Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002¶
(2002). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. United States Government Publishing.
Cited by¶
8 citations across 8 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Certification
- The hard-won lessons of auditor-independence reform — that the certifier's incentive must not depend on the certifiee's approval — port from financial audit to rating-agency oversight, and onward to any setting where a paid evaluator attests to a paying party, including review and rating systems generally.
This sourceReforms auditor independence (limits on the audited company funding the auditor, mandatory partner rotation), the canonical response to captured attestation where the certifiee pays the certifier.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
SOX supplies the auditor-independence statutes and a directive to study credit-rating-agency conflicts of interest, but not the claim's thesis that this lesson ports to any paid-evaluator or review/rating setting.
“(Sec. 702) Directs the SEC to report to Congress on the role of credit rating agencies in the securities market, including: (1) their role in securities evaluation; (2) impediments to accurate appraisal by credit rating agencies of the resources and risks of issuers of securities; and (3) conflicts of interest in the operation of credit rating agencies and measures to prevent or ameliorate the consequences of such …”
- The hard-won lessons of auditor-independence reform — that the certifier's incentive must not depend on the certifiee's approval — port from financial audit to rating-agency oversight, and onward to any setting where a paid evaluator attests to a paying party, including review and rating systems generally.
- Editorial Independence
- Audit and assurance: external auditors barred from consulting with the auditee, mandatory rotation, and audit committees insulated from management, as under Sarbanes-Oxley and PCAOB regimes.
This sourceEstablishes auditor-independence rules — bars on consulting for audit clients, mandatory partner rotation, and audit committees of independent directors who appoint the auditor.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The CRS summary of Sarbanes-Oxley supplies Sec. 203 audit-partner rotation and Sec. 204 auditor reporting to the audit committee, but shows no bar on consulting and no mandated firm rotation.
“(Sec. 203) Mandates: (1) audit partner rotation on a five-year basis; and (2) auditor reports to audit committees of the issuer.”
- Audit and assurance: external auditors barred from consulting with the auditee, mandatory rotation, and audit committees insulated from management, as under Sarbanes-Oxley and PCAOB regimes.
- Journalistic Objectivity
- Audit and assurance. Auditor independence from the audited firm, rotation requirements, prohibition on non-audit services to audit clients, and oversight inspection of the auditors themselves.
This sourceTitle II codifies auditor independence — prohibition on non-audit services to audit clients, audit-partner rotation, audit-committee pre-approval, and PCAOB oversight of auditors — converting structural distance from the audited firm into a binding constraint.
SupportedVerified against the work's full text
Title II of the Act prohibits an auditor from "performing specified non-audit services contemporaneously with an audit", requires audit-committee pre-approval of permitted non-audit services, and mandates audit-partner rotation on a five-year basis, while Section 104 provides for continuing inspections of registered audit firms. Independence, rotation, the non-audit prohibition, and oversight inspection of auditors are the four elements the sentence lists. The wording relied on is the bill page's summary of the Act rather than the enrolled statutory text.
“Title II: Auditor Independence - Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit an auditor from performing specified non-audit services contemporaneously with an audit (auditor independence).”
- Audit and assurance. Auditor independence from the audited firm, rotation requirements, prohibition on non-audit services to audit clients, and oversight inspection of the auditors themselves.
- Transparency
- T1: Transparency scope versus legitimate secrecy.
This sourceEnacted in response to the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco accounting scandals; mandates CEO/CFO certification of financial statements (§ 302), internal-controls attestation (§ 404), enhanced disclosure of off-balance-sheet transactions, and auditor-independence rules under PCAOB oversight — the principal modern US statute calibrating corporate-disclosure scope against legitimate confidentiality interests.
- T1: Transparency scope versus legitimate secrecy.
Mechanisms¶
- Access Recertification
- Anonymous Reporting
- A useful legal anchor here is the confidential-and-anonymous submission procedure that Sarbanes-Oxley requires of audit committees
This sourceRequires audit committees to establish procedures for receiving, retaining, treating, and accepting confidential anonymous employee concerns about accounting or auditing.
- A useful legal anchor here is the confidential-and-anonymous submission procedure that Sarbanes-Oxley requires of audit committees
- Audit Committee
- This independence is why regulators mandate it: post-Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required listed-company audit committees to be composed of independent directors and to hold direct authority over the external auditor, precisely so assurance would not report to the management it assures.
This source745. (2002). Requires listed-company audit committees to consist solely of independent directors and makes them directly responsible for appointing, compensating, and overseeing the external auditor.
- This independence is why regulators mandate it: post-Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required listed-company audit committees to be composed of independent directors and to hold direct authority over the external auditor, precisely so assurance would not report to the management it assures.
- Compliance Signoff
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 3 of 8 citations: 1 supported, 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Was it audited? Yes. A second, independent pass read the citation against the article text and recorded a verdict.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 4 other ways.
- https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-107publ204 ×1
- https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-107publ204/html/PLAW-107publ204.htm ×1
- https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-107publ204/pdf/PLAW-107publ204.pdf ×1
- https://www.govinfo.gov/link/plaw/107/public/204 ×1
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