# Working

## STATE

**problem** — Many independent, competing farms pump from one shared underground reserve. State (level) is hidden, expensive/slow to measure. Refill is glacial. Past a compaction threshold capacity is *permanently* lost. Currently looks fine to each farmer. No central owner; each has near-term reasons to keep pumping. A regional body can set rules, fund measurement, and change what farms know / are accountable for, but cannot cheaply meter every well or change the physics. Success = reserve stays above the loss point AND farms keep operating; failure = crossing into permanent loss OR rules so harsh they kill the farms.

## Verbs run (verb — why)

- **match** — `search_by_facets` with six structural facets (shared finite resource / irreversible threshold / hidden state / no owner + extraction incentive / governing body changes knowledge+accountability / individual-rational → collective ruin). Fused archetype #1 = `commons_governance` (rrf .061), #2 `skin_in_the_game_alignment`; fused primes lead with `tragedy_of_the_commons`, `irreversibility`, `governance`, `free_riding`. One operative pattern surfaced cleanly.
- **salience-rank** — load-bearing: `tragedy_of_the_commons` (the core gap), `irreversibility` (the distinctive twist — failure is permanent, so the design must hold a *buffer*, not optimize to the edge), `governance` (the regional body is the only lever). Context: `free_riding`, `accountability`, `incentive_compatibility`.
- **prune** — drop `skin_in_the_game_alignment` as a *second pattern*. Its function (binding the decider to the downside) is real here, but it is discharged inside commons governance's sanction/contribution rules; instantiating its 15 components would over-build. Kept only as a homolog source.
- **compose** — model. Nodes: Reserve (resource), Farms (users), RegionalBody (governor), Threshold (invariant), Measurement (signal), Budget (shared allowance). Edges: Farms—draw→Reserve; Reserve—approaches→Threshold; RegionalBody—sets→Budget; RegionalBody—funds→Measurement; Measurement—reveals→Reserve-condition; Budget—binds→Farms. Referential integrity: every edge connects declared nodes; operative primes annotate edges (tragedy_of_commons on draw→Reserve; irreversibility on approaches→Threshold; governance on sets→Budget). OK.
- **lift (L1)** — meta-model: *agents drawing from a shared stock with a hidden level and an absorbing (irreversible) failure boundary; a coordinator that controls information and accountability but not the dynamics.* Roles: extractors, shared stock, coordinator, absorbing boundary. Every role has a witness (farms, reserve, regional body, compaction point); no domain terms remain. OK.
- **transport** — `commons_governance` is structural-recognitional here; direct map (resource=reserve, users=farms, governor=regional body). `irreversibility` supplies the buffer/early-warning logic (precaution multiplier, approach-to-threshold signals) as a homolog into the use-limit + monitoring components.
- **lift (L2)** — scoped coverage map below.
- **evaluate-fit (gate)** — walk `commons_governance` anti-signatures: (a) "fully private, no spillover" — NO, shared reserve. (b) "underproduction of a non-rival benefit" — NO, this is overuse/depletion. (c) "central authority can directly allocate without info/enforcement problems" — NO, body can't meter cheaply or see the level; that *is* the problem. (d) "one-time two-party dispute" — NO, many farms, repeated. None disqualifies. Gate verdict: KEEP.

## SCOPED COVERAGE MAP — operative pattern: Commons Governance (13 components)

1. **Shared Resource Boundary** — [instantiated] define the reserve's recharge zone, the set of drawing farms, and the compaction threshold as the protected object.
2. **Access Rule** — [instantiated] all current farms are members of the reserve compact; new wells in the zone require a permit, so access cannot silently expand.
3. **Use Quota / Use Limit** — [instantiated] an annual total draw budget set strictly *below* estimated safe recharge, divided into per-farm shares; this is the central limit, tied to resource capacity not arbitrary.
4. **Monitoring Signal** — [instantiated] body funds a sparse network of dedicated observation wells (cheap relative to metering every well) to track the *level* directly, plus self-reported + spot-audited draw. Carries `irreversibility`'s approach-to-threshold early-warning homolog (watch for accelerating decline / slow recovery).
5. **Sanction Rule** — [instantiated] graduated: first overdraw → warning + next-year share cut; repeat → escalating share reduction; severe → permit suspension. Proportional, preserves farm viability.
6. **Replenishment Rule** — [homolog] the reserve cannot be actively refilled (physics). Discharged by its functional analog: a *standing safety buffer* — the budget is held a margin above the threshold and ratcheted down the moment monitoring shows approach, so "keeping it viable" = protecting headroom rather than restoring stock.
7. **Legitimacy Basis** — [instantiated] farms co-set the budget and shares (participatory), see the same monitoring data, and the rule is justified as keeping *all* farms in business long-term.
8. **Dispute Resolution Path** — [instantiated] a standing panel hears share appeals, attribution disputes, and hardship claims, with transparent criteria.
9. **Adaptation Cadence** — [instantiated] budget and shares are recomputed each season against the latest level reading and recharge estimate — a tripwire schedule that tightens automatically near the threshold.
10. **Contribution Rule** — [instantiated] farms fund the monitoring network and panel pro-rata to their share — pairing obligation with access voice.
11. **Funding Pool** — [homolog] no restoration to fund; the contribution levy instead funds *measurement and governance* (the thing that actually preserves the resource here), discharging the pool's function.
12. **Exception Process** — [instantiated] hardship/drought exceptions handled by the panel within a hard reserve-wide ceiling, so no exception can breach the buffer.
13. **Transparency Record** — [instantiated] a public ledger of level readings, each farm's share and actual draw, sanctions, and exceptions — converts hidden state into common knowledge.

Counts: instantiated 11 / homolog 2 / correctly_declined 0 / missing 0. No component missing → may finalize.

(Note: `skin_in_the_game_alignment`'s components are deliberately NOT enumerated — declined as a pattern; its consequence-binding function rides inside Sanction + Contribution + Transparency.)

COST: ~7 operations, ~12k tokens.

===RECOMMENDATION_BEGIN===
Treat the reserve as a single jointly-owned asset whose one unforgivable failure is crossing the compaction point, and build a standing agreement among all the farms drawing from it, hosted by the regional body. The governing idea: because lost capacity never returns, the system must be run to protect a safety margin above the danger line, never optimized to the edge.

First, make the invisible visible cheaply. The body should not try to meter every well. Instead it funds a small network of dedicated observation wells that read the reserve's actual level and how fast it is moving. That direct level signal — not pump-by-pump metering — is the real instrument. Pair it with simple self-reported draw from each farm, backed by occasional spot audits. Publish everything on an open ledger: the latest level, each farm's allowed share, each farm's reported draw, every penalty, and every exception granted. Hidden state is the engine of the problem; shared knowledge defends against it.

Second, set a yearly total draw budget for the whole reserve, and set it deliberately below the best estimate of how much the reserve can safely give — leaving headroom between normal use and the compaction point. Divide that budget into per-farm shares (start from historical use to be acceptable, then hold steady). The budget is the heart of the design, and it must move with the reserve: recompute it every season against the newest level reading. Define tripwire levels in advance. As the reserve drops toward the first tripwire, the total budget automatically tightens by a set step; near the final danger band it tightens hard. Farmers know the rule ahead of time, so cuts feel like weather, not politics.

Third, attach proportionate, escalating consequences so that staying within a share is the rational choice. A first overdraw earns a warning and a deduction from next season's share. Repeated overdrawing escalates the deduction; persistent or gross abuse leads to suspension of the right to pump. Consequences are graduated precisely so they bite enough to deter without destroying a farm over a single bad year — that protects the second success condition, farm viability.

Fourth, give the farms ownership of the rules. The farms, sitting with the body, jointly set and revise the total budget and the share formula, and they all see the same data. People accept a binding limit far more readily when they helped set it, can see the evidence behind it, and understand it exists to keep every one of them in business for decades rather than to favor anyone. Fund the observation wells and the governing body through a small levy on each farm, scaled to its share — so the people who benefit from access also pay for the eyes that protect it.

Fifth, build in fair flex. A standing panel handles disputes, hardship and drought requests, and arguments about whether a reading or a deduction was correct, using published criteria. Crucially, all exceptions live under one hard ceiling: the panel may shuffle who draws within the seasonal budget, but nothing it grants may ever push total draw past the buffer line. Flexibility is allowed inside the safety margin, never through it.

The final operating rule, the one sentence everyone should carry: We pump only within a shared yearly budget that is always kept a safe distance above the point of permanent loss, we watch the reserve's real level together and tighten the budget automatically the moment it falls toward that point, and we share both the limit and the cost of watching fairly — so the water keeps flowing and so do the farms.
===RECOMMENDATION_END===
