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Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets

Handel, B. R. (2013). Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts. American Economic Review.

Type
Journal article
Intellectual base
Primary research
Year
2013
DOI
10.1257/aer.103.7.2643
Link
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.7.2643
Cited from
economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

  • Screening
    • T3: Menu Richness vs Participant Cognitive Load.

      This sourceDocuments that consumers facing rich health-plan menus exhibit large inertia and frequently choose dominated options, complicating the simple screening assumption that menu choices reveal type rather than choice-architecture artifacts.

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Registry ID ref:020266784f2a · see in the full table