Occupational licensing¶
Kleiner, M. M. (2000). Occupational licensing. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 189-202.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Regulatory Capture
- Occupational licensing: Incumbent practitioners in a profession (physicians, lawyers, electricians) use regulatory bodies to restrict entry, raising barriers for new entrants and protecting their market position under the guise of quality assurance, an effect Kleiner (2000) documents empirically across U.S. occupations.
This sourceEmpirical synthesis showing that occupational licensing run by incumbent practitioners raises consumer prices and restricts entry without measurable quality gains, the canonical capture pattern in licensing.
- Occupational licensing: Incumbent practitioners in a profession (physicians, lawyers, electricians) use regulatory bodies to restrict entry, raising barriers for new entrants and protecting their market position under the guise of quality assurance, an effect Kleiner (2000) documents empirically across U.S. occupations.
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