A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.¶
Simon, H. A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99-118.
Cited by¶
10 citations across 10 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Agency
- In economics and decision theory, the rational-agent model — preferences, beliefs, expected-utility maximization — is a formalization of the triad, with bounded rationality the recognition that real agents approximate it under resource limits.
This sourceIntroduces bounded rationality — real agents approximating the rational-agent model under resource limits.
- In economics and decision theory, the rational-agent model — preferences, beliefs, expected-utility maximization — is a formalization of the triad, with bounded rationality the recognition that real agents approximate it under resource limits.
- Bounded Rationality
- … selecting the globally best option from a fully enumerated choice set, bounded agents search locally, apply heuristics, and stop when an option is "good enough" (satisficing) relative to an aspiration level — a process that is adaptive to the environment rather than deficient by contrast with an idealized optimum.
This sourceIntroduces satisficing, sequential search with aspiration level, and the procedural-vs-outcome rationality distinction; directly supports the satisficing/local-search reframing and procedural-rule claims.
- … selecting the globally best option from a fully enumerated choice set, bounded agents search locally, apply heuristics, and stop when an option is "good enough" (satisficing) relative to an aspiration level — a process that is adaptive to the environment rather than deficient by contrast with an idealized optimum.
- Boundedness
- As Simon (1955) argues in his foundational paper on bounded rationality, distinguishing systems with explicit finite limits from those with no such limits is a prerequisite for productive reasoning under finite resources.
This sourcefoundational bounded-rationality paper — decision-making under finite computational capacity requires explicit recognition of bounds, motivating the clarity contribution of distinguishing systems with finite limits.
- As Simon (1955) argues in his foundational paper on bounded rationality, distinguishing systems with explicit finite limits from those with no such limits is a prerequisite for productive reasoning under finite resources.
- Decision
- Each exhibits the logic of uncertainty, trade-off, commitment, and consequence, an isomorphism Simon (1955) articulated in his foundational behavioral model of rational choice.
This sourceFirst formalization of choice by a boundedly rational agent (an ante-litteram statement of bounded rationality).
- Each exhibits the logic of uncertainty, trade-off, commitment, and consequence, an isomorphism Simon (1955) articulated in his foundational behavioral model of rational choice.
- Heuristic
This sourceFoundational paper on bounded rationality: introduces the concept that decision-making under finite cognitive resources requires explicit recognition of bounds, with the asymmetric cost of mistakenly treating finite resources as unbounded as a key motivation for the framework.
- Marginal Utility
- Bounded-rationality models (Simon, 1955)
This sourceFoundational paper on bounded rationality: introduces the concept that decision-making under finite cognitive resources requires explicit recognition of bounds, with the asymmetric cost of mistakenly treating finite resources as unbounded as a key motivation for the framework.
- Bounded-rationality models (Simon, 1955)
- Problem Framing
- Everything outside the boundary becomes a recorded assumption, priced once instead of reconsidered against every proposal; the parameter half of the lever-parameter split ends all search over conditions declared unmovable; and the criterion collapses an unbounded set of desirable outcomes into one observable condition, which is the only reason work can ever stop.
This sourceIntroduces the aspiration-level criterion of satisfactoriness that terminates search over an otherwise unbounded set of alternatives and outcomes.
- Everything outside the boundary becomes a recorded assumption, priced once instead of reconsidered against every proposal; the parameter half of the lever-parameter split ends all search over conditions declared unmovable; and the criterion collapses an unbounded set of desirable outcomes into one observable condition, which is the only reason work can ever stop.
- Satisficing
- Satisficing is a decision-making strategy in which an agent (1) sets an aspiration level — a threshold of "good enough" on one or more criteria, either deliberately chosen or derived from prior experience
This sourceFoundational paper introducing aspiration-level search and distinguishing it from utility maximization; establishes the threshold-acceptance mechanism that defines satisficing. Cross-G3 B3 candidate: shared with bounded_rationality (#67) — verify dedup at B3.*
- Satisficing is a decision-making strategy in which an agent (1) sets an aspiration level — a threshold of "good enough" on one or more criteria, either deliberately chosen or derived from prior experience
Domain-specific¶
Mechanisms¶
- Aspiration-Level Decision Rule
- The rule is Herbert Simon's original satisficing move — decide by aspiration level, not by optimization
This sourceDevelops satisficing as choice by aspiration level rather than optimization.
- The rule is Herbert Simon's original satisficing move — decide by aspiration level, not by optimization
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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