Informational Equilibrium.

Riley, J. G. (1979). Informational Equilibrium. Econometrica, 331-359.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1979

Pages

331-359

DOI

10.2307/1912649 did not resolve

DOI registrant

registered by a platform that did not publish the work; the publisher is not recorded

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1912649

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Screening

  • This sourceFramework for equilibrium analysis in signaling games; addresses equilibrium existence and uniqueness under information asymmetry.

• Signaling
  • Riley's (1979)

    This sourceFramework for equilibrium analysis in signaling games; addresses equilibrium existence and uniqueness under information asymmetry.

Verification

Does it exist? Not confirmed. The DOI recorded for this work did not resolve when it was last checked, so it is shown above but not linked. The citation may still be sound; the recorded identifier is not. Flagged for repair.

Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.

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Registry ID ref:1dc57d6cc261 · see in the full table