Manipulation of Voting Schemes

Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica, 41(4), 587-601.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1973

DOI

10.2307/1914083

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

4 citations across 4 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • This matters especially in distributed or private-information settings, where no central authority can verify each agent's type or action. The revelation principle, formalized by Myerson (1979) and Gibbard (1973)

    This sourceProves that every non-dictatorial voting rule with three or more alternatives is manipulable; foundational impossibility result connecting voting-rule design to strategic incentives faced by voters.

• Mechanism Design
  • The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem proves that for bilateral trade with private values, no mechanism can be simultaneously efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and Bayesian incentive-compatible. Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard 1973

    This sourceProves that every non-dictatorial voting rule with three or more alternatives is manipulable; foundational impossibility result connecting voting-rule design to strategic incentives faced by voters.

• Social Choice
  • It carries the Gibbard–Satterthwaite strategyproofness result, transferring to mechanism design (auctions circumvent it via single-dimensional types) and to multi-judge decision-making (judges' incentives to vote strategically given the rule).

Domain-specific

• Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
  • If \(f\) is onto and truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for every voter, then \(f\) is dictatorial: there is one fixed voter whose top-ranked alternative is always selected.

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