How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens¶
Fitelson, & Hawthorne. (2010). How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Domain-specific¶
- Hempel's Paradox
- Observing a white shoe raises H's probability too, but by a Bayes factor of about 1 + 10⁻¹⁴ — exceeding 1 by only the order of the ratio of ravens to non-black things, roughly 10⁻¹⁴
This sourceChapter presenting a new-and-improved Bayesian confirmation-theoretic resolution of the paradox of the ravens.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- Observing a white shoe raises H's probability too, but by a Bayes factor of about 1 + 10⁻¹⁴ — exceeding 1 by only the order of the ratio of ravens to non-black things, roughly 10⁻¹⁴
Verification¶
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