The Economic Structure of Corporate Law¶
Easterbrook, F. H., & Fischel, D. R. (1991). The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Harvard University Press.
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1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Mandatory vs. Default Norms
- Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) argue, in their economic analysis of corporate law, that the bulk of corporate-law rules are best understood as defaults—standard-form contracts that firms can deviate from via charter amendment—because uniform mandatory regimes deny firms the ability to tailor governance to heterogeneous shareholder preferences and operating environments.
This sourceArgues that the bulk of corporate-law rules are best understood as defaults—standard-form contracts firms can deviate from via charter amendment—because uniform mandatory regimes deny firms the ability to tailor governance to heterogeneous shareholder preferences.
- Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) argue, in their economic analysis of corporate law, that the bulk of corporate-law rules are best understood as defaults—standard-form contracts that firms can deviate from via charter amendment—because uniform mandatory regimes deny firms the ability to tailor governance to heterogeneous shareholder preferences and operating environments.
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