Incentives in Teams.

Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, 41(4), 617-631.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1973

DOI

10.2307/1914085

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • and school-choice algorithms are all built around IC as a non-negotiable design criterion.

    This sourceGeneralized Vickrey-Clarke mechanisms to the VCG family.

• Mechanism Design
  • VCG mechanisms (named for Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973

    This sourceGeneralized Vickrey-Clarke mechanisms to the VCG family.

Domain-specific

• Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
  • … pays the highest welfare the other bidders could obtain without that bidder. to In a combinatorial allocation problem, the mechanism can choose the feasible bundle assignment maximizing reported total value and compute Clarke-pivot payments from counterfactual optima without each agent. demonstrates that continuity.

Verification

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