Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics¶
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251-267.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Institutional Lag
- Path dependence, as Pierson (2000) develops the concept for political analysis, describes how historical choices constrain future options and create self-reinforcing systems.
This sourceArgues that political institutions exploit increasing returns and irreversibility as protective features—stable commitments depend on costly reversal, so reflexive horizon-shortening risks destabilizing institutional order.
- Path dependence, as Pierson (2000) develops the concept for political analysis, describes how historical choices constrain future options and create self-reinforcing systems.
- Path Dependence
- This frame is more parsimonious than alternatives (ideology, incompetence, organizational dysfunction) because it explains stickiness as structural rather than behavioral.
This sourceArgues that political institutions exploit increasing returns and irreversibility as protective features—stable commitments depend on costly reversal, so reflexive horizon-shortening risks destabilizing institutional order.
- This frame is more parsimonious than alternatives (ideology, incompetence, organizational dysfunction) because it explains stickiness as structural rather than behavioral.
- Reversibility Horizon
- Reflexively shortening reversibility horizons (making everything easily reversible) risks destabilizing institutions and commitments that depend on irreversibility—a feature Pierson (2000) treats as central to the increasing-returns logic of political institutions.
This sourceArgues that political institutions exploit increasing returns and irreversibility as protective features—stable commitments depend on costly reversal, so reflexive horizon-shortening risks destabilizing institutional order.
- Reflexively shortening reversibility horizons (making everything easily reversible) risks destabilizing institutions and commitments that depend on irreversibility—a feature Pierson (2000) treats as central to the increasing-returns logic of political institutions.
- Suspension
- A strong-beat rule: the dissonance is most felt at the moment the new context demands action — the institutional friction peaks when a regulator must rule on a case the old rule does not fit. Resolution-by-step: the held element typically moves by a small increment rather than a leap, so ad-hoc reinterpretation and incremental amendment usually discharge institutional dissonance better than abrupt repeal. Length matters: a long-held suspension generates more tension than a short one and demands a more emphatic resolution — a regulation stale for forty years cannot be quietly amended.
This sourceInstitutions become path-dependent through increasing returns, so the cost of changing an arrangement rises the longer it persists — the mechanism behind accumulated institutional inertia.
- A strong-beat rule: the dissonance is most felt at the moment the new context demands action — the institutional friction peaks when a regulator must rule on a case the old rule does not fit. Resolution-by-step: the held element typically moves by a small increment rather than a leap, so ad-hoc reinterpretation and incremental amendment usually discharge institutional dissonance better than abrupt repeal. Length matters: a long-held suspension generates more tension than a short one and demands a more emphatic resolution — a regulation stale for forty years cannot be quietly amended.
Mechanisms¶
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