Toward a more general theory of regulation¶
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Primes¶
- Regulatory Capture
- A regulator with poor accountability and weak governance may fail to protect the public interest; a captured regulator actively serves the interests of the regulated, whether or not accountability mechanisms exist, a distinction Peltzman (1976) embeds in his general theory of regulation.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Peltzman's general theory of regulation has regulators maximize political support with producer interests typically prevailing, but the text does not draw the accountability-versus-capture distinction the claim puts in it.
“as between the two main countending interests in regulatory processes, the pro- ducer interesb tends to prevnil over the consumer interest.”
- A regulator with poor accountability and weak governance may fail to protect the public interest; a captured regulator actively serves the interests of the regulated, whether or not accountability mechanisms exist, a distinction Peltzman (1976) embeds in his general theory of regulation.
Verification¶
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