Repeated Games and Reputations¶
Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Folk Theorem (Repeated Games)
- The result is "folk" because it circulated informally among game theorists before receiving formal proofs: successive versions were established by Friedman (1971), Aumann and Shapley (1976), Rubinstein (1979), and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
This sourceA monograph on repeated games that proves the folk theorem.
- The result is "folk" because it circulated informally among game theorists before receiving formal proofs: successive versions were established by Friedman (1971), Aumann and Shapley (1976), Rubinstein (1979), and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
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