because "the collapse threshold is irreversible," tightens sharply as the stock drifts toward danger, and frames recovery-first as buffering against irreversibility.
TOTAL: 52/60

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## Recommendation R6

1. Structural coherence: 8/10 — Defined governed unit, frozen roster, independently-assessed cap, observation-linked allocation, subsistence floor with income bridge, standing council, and triennial review cohere; removing the independent assessment funding would predictably reopen capture.
2. Failure-mode anticipation: 8/10 — Names reopening the race via new entrants, the regulator bargaining the number down, recovery stalling/sizes still shrinking, and the bottom quartile starving, each with a counter (frozen roster, independent public number, auto-tighten, subsistence floor plus bridge).
3. Implementability: 8/10 — Independent panel, landings levy plus recovery grant, voluntary gear-buyback, and a published record are executable, though "a deliberately larger share routed to the smallest operators" lacks a sizing mechanism.
4. Mechanism grounding: 7/10 — Quarter-below-current cut, hard subsistence floor, levy-plus-grant bridge, spawning closures, and graduated four-step sanctions are concrete, but the catch limit and allocation thresholds stay more qualitative than R1/R3/R5.
5. Stakeholder/equity fit: 8/10 — Hard subsistence floor under every boat, larger share to the smallest operators, a targeted income bridge, and a voluntary exit option engage heterogeneity and who bears the cost well.
6. Threshold/time-horizon awareness: 8/10 — Auto-tightens "whenever the stock nears its collapse threshold" without debate, reviews immediately if a threshold warning fires, and explains the near-term trough versus long-term per-trip rebound, though it lacks an explicit precautionary-floor magnitude.
TOTAL: 47/60

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## Comparison (~150 words)

All six converge on the same correct diagnosis (open-access externality, irreversible threshold) and the same skeleton: science-anchored cap, progressive shares with a subsistence floor, a transition cushion, and capture-resistant co-management. They separate on precision and on how hard they buffer against the irreversible threshold. R1, R3, and R5 are the strongest: each carries explicit numeric cuts (25-30%), a written harvest-control formula, and a sharp equity mechanism, and each treats the threshold as a hard constraint rather than an annual negotiation. R3 adds the cleanest distinctive features — a conflict-of-interest voting firewall and an explicit emergency brake. R4 stands out for its asymmetric recovery test (easy to enter the danger zone, hard to leave) but relies on village-level shares that defer the equity problem one level down. R6 is solid but more qualitative. R2 is the weakest: its ~10% initial cut leaves almost no safety margin against an irreversible threshold while the overshoot is 20%.

## Ranking (best to worst)

1. R3 (53)
2. R1 (53)
3. R5 (52)
4. R4 (50)
5. R6 (47)
6. R2 (44)

R1 and R3 tie at 53; R3 edges ahead on its conflict-of-interest firewall and explicit emergency brake, which are the two sharpest distinctive defenses in the set.

## One I would adopt

R3 — it pairs the most concrete, formula-driven cap and progressive floor-plus-proportional allocation with the two best capture/irreversibility defenses (conflict-of-interest voting firewall and a precautionary-floor emergency brake), making it the most robust under the regulator-deference and threshold risks that define failure here.
