Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games.¶
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993). Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica, 61(1), 29-56.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
- Many problems appear to be about motivation, capability, or efficiency; equilibrium selection reframes them as multiplicity under rational indifference, the formal problem Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) addressed through stochastic stability analysis.
This sourceStochastic-stability framework selecting among multiple strict equilibria; in 2×2 coordination games the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected under rare mutations and bounded-rational learning.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Confirms KMR 1993 select among multiple strict equilibria by stochastic stability (risk-dominance), but not the claim's 'multiplicity under rational indifference'.
“The effect of these mutations is to drastically reduce the set of equilibria to what we term "long-run equilibria."For 2 x 2 symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the equilibrium selected satisfies (for large populations) Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) criterion of risk-dominance.”
- Many problems appear to be about motivation, capability, or efficiency; equilibrium selection reframes them as multiplicity under rational indifference, the formal problem Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) addressed through stochastic stability analysis.
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