Market Provision of Broadcasting

Anderson, S. P., & Coate, S. (2005). Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis. Review of Economic Studies, 947-972.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2005

Pages

947-972

ISSN

0034-6527

DOI

10.1111/0034-6527.00357

DOI registrant

Oxford University Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00357

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Demand
  • (set the copay too high in an elastic region and patients forgo needed care), and attention markets, where reader time is the priced quantity and a feed's ad load is a movement along the demand-for-content curve.

    This sourceMedia-economics model in which viewer attention is the scarce quantity and advertising load is set against viewers' nuisance cost — the demand-for-content / ad-load trade in an attention market.

    Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

    Supports only the attention-market half: ad levels are set against viewers' nuisance cost, but the abstract says nothing of copays, elasticity of demand for care, or a demand-for-content curve.

    “Equilibrium advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programmes, and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers.”

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

Verification

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Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

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Registry ID ref:1a9f02109871 · see in the full table