An Introduction to Auction Theory¶
Menezes, F. M., & Monteiro, P. K. (2005). An Introduction to Auction Theory. Oxford University Press.
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Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- In second-price auctions the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid; in Dutch auctions the price descends and the first bidder to accept wins at that price; in combinatorial auctions winners are determined by solving an optimization over packages, as Menezes and Monteiro (2005) systematize in their Introduction to Auction Theory.
This sourceTreats allocation rule, payment rule, and information structure as independent design dimensions.
- In second-price auctions the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid; in Dutch auctions the price descends and the first bidder to accept wins at that price; in combinatorial auctions winners are determined by solving an optimization over packages, as Menezes and Monteiro (2005) systematize in their Introduction to Auction Theory.
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