Pricing and Commitment by Two-Sided Platforms.¶
Hagiu, A. (2006). Pricing and Commitment by Two-Sided Platforms. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 720-737.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Two Sided Market
- Gaming and computing platforms — developers and users connected by consoles and operating systems, where the cross-side externality motivates subsidised hardware and developer lock-in.
This sourceAnalyzes platform pricing including software/console platforms connecting developers and users.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Hagiu's abstract models two-sided platform pricing, with an exclusive single-platform seller equilibrium against multi-homing, but never mentions consoles, subsidised hardware, or developer lock-in.
“With competing platforms, commitment makes the existence of an exclusive equilibrium (in which sellers register with only one platform) less likely, but it has no impact on multi-homing equilibria (in which sellers support both platforms) whenever these exist.”
- Gaming and computing platforms — developers and users connected by consoles and operating systems, where the cross-side externality motivates subsidised hardware and developer lock-in.
Verification¶
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