Does Oil Hinder Democracy?

Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy?. World Politics, 53(3), 325-361.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2001

DOI

10.1353/wp.2001.0011

Link

https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0011

Cited from

economics_finance, political_science

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Severed Accountability Via Unearned Revenue
  • In petro-states and resource-rich autocracies, the resource-curse literature describes states funded by oil or mineral rents independent of broad citizen consent, weakening the coupling between government performance and revenue, with predictable downstream effects: lower bureaucratic capacity, weaker public goods, higher corruption.

    This sourceEmpirical evidence that resource (especially oil) rents weaken the fiscal link between government and citizens, lowering accountability and bureaucratic capacity and sustaining authoritarianism — the rentier-state mechanism.

• Unearned Windfall Mechanism Atrophy
  • The coupling between revenue and performance is the historical mechanism: a state that must tax a productive base to fund itself is forced to bargain with its constituents, who demand accountability in exchange for taxes — "no taxation without representation" runs in reverse as "representation because of taxation."

    This sourceArgues resource revenue lets states fund themselves without taxing constituents, weakening the taxation-accountability bargain (the rentier-state mechanism).

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