Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards

Vuagnoux, M., & Pasini, S. (2009). Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards. Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium, 1-16.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2009

Link

https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity09/technical-sessions/presentation/compromising-electromagnetic-emanation-0

Cited from

computer_science

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Hidden Information Reconstruction
  • TEMPEST and acoustic emanation: electromagnetic emanations reconstruct displayed pixels, and keyboard or printer acoustic emanations reconstruct typed or printed content, via a prior over expected text.

    This sourceReconstructs keystrokes from keyboard electromagnetic emanations (recovering up to 95% of keystrokes at 20 m); representative of the TEMPEST / acoustic-emanation eavesdropping literature reconstructing displayed or typed content.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:1431a786e463 · see in the full table