Informational Equilibrium.

Riley, J. G. (1979). Informational Equilibrium. Econometrica.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1979

DOI

10.2307/1912649

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1912649

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Screening

  • This sourceFramework for equilibrium analysis in signaling games; addresses equilibrium existence and uniqueness under information asymmetry.

• Signaling
  • Refinements — Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion (1987) and Banks-Sobel D1 criterion (1987) — address the multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games and select the most "reasonable" separating equilibrium under plausible beliefs about off-path behavior. Riley's (1979)

    This sourceFramework for equilibrium analysis in signaling games; addresses equilibrium existence and uniqueness under information asymmetry.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:1dc57d6cc261 · see in the full table