Game Theory

Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1991

Link

https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262061414/game-theory/

Cited from

cognitive_science, economics_finance, mathematics, organizational_management

Cited by

9 citations across 9 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Abilene Paradox
  • Model the decision as a one-shot signaling game among \(n\) members facing a discrete choice between action \(X\) and the status quo.

    This sourceStandard reference for the signaling-game apparatus used to model the decision as a one-shot game of incomplete information over public signals.

• Nash Equilibrium
  • Economics and game theory — the origin: oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, public-goods provision, bargaining; the central solution concept of non-cooperative strategic analysis.

    This sourceStandard graduate text presenting Nash equilibrium as the central solution concept of non-cooperative strategic analysis across oligopoly, auctions, and bargaining.

• Realized vs Possible Outcomes
  • Optimization and decision theory — the feasible set is the possibility set; the chosen point is the realized; suboptimal choices sit inside but not at the Pareto frontier. Probability theory — the support of a distribution is the possibility set; a finite sample is the realized set. Game theory — the strategy space is the possibility set; equilibrium actions are the realized set; off-equilibrium paths constrain behaviour through threat structure.

    This sourceStandard reference on strategy spaces and equilibrium, including how off-equilibrium paths constrain behavior through threat structure.

• Theory Of Mind
  • Negotiation, diplomacy, and game theory: any bargaining or signalling game requires modelling the counterparty's information set, beliefs about your type, and beliefs about your beliefs — common knowledge and signalling equilibria rest on iterated theory-of-mind reasoning.

    This sourceStandard reference for signalling games, beliefs about other players' types, and perfect Bayesian/sequential equilibria — the iterated belief reasoning underlying negotiation and diplomacy.

Domain-specific

• Farsightedness (game theory)
  • The entry records a descriptive analytical identity; practical use requires the governing domain's evidence, standards, and safety obligations.
• Grim Trigger
  • In a finite-horizon game the strategy unravels by backward induction, and at low discount factors it cannot support cooperation at all

    This sourceA game-theory text setting out backward induction as the solution concept for finite games of perfect information.

    Supported in partVerified against the work's full text

    “Backward [induction] can be applied to any [finite] game of perfect”

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

• Move by nature
  • … demonstrates that game tree, chance node, outcome distribution, timing, observability, information sets, type or signal interpretation, and independence from strategic payoffs are explicit. to An applied instance preserves the same invariant under a changed scale, notation, jurisdiction, dataset, or implementation..
• One-shot deviation principle
  • … assumptions, horizon or discounting conditions, strategy profile, every subgame or information set, one-action deviation and continuation strategy and payoff comparison are explicit. to An applied instance preserves the same invariant under a changed scale, notation, jurisdiction, dataset, or implementation..
• Risk dominance
  • … directly demonstrates that the game has the relevant multiple equilibria, payoff orientation and loss products are explicit, and risk dominance is distinguished from Pareto or payoff dominance. to An applied instance preserves the same invariant under a changed notation, scale, implementation, or empirical setting..

Verification

Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.

Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 9 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.

See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:122f585d3b11 · see in the full table