Who's Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?¶
Curry. (2006). Who's Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Domain-specific¶
- Naturalistic Fallacy
- The fallacy is distinct from, but frequently conflated with, two related theses: Hume's is-ought gap — the logical claim that no set of purely descriptive premises can entail a normative conclusion — and the appeal to nature informal fallacy — the everyday move of inferring that what is natural is good or what is unnatural is wrong
This sourceA review of several versions of the naturalistic fallacy arguing that none of them blocks an updated, evolutionary Humean ethical naturalism.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
“This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that none of them present an obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical naturalism.”
- The fallacy is distinct from, but frequently conflated with, two related theses: Hume's is-ought gap — the logical claim that no set of purely descriptive premises can entail a normative conclusion — and the appeal to nature informal fallacy — the everyday move of inferring that what is natural is good or what is unnatural is wrong
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