Expertise as mental set¶
Wiley, J. (1998). Expertise as mental set: The effects of domain knowledge in creative problem solving. Memory & Cognition, 26(4), 716-730.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Cognitive Entrenchment
- The entrenched structures continue to be applied despite accumulating evidence of misfit; performance on novel conditions is systematically worse than would be expected from general intelligence or adjacent expertise, revealing the expertise-induced fixedness. Revision resistance.
This sourceShows domain knowledge can confine search and inhibit creative (remote-associates) problem solving. Venue corrected from the prime's Journal of Experimental Psychology: LMC, 24(4), 932–945.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Wiley (1998) shows domain knowledge can act as a mental set that inhibits creative problem solving — supporting the fixedness frame, not the comparison to general intelligence.
“In other words, domain knowledge may act as a mental set, promoting fixation in creative problem-solving attempts. A series of three experiments in which an adapted version of Mednick’s (1962) remote associates task was used demonstrates conditions under which domain knowledge may inhibit creative problem solving.”
- The entrenched structures continue to be applied despite accumulating evidence of misfit; performance on novel conditions is systematically worse than would be expected from general intelligence or adjacent expertise, revealing the expertise-induced fixedness. Revision resistance.
Domain-specific¶
- Functional Fixedness
- The same retrieval-economy mechanism appears across design-fixation research, tool-use cognition, and expert-novice comparisons: experts, whose category labels are fast and reliable on routine problems, are often slower than novices on insight problems that require stepping outside the category.
This sourceExperiments showing that domain experts solve creative remote-associate problems less often than novices when their domain knowledge points toward a misleading answer, domain knowledge acting as a mental set.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- The same retrieval-economy mechanism appears across design-fixation research, tool-use cognition, and expert-novice comparisons: experts, whose category labels are fast and reliable on routine problems, are often slower than novices on insight problems that require stepping outside the category.
Verification¶
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