Vickrey auction¶
The. (1996). Vickrey auction.
Retired. This entry was not a citation. Our extractor stored an inline prose definition from the article as though it were a bibliographic record, so its title is the name of a concept rather than of a published work. The page is kept because links to it still resolve, but it is withdrawn from the reference list. This entry is kept so the citations that pointed at it still resolve, and so the correction is visible rather than silent.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Truthful Auction Mechanism
- The generalization of this rule to many goods is the same idea: charge each winner the cost their presence imposes on everyone else.
This sourceIts multi-good generalization, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism, charges each winner the externality their participation imposes on the others, extending the truthful property to complex allocations.
- The generalization of this rule to many goods is the same idea: charge each winner the cost their presence imposes on everyone else.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:08c7c040161d · see in the full table