Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit.¶
Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121(2), 301-324.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Credible Commitment
- The prime supports several portable reasoning moves, each stated in terms of incentives and constraints rather than any particular institution. Backward induction: credibility is the substantive content of subgame-perfect equilibrium, since a non-credible threat is one that would not actually be played in the subgame where it would have to be executed, and subgame perfection prunes exactly those threats.
This sourceIntroduces subgame-perfect equilibrium, which prunes non-credible threats that would not be carried out in the subgame where they would have to be executed.
- The prime supports several portable reasoning moves, each stated in terms of incentives and constraints rather than any particular institution. Backward induction: credibility is the substantive content of subgame-perfect equilibrium, since a non-credible threat is one that would not actually be played in the subgame where it would have to be executed, and subgame perfection prunes exactly those threats.
- Game-Theoretic Strategy
- … distribution over pure strategies), behavioural (independent randomisation at each information set), or correlated (joint randomisation through a public signal); (3) the solution concept that justifies the strategy — Nash equilibrium, dominant-strategy equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential games
This source(The originating treatment of subgame-perfect equilibrium — the refinement of Nash equilibrium for sequential games that requires equilibrium in every subgame and rules out non-credible threats. Selten won the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Nash and Harsanyi for this and the trembling-hand refinement.)
- … distribution over pure strategies), behavioural (independent randomisation at each information set), or correlated (joint randomisation through a public signal); (3) the solution concept that justifies the strategy — Nash equilibrium, dominant-strategy equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential games
Domain-specific¶
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
- SPE was introduced by Reinhard Selten (1965) as the first systematic refinement of Nash equilibrium for sequential games
SupportedVerified against the source
- SPE was introduced by Reinhard Selten (1965) as the first systematic refinement of Nash equilibrium for sequential games
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