Incentives in Teams.¶

Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, 41(4), 617-631.

Type: Journal article
Intellectual base: Primary research
Year: 1973
Volume: 41
Issue: 4
Pages: 617-631
DOI: 10.2307/1914085
DOI registrant: JSTOR
Link: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
Cited from: economics_finance

Cited by¶

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes¶

Incentive Compatibility
- and school-choice algorithms are all built around IC as a non-negotiable design criterion.
  This sourceGeneralized Vickrey-Clarke mechanisms to the VCG family.
  
  Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
  
  Groves's own abstract shows only compensation rules that induce truthful communication and team behavior; it never states DSIC, quasi-linearity, or externality charging.
  
  “The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior.”
  From the publisher's abstract.
  
  Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked
Mechanism Design
- VCG mechanisms (named for Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973
  This sourceGeneralized Vickrey-Clarke mechanisms to the VCG family.

Domain-specific¶

Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
- … pays the highest welfare the other bidders could obtain without that bidder. to In a combinatorial allocation problem, the mechanism can choose the feasible bundle assignment maximizing reported total value and compute Clarke-pivot payments from counterfactual optima without each agent. demonstrates that continuity.

Verification¶

Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.

Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 3 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.

See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:06cba76017ed · see in the full table