Moral Hazard in Teams¶
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324-340.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Axiomatic Incompatibility
- In mechanism design, Holmström's impossibility rules out budget balance, efficiency, individual rationality, and dominant-strategy truthfulness together in team production.
This sourceProves that in team production no sharing rule can simultaneously balance the budget and provide efficient (Pareto-optimal) effort incentives, establishing the impossibility of jointly satisfying budget balance, efficiency, and individual incentive compatibility.
- In mechanism design, Holmström's impossibility rules out budget balance, efficiency, individual rationality, and dominant-strategy truthfulness together in team production.
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