Manipulation of Voting Schemes

Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica, 41(4), 587-601.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1973

Volume

41

Issue

4

Pages

587-601

DOI

10.2307/1914083

DOI registrant

JSTOR

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

5 citations across 5 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • The revelation principle, formalized by Myerson (1979) and Gibbard (1973)

    This sourceProves that every non-dictatorial voting rule with three or more alternatives is manipulable; foundational impossibility result connecting voting-rule design to strategic incentives faced by voters.

• Mechanism Design
  • Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard 1973

    This sourceProves that every non-dictatorial voting rule with three or more alternatives is manipulable; foundational impossibility result connecting voting-rule design to strategic incentives faced by voters.

• Social Choice
  • It carries the Gibbard–Satterthwaite strategyproofness result, transferring to mechanism design (auctions circumvent it via single-dimensional types) and to multi-judge decision-making (judges' incentives to vote strategically given the rule).

    Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

    The abstract states Gibbard's manipulation result for non-dictatorial schemes with three or more outcomes, but says nothing about auctions' single-dimensional types or multi-judge strategic voting.

    “I SHALL PROVE in this paper that any non-dictatorial scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation.”

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

Domain-specific

• Dominated Strategy
  • Auction theory — certifying that bidding one's true valuation weakly dominates every other bid in the Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auction. Mechanism design — the gold-standard target, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), under which truthful reporting is optimal for each participant regardless of others' beliefs, types, or strategies. Voting theory — the object of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which characterizes when truthful voting can be dominant and proves no non-dictatorial rule makes it always so.

    This sourceGibbard’s theorem that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to manipulation, so honest voting is not always a dominant strategy.

    Supported in partVerified against the source

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

• Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
  • If \(f\) is onto and truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for every voter, then \(f\) is dictatorial: there is one fixed voter whose top-ranked alternative is always selected.

Verification

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