Authority and communication in organizations

Dessein, W. (2002). Authority and communication in organizations. Review of Economic Studies, 69(4), 811-838.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2002

DOI

10.1111/1467-937x.00227

Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00227

Cited from

military_strategic_studies

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Authority Delegation Under Uncertainty
  • Authority Delegation Under Uncertainty presupposes authority and asks a subsequent question: "When you do not know what decisions will be needed, how do you pre-position that authority to enable rapid action?" — the very question Dessein (2002) examines when showing that a principal who cannot communicate every contingency strictly prefers to delegate decision rights to a better-informed but partially-misaligned agent.

    This sourceShows formally that when a principal cannot communicate every contingency to a better-informed, partially-misaligned agent, delegating decision rights dominates retaining authority

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