Why Nations Fail¶
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Culture Lag
- Historical-institutional economics (North, Acemoglu) uses lag-like analysis: formal institutional change (new laws) does not automatically produce matching informal-norm change, leaving transition economies in extended lag where formal and informal institutions contradict
This sourceArgues prosperity turns on inclusive vs extractive institutions. Loosely supports 'institutions matter and change unevenly,' but does NOT specifically establish the cited claim that formal institutional change fails to produce matching informal-norm change, leaving transition economies in extended formal/informal lag (that is North's framing). Citation real; see prose-overreach flag.
- Historical-institutional economics (North, Acemoglu) uses lag-like analysis: formal institutional change (new laws) does not automatically produce matching informal-norm change, leaving transition economies in extended lag where formal and informal institutions contradict
- Governance
- Lowering the activation energy for participation often requires raising the entropy of decision-making; concentrating authority for speed often sacrifices legitimacy, a recurrent fault line that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) trace across centuries of inclusive and extractive institutional designs.
This sourceArgues that the divergence between prosperous and impoverished societies turns on whether political and economic institutions are inclusive (binding elites to the same rules as citizens) or extractive (allowing elites to escape rule-bound constraints and capture surplus); supports the centralized-efficiency vs. distributed-legitimacy fault line.
- Lowering the activation energy for participation often requires raising the entropy of decision-making; concentrating authority for speed often sacrifices legitimacy, a recurrent fault line that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) trace across centuries of inclusive and extractive institutional designs.
- No One Is Above the Rules
- Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) place the dynamic at the center of their account of why nations fail: extractive institutions enable elites to escape rule-bound constraints and channel resources to themselves, while inclusive institutions bind elites to the same legal regime as ordinary citizens.
This sourceArgues that the divergence between prosperous and impoverished societies turns on whether political and economic institutions are inclusive (binding elites to the same rules as citizens) or extractive (allowing elites to escape rule-bound constraints and capture surplus).
- Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) place the dynamic at the center of their account of why nations fail: extractive institutions enable elites to escape rule-bound constraints and channel resources to themselves, while inclusive institutions bind elites to the same legal regime as ordinary citizens.
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