Security Intelligence¶

7 primes originate from Security Intelligence. 3 more draw from it as a secondary origin.

Primary members (7)¶

Primes whose canonical origin is Security Intelligence.

Adversarial Boundary Navigation — An adaptive opponent searches a rule's boundary for the cheapest legal-side configuration that keeps the prohibited substance.
Asymmetric Attack Defense Cost — On a shared channel, the cost ratio between producing harm and producing correction determines whether defense is sustainable by effort or requires structural redesign.
Community-Distributed Adversarial Learning — A sharing adversary community out-learns a slow-updating rule system because discovery cost amortizes across many opponents.
Confused Deputy — A privileged intermediary acts on its own authority while the intent originated with an outsider who lacks it, so authority is borrowed without intent being tracked.
Control / Data Channel Confusion — A receiver interprets attacker-controlled data as authoritative instructions because the protocol separates control from data by content inspection rather than by structure.
Minimum-Necessary Disclosure — A producer delivers only the subset of its record a consumer's role requires, stripping the surplus at the source.
Untrusted Input Execution — Attacker-influenced input crosses a data-to-control (or authority) boundary and a correctly-operating intermediary executes it with the intermediary's own authority, so the attacker borrows the defender's privilege without ever violating the intermediary's rules.

Primes whose canonical origin is elsewhere, but who list Security Intelligence among their alternate origin domains.

Coevolution — Reciprocal, mutually-selective adaptation between coupled systems.
Discretion — Latitude granted to an agent to decide within bounded limits.
Expected Utility — Ranking risky options by their probability-weighted utility.