The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments

Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments. Acta Psychologica, 6918(80), 211-233.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1980

DOI

10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

• Base Rate
  • Tversky and Kahneman documented judgments that insufficiently respond to prior probabilities, and Bar-Hillel analyzed conditions under which people attend to or ignore base-rate information.

Mechanisms

• Likelihood-Ratio Frame
  • Its strength is that it dissolves the most stubborn error in the whole archetype — the base rate fallacy, in which a strong-looking test result is read as a strong-looking diagnosis while the prevalence is ignored

    This sourceDescribes the base-rate fallacy as overweighting case-specific diagnostic information while neglecting relevant base rates.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:1fb9966f2cff · see in the full table