Game Theory¶
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press.
Cited by¶
6 citations across 6 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Abilene Paradox
- Model the decision as a one-shot signaling game among \(n\) members facing a discrete choice between action \(X\) and the status quo.
This sourceStandard reference for the signaling-game apparatus used to model the decision as a one-shot game of incomplete information over public signals.
- Model the decision as a one-shot signaling game among \(n\) members facing a discrete choice between action \(X\) and the status quo.
- Nash Equilibrium
- Economics and game theory — the origin: oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, public-goods provision, bargaining; the central solution concept of non-cooperative strategic analysis.
This sourceStandard graduate text presenting Nash equilibrium as the central solution concept of non-cooperative strategic analysis across oligopoly, auctions, and bargaining.
- Economics and game theory — the origin: oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, public-goods provision, bargaining; the central solution concept of non-cooperative strategic analysis.
- Realized vs Possible Outcomes
- Optimization and decision theory — the feasible set is the possibility set; the chosen point is the realized; suboptimal choices sit inside but not at the Pareto frontier. Probability theory — the support of a distribution is the possibility set; a finite sample is the realized set. Game theory — the strategy space is the possibility set; equilibrium actions are the realized set; off-equilibrium paths constrain behaviour through threat structure.
This sourceStandard reference on strategy spaces and equilibrium, including how off-equilibrium paths constrain behavior through threat structure.
- Optimization and decision theory — the feasible set is the possibility set; the chosen point is the realized; suboptimal choices sit inside but not at the Pareto frontier. Probability theory — the support of a distribution is the possibility set; a finite sample is the realized set. Game theory — the strategy space is the possibility set; equilibrium actions are the realized set; off-equilibrium paths constrain behaviour through threat structure.
- Theory Of Mind
- Negotiation, diplomacy, and game theory: any bargaining or signalling game requires modelling the counterparty's information set, beliefs about your type, and beliefs about your beliefs — common knowledge and signalling equilibria rest on iterated theory-of-mind reasoning.
This sourceStandard reference for signalling games, beliefs about other players' types, and perfect Bayesian/sequential equilibria — the iterated belief reasoning underlying negotiation and diplomacy.
- Negotiation, diplomacy, and game theory: any bargaining or signalling game requires modelling the counterparty's information set, beliefs about your type, and beliefs about your beliefs — common knowledge and signalling equilibria rest on iterated theory-of-mind reasoning.
Domain-specific¶
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