Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games.

Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993). Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica, 61(1), 29-56.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1993

DOI

10.2307/2951777

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/2951777

Cited from

information_theory

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
  • Many problems appear to be about motivation, capability, or efficiency; equilibrium selection reframes them as multiplicity under rational indifference, the formal problem Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) addressed through stochastic stability analysis.

    This sourceStochastic-stability framework selecting among multiple strict equilibria; in 2×2 coordination games the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected under rare mutations and bounded-rational learning.

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