Filling gaps in incomplete contracts

Ayres, I., & Gertner, R. (1989). Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: An economic theory of default rules. Yale Law Journal, 99(1), 87-130.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1989

Volume

99

Issue

1

Pages

87-130

DOI registrant

registered by a platform that did not publish the work; the publisher is not recorded

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/796722 not authoritativefound

Cited from

law_governance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Mandatory vs. Default Norms
  • Ayres and Gertner (1989), in their canonical analysis of filling gaps in incomplete contracts, distinguish "majoritarian" defaults (matching what most parties would have chosen) from "penalty" defaults (deliberately set against the better-informed party to force disclosure), demonstrating that the choice of default rule is itself a strategic design decision rather than a neutral guess about preferences.

    This sourceDistinguishes "majoritarian" defaults (matching what most parties would have chosen) from "penalty" defaults (deliberately set against the better-informed party to force disclosure); establishes default-rule design as strategic choice rather than neutral guess.

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