Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes.¶
Hurwicz, L. (1960). Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes. Mathematical methods in the social sciences, 1959.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Incentive Compatibility
- Leonid Hurwicz (1960
This sourceThe founding statement of the informational-efficiency problem in decentralized-allocation design. (Often mis-cited as a standalone paper; it is a chapter in the Arrow-Karlin-Suppes volume.).
- Leonid Hurwicz (1960
- Mechanism Design
- Mechanism Design inverts standard game theory: (1) rather than taking a game's rules as given and predicting how strategic agents will play, (2) the designer starts with a desired outcome — efficient allocation, revenue maximization, truthful information aggregation, fair matching — and (3) searches the space of possible rule structures for a game whose equilibrium implements that outcome (4) given participants' private information and self-interest, without relying on external enforcement beyond the rules themselves.
This sourceThe founding statement of the informational-efficiency problem in decentralized-allocation design. (Often mis-cited as a standalone paper; it is a chapter in the Arrow-Karlin-Suppes volume.).
- Mechanism Design inverts standard game theory: (1) rather than taking a game's rules as given and predicting how strategic agents will play, (2) the designer starts with a desired outcome — efficient allocation, revenue maximization, truthful information aggregation, fair matching — and (3) searches the space of possible rule structures for a game whose equilibrium implements that outcome (4) given participants' private information and self-interest, without relying on external enforcement beyond the rules themselves.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
Was it audited? Yes. A second, independent pass read the citation against the article text and recorded a verdict.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:2084828c4748 · see in the full table