Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses

Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 24-52.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1991

Pages

24-52

DOI

10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24

DOI registrant

Oxford University Press

Link

https://www.jstor.org/stable/764957

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Agency Problem
  • Multi-task agency theory (Holmström and Milgrom 1991) shows that strong incentives on measurable tasks can distort effort away from unmeasurable ones

    This sourceShows that strong incentives on measurable tasks distort effort away from unmeasurable ones; grounds the multi-task tension. SUPPORTS the T1 multi-task claim that strong incentives on measurable tasks distort effort away from unmeasurable ones.

Mechanisms

• Incentive Compensation Plan
  • Where effort spans measured and unmeasured tasks

    This sourceShows that when tasks compete for attention and differ in measurability, stronger incentives on measured work redirect effort away from other duties.

• Incentive Redesign
  • Its failure mode is the multitask problem — reward one measurable dimension strongly and effort quietly drains from every dimension you didn't reward, including the ones that were the whole point.

Verification

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 ×2

Registry ID ref:18cceefe41a7 · see in the full table