Eliminative Pluralism¶
Ereshefsky, M. (1992). Eliminative Pluralism. Philosophy of Science, 59(4), 671-690.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Essentialism
- Historical essentialism about species (Linnaeus, natural-kind species concepts); Ereshefsky's eliminative pluralism rejecting species essentialism
This sourceArgues the species category should be eliminated in favor of a plurality of concepts (interbreeding, descent, ecology) with no shared essence — supports the eliminative-pluralism / species-anti-essentialism claim.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Ereshefsky's title and abstract establish species pluralism only; they do not state that the species category is eliminated or that species essentialism is rejected.
“This paper takes up the cause of species pluralism. An argument for species pluralism is provided and standard monist objections to pluralism are answered.”
- Historical essentialism about species (Linnaeus, natural-kind species concepts); Ereshefsky's eliminative pluralism rejecting species essentialism
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:07b0f94d3ce2 · see in the full table