Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets

Handel, B. R. (2013). Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts. American Economic Review, 2643-2682.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2013

Pages

2643-2682

DOI

10.1257/aer.103.7.2643

DOI registrant

American Economic Association

Link

https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.7.2643

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Screening
  • T3: Menu Richness vs Participant Cognitive Load.

    This sourceDocuments that consumers facing rich health-plan menus exhibit large inertia and frequently choose dominated options, complicating the simple screening assumption that menu choices reveal type rather than choice-architecture artifacts.

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