Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes.¶
Hurwicz, L. (1960). Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes. Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Incentive Compatibility
- Leonid Hurwicz (1960
This sourceThe founding statement of the informational-efficiency problem in decentralized-allocation design. (Often mis-cited as a standalone paper; it is a chapter in the Arrow-Karlin-Suppes volume.).
- Leonid Hurwicz (1960
- Mechanism Design
- Mechanism Design inverts standard game theory: (1) rather than taking a game's rules as given and predicting how strategic agents will play, (2) the designer starts with a desired outcome — efficient allocation, revenue maximization, truthful information aggregation, fair matching — and (3) searches the space of possible rule structures for a game whose equilibrium implements that outcome (4) given participants' private information and self-interest, without relying on external enforcement beyond the rules themselves.
This sourceThe founding statement of the informational-efficiency problem in decentralized-allocation design. (Often mis-cited as a standalone paper; it is a chapter in the Arrow-Karlin-Suppes volume.).
- Mechanism Design inverts standard game theory: (1) rather than taking a game's rules as given and predicting how strategic agents will play, (2) the designer starts with a desired outcome — efficient allocation, revenue maximization, truthful information aggregation, fair matching — and (3) searches the space of possible rule structures for a game whose equilibrium implements that outcome (4) given participants' private information and self-interest, without relying on external enforcement beyond the rules themselves.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:2084828c4748 · see in the full table