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Reckless endangerment of persons

A jurisdiction-defined offense for reckless conduct that creates the specified danger of serious bodily harm to another person.

Version
v1 · 2026-10-31 · History
Domain-specific #
14564
Domain group
Professional & Organizational Practice
Origin domain
Law & Governance
Subdomain
Criminal Law → Law & Governance

Core Idea

Reckless endangerment can criminalize conduct that creates a legally specified danger to another person before injury occurs. The offense and the meaning of recklessness depend on the jurisdiction. New York's second-degree statute requires a substantial risk of serious physical injury; Pennsylvania instead describes conduct that places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.[1][2]

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The Danger-Before-Hurt Rule

Some laws say you can get in trouble for doing something that puts another person in real danger of getting badly hurt, even if nobody got hurt yet. Each place writes its own version of this rule. Something turning out dangerous isn't enough by itself; the law also looks at how the person acted.

Putting People in Danger Law

Reckless endangerment is a kind of law against putting another person in danger of serious harm, even before anyone is actually injured. Different places write the law differently. The law says what kind of danger counts and how serious it must be, and a separate rule says what makes someone's behavior 'reckless.' Just because something dangerous happened doesn't automatically mean the law was broken. Both parts have to be checked against that place's written law.

Crime of Creating Risk

Reckless endangerment of persons is a type of criminal offense aimed at conduct that endangers someone else's bodily safety, even if no injury results. Whether the offense applies depends on the specific statute in a given jurisdiction. The statute spells out what kind and degree of danger is required, while a separate rule about culpability (the mental state) defines what counts as 'reckless.' A dangerous result alone doesn't settle either question. For example, New York's second-degree version requires reckless conduct creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury, while Pennsylvania's speaks of conduct that places or may place someone in danger of death or serious bodily injury; these are related but not interchangeable tests.

 

Reckless endangerment offenses criminalize conduct that creates danger to another person's bodily safety without requiring that injury actually occur. The elements are statutory and jurisdiction-specific. The offense definition fixes the required kind and degree of danger, while a separate culpability provision defines recklessness as the mental state. Proof that a dangerous outcome occurred does not by itself establish either the danger element or the culpability element. Statutory formulations differ: New York's second-degree offense requires reckless conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person, whereas Pennsylvania's statute covers reckless conduct that places or may place another in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The two are related but should not be treated as the same legal test; analysis must proceed from the governing statute's text.

How It Works

Identify the governing law and date, the actor's conduct, the other person, and the statute's danger threshold. Then apply the jurisdiction's culpability rule. New York generally requires conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, with disregard a gross deviation from reasonable conduct. It also treats a person who creates the risk but is unaware of it solely because of voluntary intoxication as reckless. Pennsylvania separately requires conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk involving a gross deviation, considering the nature and intent of the conduct and the circumstances known to the actor; its cited definition does not contain New York's provision.[3][4]

Examples

In People v. Byrd, the court affirmed a New York second-degree conviction on weight-of-evidence review. An eyewitness described shots in the victim's general direction, although he did not see the victim at the moment of firing; the defendant described warning shots. The court did not require proof of direct aim.[5]

In People v. Corliss, security stopped a planned BASE jump from an exposed building ledge. The court held the grand-jury evidence sufficient for the lesser second-degree charge and remanded for reduction of the indictment. It did not convict the defendant. His safety-planning statements were not before the grand jury and were not part of its sufficiency record.[6]

Boundaries

Neither case establishes that all gunfire or jumping is criminal. The two cases apply New York law; Pennsylvania is a statutory comparison, not a third adjudicated case. Criminal negligence is separately defined in the cited codes. New York's first-degree offense has its own depraved-indifference and grave-risk-of-death formulation. A charge and a conviction have different evidentiary postures.[3][4][7][6]

Neighborhood in Abstraction Space

Reckless endangerment of persons sits in a sparse region of the domain-specific corpus (93rd percentile for distinctiveness): few abstractions share its structure, so a faithful description tends to retrieve it precisely.

Family — Unclustered & Miscellaneous (2835 abstractions)

Nearest neighbors

Computed from structural-signature embeddings · 2026-10-31

References

[1] New York State Senate. “New York Penal Law Section 120.20: Reckless endangerment in the second degree.” https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/120.20 registry ↩

[2] Pennsylvania General Assembly. “18 Pa.C.S. Section 2705: Recklessly endangering another person.” https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/18/00.027.005.000..HTM registry ↩

[3] New York State Senate. “New York Penal Law Section 15.05: Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states,” subsections 3–4. https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/15.05 registry ↩a ↩b

[4] Pennsylvania General Assembly. “18 Pa.C.S. Section 302: General requirements of culpability,” subsections (b)(3)–(4). https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/18/00.003.002.000..HTM registry ↩a ↩b

[5] New York Appellate Division. “People v. Byrd, 79 A.D.3d 1256.” (2010). https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09019.htm registry ↩

[6] New York Appellate Division. “People v. Corliss, 51 A.D.3d 79.” (2008), especially 83–85. https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries/2008/2008_01869.htm registry ↩a ↩b

[7] New York State Senate. “New York Penal Law Section 120.25: Reckless endangerment in the first degree.” https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/120.25 registry ↩