Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading.

Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983). Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 0531(83), 265-281.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1983

DOI

10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • showed that no mechanism is simultaneously efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and BIC under bilateral trade with private values — and efficient allocations may be unimplementable if truth-telling is not IC.

    This sourceEstablished the canonical impossibility result that no mechanism is simultaneously efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and Bayesian incentive-compatible under bilateral trade with private values.

• Mechanism Design
  • Mechanism design reveals what is possible and what is impossible — both directions matter.

    This sourceEstablished the canonical impossibility result that no mechanism is simultaneously efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and Bayesian incentive-compatible under bilateral trade with private values.

• Pareto Efficiency
  • Mechanism design — Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms achieve Pareto efficiency under private-valuation assumptions; Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983)

    This sourceEstablished the canonical impossibility result that no mechanism is simultaneously efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and Bayesian incentive-compatible under bilateral trade with private values.

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