The Embodied Mind¶
Varela, F. J., Thompson, & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Autopoiesis
- Critics argue the criterion is too strict (excluding viruses) or too loose (applying to too much); the frame's value lies in forcing those debates into explicit structural terms.
This sourceFoundational text of enactive cognitive science, grounding cognition in the autopoietic organization of the embodied agent and developing structural coupling as the basis of sense-making
- Critics argue the criterion is too strict (excluding viruses) or too loose (applying to too much); the frame's value lies in forcing those debates into explicit structural terms.
- Phenomenology
- Varela's neurophenomenology and enactivism offer middle ground: consciousness arises from dynamical brain-body-world coupling, not pure computation.
This sourceFoundational text of enactive cognitive science, grounding cognition in the autopoietic organization of the embodied agent and developing structural coupling as the basis of sense-making.
- Varela's neurophenomenology and enactivism offer middle ground: consciousness arises from dynamical brain-body-world coupling, not pure computation.
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