Physicalism, or Something Near Enough¶
Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Downward Causation
- Kim argued mental causation faces exclusion unless mental events reduce to or identify with physical events.
This sourceExtends the exclusion argument and the near-enough physicalism strategy; supports D19-078 (mental causation faces exclusion unless mental events reduce to or identify with physical events).
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Kim's 2005 book description confirms he reformulates the exclusion argument and that physicalists face reductionism or epiphenomenalism; it does not speak of downward causation or of 'identify with'.
“This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent).”
- Kim argued mental causation faces exclusion unless mental events reduce to or identify with physical events.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Registry ID ref:1cc23f7b8f64 · see in the full table