Filling gaps in incomplete contracts¶
Ayres, I., & Gertner, R. (1989). Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: An economic theory of default rules. Yale Law Journal, 99(1), 87-130.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Mandatory vs. Default Norms
- Ayres and Gertner (1989), in their canonical analysis of filling gaps in incomplete contracts, distinguish "majoritarian" defaults (matching what most parties would have chosen) from "penalty" defaults (deliberately set against the better-informed party to force disclosure), demonstrating that the choice of default rule is itself a strategic design decision rather than a neutral guess about preferences.
This sourceDistinguishes "majoritarian" defaults (matching what most parties would have chosen) from "penalty" defaults (deliberately set against the better-informed party to force disclosure); establishes default-rule design as strategic choice rather than neutral guess.
- Ayres and Gertner (1989), in their canonical analysis of filling gaps in incomplete contracts, distinguish "majoritarian" defaults (matching what most parties would have chosen) from "penalty" defaults (deliberately set against the better-informed party to force disclosure), demonstrating that the choice of default rule is itself a strategic design decision rather than a neutral guess about preferences.
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