Executive Equity Incentive Plans¶
Liu, B., Zhang, N., Chan, K. C., Chen, Y., & Qiu, X. (2024). Executive Equity Incentive Plans: Effective Golden Handcuffs?. International Review of Economics & Finance, 83-97.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Mechanisms¶
- Vesting Schedule
- The design protects the company's long-term interest — it wants builders who stay through the hard middle, not people who collect equity and leave — and it protects hers, because the growing unvested portion is a standing reason to see the work through rather than chase the next shiny offer.
This sourceFinds that unvested equity can align long-term company interests and create a continuing retention incentive.
- The design protects the company's long-term interest — it wants builders who stay through the hard middle, not people who collect equity and leave — and it protects hers, because the growing unvested portion is a standing reason to see the work through rather than chase the next shiny offer.
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.
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Registry ID ref:206c6fa429a2 · see in the full table